The Manufactured Mandate: When the EC Works for the Government, Not the Constitution
Summary
The Election Commission of India (ECI), a cornerstone of Indian democracy, is facing a severe crisis of public trust driven by controversial administrative actions and legislative changes. This crisis undermines the fairness of the electoral process through three main avenues:
1. Administrative Overreach and Exclusion: The Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, challenged in the Supreme Court, is criticized as an illegal, non-statutory en masse exercise (violating Section 21(3) of ROPA, 1950) that places an unreasonable burden of proof on citizens. The deletion of an estimated 65 lakh voters in Bihar and detailed allegations of "Vote Theft" (including claims of 25 lakh fake voters in Haryana and one lakh 'stolen' votes in Mahadevpura) have been dismissed by the ECI without releasing key technical evidence (like IP addresses), fueling a narrative of systemic fraud.
2. Erosion of Independence and Accountability: The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners Act, 2023, fundamentally compromised the ECI's autonomy. It replaced the Supreme Court-mandated selection committee with one dominated by the Executive (PM + Union Cabinet Minister + LoP), ensuring the appointment of politically favourable candidates. Furthermore, Section 16 of the Act grants ECI members near-absolute immunity from civil or criminal proceedings for official acts, effectively shielding them from post-retirement accountability.
3. Destruction of Evidence and Financial Inequity: The ECI directed that all CCTV/webcasting footage be destroyed after 45 days, precisely the deadline for filing an Election Petition (EP). This pre-emptive destruction of "unimpeachable evidence" severely cripples judicial review. Concurrently, the Supreme Court's failure to order the recovery of the proceeds from the unconstitutional Electoral Bond Scheme has allowed the ruling party to retain an unconstitutional war chest of over ₹16,518 crore (with the largest beneficiary receiving approximately 70%), institutionalizing massive financial disparity in the electoral contest.
These combined actions transform the ECI from an independent guardian of democracy into an institution widely perceived as being subservient to the ruling establishment, thereby endangering the integrity and fairness of Indian elections.
The Election Commission of India (ECI), a constitutional bulwark created to ensure free and fair elections, is embroiled in an unprecedented crisis of trust. This crisis is not fueled by mere political rhetoric but by a confluence of controversial administrative actions and legislative changes that collectively undermine the ECI's independence, transparency, and neutrality. The result is a profound threat to the core democratic principle: that the loser must believe the process was fair.
The ECI was established on January 25, 1950, under Article 324 of the Constitution of India. Its fundamental mandate is the "superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of the electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections" to the Parliament and State Legislatures.
Historically, the ECI has piloted major reforms to strengthen democracy, driven by judicial, legislative, and ECI initiative:
1988 (61st Amendment): Reduced the voting age from 21 to 18.
1989: Empowered the ECI to countermand elections due to booth capturing (Section 58A, Representation of the People Act, 1951 (ROPA)).
1993: Introduced Electors Photo Identity Cards (EPIC) to curb impersonation.
2003: Mandated disclosure of criminal antecedents of candidates (following a Supreme Court order).
2019: Full implementation of Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) to confirm EVM votes
These efforts built public confidence. However, recent developments—particularly the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) and a new law governing ECI appointments—signal a dangerous retreat into opacity and executive subservience.
The Special Intensive Revision (SIR), a deep, document-intensive audit of electoral rolls, is the central administrative controversy. Unlike the routine Summary Revision (SR), SIR forces citizens to re-establish their constitutional right to vote, placing an unreasonable burden of proof upon them.
The Core Objections and the Supreme Court Challenge
Multiple petitions, including those from opposition parties and NGOs like the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), have been consolidated before the Supreme Court, challenging the SIR's very legality and methodology in states like Bihar, Kerala, and West Bengal.
