Why Vijay Must Be Allowed to Take Oath and Prove Majority on the Floor of the Tamil Nadu Assembly
-Ramphal Kataria
Abstract
The post-election political developments in Tamil Nadu have triggered one of the gravest constitutional debates in contemporary India regarding the discretionary powers of Governors in a parliamentary democracy. In the present situation, Vijay’s Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) has emerged as the single largest party in the Assembly elections, yet the Governor has allegedly refused to invite him to form the government unless he first demonstrates majority support before taking oath. Such a position raises fundamental constitutional questions regarding the role of Governors, the sanctity of democratic mandates, the limits of gubernatorial discretion, and the protection of federalism under the Indian Constitution.
This essay critically analyses the constitutional, judicial, historical, and political dimensions of the crisis. It argues that the Governor’s refusal to invite Vijay despite the absence of any rival claimant is contrary to established constitutional conventions, Supreme Court precedents, Sarkaria Commission recommendations, Punchhi Commission observations, and democratic morality. The essay situates the Tamil Nadu episode within a broader historical pattern wherein Governors have allegedly acted as political instruments of the Union government in opposition-ruled states.
The study examines key judicial pronouncements including S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006), Jagdambika Pal case (1998), Shivraj Singh Chouhan v. Speaker (2020), Nabam Rebia (2016), and the Karnataka, Maharashtra, Goa, Uttarakhand, Arunachal Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh constitutional crises. It compares the present controversy with historical instances involving A.B. Vajpayee, P.V. Narasimha Rao, B.S. Yediyurappa, H.D. Kumaraswamy, and numerous minority governments that were constitutionally allowed to assume office and later prove majority on the floor of the House.
The essay argues that the Governor’s conduct amounts to a dangerous distortion of constitutional federalism and parliamentary democracy. It also analyses reactions from political parties including the CPI(M), CPI, and DMK leadership, who condemned the Governor’s stance as partisan and unconstitutional. Ultimately, the essay concludes that the Governor’s refusal to swear in Vijay represents a serious assault on democratic norms, public mandate, constitutional morality, and the federal spirit of the Indian Republic.
“A Governor must be an impartial constitutional sentinel, not an agent of political intrigue.”
— Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer
“Constitutional morality is not a natural sentiment. It has to be cultivated.”
— Dr. B.R. Ambedkar
“The essence of democracy lies not merely in elections but in respecting the mandate that emerges from them.”
— Granville Austin
“Federalism is the basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be undermined through political manipulation.”
— Supreme Court of India, S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)
Introduction
The constitutional turbulence unfolding in Tamil Nadu is not merely another post-election disagreement over numbers in the Assembly. It is a defining confrontation between democratic mandate and gubernatorial discretion; between elected legitimacy and unelected authority; between constitutional morality and partisan opportunism.
At the heart of the crisis stands a deeply disturbing constitutional question: Can a Governor refuse to appoint the leader of the single largest party as Chief Minister even when no rival claimant exists, merely because the Governor subjectively doubts the stability of the proposed government?
The answer emerging from constitutional history, Supreme Court precedents, parliamentary conventions, and democratic logic is overwhelmingly clear — no.
Yet Tamil Nadu today stands trapped in precisely such a constitutional confrontation.
The refusal to allow Vijay, leader of Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK), to take oath despite emerging as the principal claimant to power has generated outrage across legal, political, and intellectual circles. The Governor’s insistence that Vijay first prove majority before oath-taking fundamentally reverses the settled constitutional sequence followed in parliamentary democracies.
The constitutional process in India has traditionally been straightforward:
The Governor invites the most viable claimant.
The Chief Minister takes oath.
The majority is tested on the floor of the Assembly.
The Governor in Tamil Nadu, however, appears to have inverted this order.
Such inversion is not a technical procedural issue. It strikes at the very foundation of parliamentary democracy.
As Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer once warned:
“Constitutional offices cannot become instruments of political convenience.”
The controversy has assumed national importance because it revives one of the oldest anxieties in Indian federalism — the misuse of Raj Bhavan as an extension of central political power.
From Kerala to West Bengal, from Maharashtra to Tamil Nadu, from Arunachal Pradesh to Punjab, Governors in recent years have increasingly faced accusations of functioning less like neutral constitutional heads and more like political supervisors.
Tamil Nadu’s political history gives this crisis even deeper significance.
The state has historically defended regional autonomy and federal rights more vigorously than perhaps any other state in India. The Dravidian movement itself emerged from resistance against central domination and cultural homogenization. Consequently, any perceived interference through gubernatorial authority immediately evokes broader fears regarding democratic erosion and federal imbalance.
This controversy therefore extends far beyond Vijay or TVK.
It concerns:
the sanctity of electoral verdicts;
the limits of constitutional discretion;
the future of Indian federalism;
the autonomy of state governments;
and the moral legitimacy of constitutional offices.
The Governor’s conduct becomes even more controversial because there is reportedly no alternative claimant before Raj Bhavan. No rival alliance has demonstrated majority support. No coalition has submitted letters proving numerical superiority. Under ordinary constitutional convention, the absence of a rival claimant strengthens the moral and constitutional claim of the single largest party.
Yet instead of facilitating democratic transition, