Is Sanchar Saathi the Beginning of State-Controlled Surveillance in India?
Abstract
The recent directive by India’s Department of Telecommunications (DoT) mandating the pre-installation of the Sanchar Saathi app on all mobile devices has triggered intense debate over state surveillance, digital rights, and constitutional privacy guarantees. Although Telecom Minister Jyotiraditya Scindia stated that the app is “optional and can be deleted,” the DoT notification requires manufacturers to pre-install the app in a manner where its functions cannot be disabled — a stipulation that contradicts the minister’s public reassurance. This blog critically examines the political, legal, and technological implications of the mandate, compares it to global practices, and evaluates concerns raised by opposition parties, civil liberties groups, and cybersecurity experts. Placed within the context of India’s expanding digital governance apparatus and earlier controversies like Pegasus spyware, this analysis explores whether Sanchar Saathi represents a legitimate public security mechanism — or a step toward centralized digital monitoring, suppression of dissent, and erosion of the constitutional right to privacy affirmed by the Supreme Court in Puttaswamy (2017).
Sanchar Saathi Optional, Can Be Deleted: Scindia Clears the Air — Or Does He?
A Critical Examination of Mandatory Surveillance, State Power, and Erosion of Digital Privacy in India
The announcement mandating Sanchar Saathi on all smartphones has become a frontline debate on civil liberties, state power, and the future of privacy in India. While the government insists Sanchar Saathi is a consumer protection tool, critics fear it may evolve into a state surveillance pipeline masked as cybersecurity infrastructure.
Telecom Minister Jyotiraditya Scindia asserted:
“Sanchar Saathi optional, can be deleted.”
However, this reassurance came only after political backlash, and crucially, it contradicts the binding DoT order.
The Notification: What It Says — Not What Is Now Being Claimed
The government’s notification dated 28 November 2025 states:
“Ensure that the Sanchar Saathi mobile application is pre-installed on all mobile handsets manufactured or imported for use in India.”
“Ensure that the functionalities are not disabled or restricted.”
“Push the app through software updates for devices already in sales channels.”
There is no mention of optional usage, user consent, or uninstallability.
Thus, Scindia’s statement appears to be a political response — not a policy reality.
Why This Alarms Citizens, Civil Society, and Opposition Parties
Congress President Mallikarjun Kharge called the move:
“Unilateral, dictatorial, and designed to muzzle citizens.”
Cyber-law experts and privacy advocates argue that the directive undermines the foundational principle of data autonomy — the right to decide what enters your device and what data it may access.
India lacks:
A strong data protection enforcement mechanism
An independent privacy regulator
Judicial oversight requirements for digital surveillance
This creates a vacuum ripe for misuse.
A Chilling Parallel: Democracies vs Authoritarian Models
No democratic nation — including the U.S., U.K., Canada, France, Australia, Japan, or South Korea — forces citizens to accept a permanent government-controlled system application.
By contrast:
China mandates similar apps linked to state monitoring.
Russia requires device-level compliance tools linked to state telecom security law.
North Korea runs Red Flag OS with built-in surveillance.
India’s directive resembles these governments — not liberal democracies.
Sanchar Saathi vs Pegasus: A Different Tool, Same Potential?
Parameter | Sanchar Saathi | Pegasus |
Visibility | Public app | Covert spyware |
Consent Model | Claimed optional; enforcement contradicts | No consent |
Access Scope | May expand through updates | Full takeover |
Legal Cover | Government mandate | Secret state use |
Risk | Future escalation to surveillance infrastructure | Immediate espionage |
Pegasus operated in the shadows — Sanchar Saathi threatens to normalize surveillance in plain sight.
Political Power Meets Technology
India’s recent history shows state digital tools often expand beyond their original stated purpose:
Government Tool | Initial Purpose | Later Criticism |
Welfare delivery | Covert tracking ecosystem | |
Crime database | Surveillance without warrants | |
Pegasus (alleged) | National security | Used against journalists & opposition |
Sanchar Saathi could be the next step enabling monitoring of:
Journalists
Opposition leaders
Judges
Civil servants
Corporate dissidents
Social and political activists
Even ruling party detractors
Once infrastructure exists — intent can change with power.
Security Without Consent Is Control
Fraud prevention is legitimate.
State surveillance is not.
If the app truly protects citizens, users would install it voluntarily.
The mandatory model exposes the real problem:
The government is not asking — it is embedding itself into every smartphone in the country.
Conclusion: A Turning Point for Indian Democracy
Sanchar Saathi may prove to be either:
A necessary security tool, or
The first normalized layer of digital authoritarianism.
A democracy that watches its citizens stops being a democracy.
The question now is not whether the app can be deleted — but whether citizens are willing to surrender privacy as the price of using a phone.
References
1. Government of India — Department of Telecommunications Notification: Directions under Telecom Cyber Security Rules, issued 28 Nov 2025.
2. Statement by Telecom Minister Jyotiraditya Scindia, Parliament Media Interaction, 1 Dec 2025.
3. Sanchar Saathi Portal Data: Government release (PIB) 01 Dec 2025, 6:36 PM.
4. Mallikarjun Kharge’s public statement opposing the directive, news briefing Dec 2025.
5. Supreme Court of India — Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) vs Union of India, 2017 — Privacy as a Fundamental Right.
6. Citizen Lab Reports on Pegasus Surveillance (2019–2022).
7. International comparisons: U.S. FCC regulation archives, EU GDPR doctrine, and OECD privacy principles.
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