Legal Challenge | Petitioner's Argument | ECI's Stance/Judicial Concern |
En Masse Jurisdiction | Senior Advocate A. M. Singhvi argued that the ECI's power under Section 21(3) of ROPA, 1950, is limited to a "constituency or part of a constituency," not an en masse, state-wide exercise. This constitutes an overreach of statutory power, where Article 324 (plenary power) cannot plug the gaps in ROPA. | The ECI defends SIR as "constitutionally mandated" to ensure purity of rolls due to migration. The SC is actively testing whether the ECI is treating electors as 'presumptive guests,' shifting the burden unfairly. |
SIR as Indirect NRC | Petitioners argue SIR acts as a de facto National Register of Citizens (NRC), forcing citizens to prove citizenship using stringent, multiple documents (Passport, Birth Certificate, Parents' records, etc.). The ECI lacks constitutional authority to determine citizenship. | The ECI claims it only verifies eligibility under Article 326 and Section 16 of ROPA. However, the strict document requirements and the threat of deletion have been criticized as leading to structural disenfranchisement. |
Mass Disenfranchisement (Bihar) | In Bihar, critics allege around 65 lakh voters were deleted in the name of correction. The process was rushed, the criteria opaque, and the ECI refused to use its own software to clean the rolls, allowing the mass deletion to stand and allegedly influencing the election outcome. | The SC has had to order the ECI to publish details of the deleted names and the reasons, highlighting the ECI's initial lack of transparency. Advocates noted the SIR failed to weed out many duplicate names that were pointed out to the court. |
The unilateral imposition of SIR, particularly in opposition-ruled states like West Bengal and Kerala, is seen as a targeted political exercise to "rob the election" by selectively purging votes from demographic groups or regions perceived as anti-incumbency, thereby manufacturing a favourable electoral result.
The controversy escalated dramatically with the Leader of the Opposition, Rahul Gandhi, leveling direct accusations of a "Vote Chori" (vote theft) operation conducted through a centralized software system.
Key Revelations (Mahadevpura, Aland, and Haryana)
Location/Event | Allegation Detail | Implication for ECI Credibility |
Mahadevapura (Karnataka) | Claimed at least one lakh votes were 'stolen' in the 2024 polls using manipulative practices. | Suggested that manipulation was systematic and widespread, not isolated. |
Aland (Karnataka) & Rajura (Maharashtra) | Presented "100 per cent proof" of "targeted deletion" of voters, primarily from communities opposed to the ruling party (Dalits, Adivasis, Minorities, OBCs). | Accused a centralized software/call-center operation of picking the 'Serial number-1' voter in a booth to apply for mass deletions without their knowledge (e.g., Suryakant deleting 12 names in 14 minutes), proving it was automated and malicious. |
Haryana Assembly Elections | Claimed the election was a "theft" orchestrated by "Operation Sarkar Chori" which allegedly created 25 lakh fake voters and involved the registration of the same voter in multiple states. | Directly accused the ECI of being in partnership with the Prime Minister and Home Minister to "destroy Indian democracy," asserting that the massive fraud happened at the state and national level. |
Attack on CEC | Accused Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) Gyanesh Kumar of "protecting" the culprits by refusing to share technical evidence (IP addresses, OTP trails, device ports) with the Karnataka CID, which wrote 18 letters over 18 months for the data. | This refusal is cited as the strongest evidence of collusion and institutional cover-up, confirming the ECI's role as a silent accomplice in subverting the process. |
The ECI has simply dismissed these specific, detailed, and documented allegations as "incorrect and baseless," without releasing the technical data requested by law enforcement, thus ensuring the allegations remain unresolved and the trust deficit grows.
The crisis of trust is fundamentally rooted in the legislative changes that have compromised the ECI's independence and accountability.
The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners Act, 2023
This Act, passed in 2023, significantly alters the selection and protection of ECI members:
1. Selection by Executive Dominance: The Act replaced the Supreme Court-mandated selection committee (PM + CJI + LoP) with a government-dominated one: PM + Union Cabinet Minister + LoP. This move ensures that the ruling party can appoint Commissioners who are politically favourable, making the ECI a "legislative hostage" of the executive.
2. Protection and Accountability (Section 16): The inclusion of a clause (Section 16) protecting the CEC and ECs from civil or criminal proceedings for acts done in their official capacity is viewed as a deliberate attempt to "protect their misdeeds." This provision, combined with executive-led appointments, virtually guarantees immunity, eliminating the threat of post-retirement judicial scrutiny for controversial decisions like the SIR or selective application of the Model Code of Conduct. The consequence is a destruction of accountability and an encouragement for officials to prioritize the executive's interests over the Constitution's.
The ECI has taken administrative steps to actively remove evidence of malpractices, further fueling suspicion:
Destruction of CCTV Footage: The ECI issued a directive that all CCTV/webcasting footage of polling and counting be destroyed after 45 days, coinciding exactly with the statutory deadline for filing an Election Petition (EP) under Section 81 of ROPA, 1951.
Sabotaging Judicial Review: By ordering the pre-emptive destruction of "unimpeachable evidence" on the very day the filing deadline expires, the ECI virtually eliminates the possibility of discovering new grounds or substantiating existing claims for an EP. This renders judicial scrutiny of the electoral process ineffective, making the court reliant on potentially manipulated paper records rather than objective video proof.
The Privacy Pretext: The ECI justifies this by citing voter privacy (Section 128, ROPA) and the need to curb "misinformation." Critics argue this is a "disproportionate and extreme response," sacrificing electoral integrity at the altar of speculative risk. As Rahul Gandhi remarked, "The one who was supposed to provide answers - is the one deleting the evidence... It is clear that the match is fixed."
The Supreme Court's landmark judgment on February 15, 2024, declaring the Electoral Bond (EB) Scheme unconstitutional for violating the voter's right to information (Article 19(1)(a)) stands as a clear victory for transparency, but its failure to act on the proceeds created a partial order with permanent, damaging consequences.
Unjust Enrichment: The ruling BJP cornered approximately 70% of the over ₹16,518 crore collected via the unconstitutional scheme. The Supreme Court, while striking down the scheme, failed to order the recovery or forfeiture of these proceeds, allowing the major beneficiary to retain a massive, unconstitutional war chest.
Institutionalizing Financial Theft: This non-action ensures the institutionalization of financial disparity. The huge, ill-gotten funds are now legally retained and used to disproportionately influence every subsequent election, making it virtually impossible for opposition parties to compete on a level playing field.
ECI's Complicity: The ECI's failure to proactively act—to either object to the unconstitutional scheme while it was in force or to advocate for remedial action (like recovery of proceeds) after it was struck down—reinforces the perception that it is unwilling to enforce a fair ground for all political parties when it conflicts with the interests of the ruling establishment.
Conclusion: The Retreat from Transparency
The ECI's trust crisis is a direct consequence of its retreat from its core constitutional mandate. The implementation of the exclusionary SIR, the refusal to respond to detailed allegations of "vote theft" by sharing evidence, the destruction of election footage, and the legislative protection afforded to its members paint a picture of an institution that is no longer an impartial guardian but is perceived as colluding with the government to "manufacture" electoral results. The parliamentary discussion, which the government only agreed to after evasion, will remain a hollow exercise unless the ECI corrects its course, releases the technical data, and submits to genuine, independent accountability. The integrity of Indian democracy now hinges on the ECI's immediate and demonstrated commitment to its original, unimpeachable objective: free and fair elections for every citizen.
References and Sources
1. The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023. (Specifically, Section 16 for Immunity and the composition of the Selection Committee in the full text.)
2. The Representation of the People Act, 1950 (ROPA). (Section 21(3) for legal limits on electoral roll revision.)
3. The Representation of the People Act, 1951 (ROPA). (Section 81 for the 45-day deadline for filing an Election Petition.)
4. The Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. (Rule 93 Amendment, December 2024, regarding restriction of public access to electronic records.)
5. Supreme Court of India Judgment, February 15, 2024 (Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India) on the Electoral Bond Scheme.
Note: Figures on the total value of Electoral Bonds (≈ ₹16,518 crore) and the percentage received by the largest beneficiary (≈ 70%) are derived from data released by the State Bank of India (SBI) following the SC order.
6. ECI Circulars/Directives (May 2025): Directives mandating the destruction of CCTV/webcasting footage after 45 days.
7. Reports by Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) and other NGOs on the methodology and outcomes of the Special Intensive Revision (SIR).
8. Statements and Allegations by Opposition Leaders (Rahul Gandhi) regarding specific voter deletion and fraud cases (Mahadevpura, Aland, Haryana).
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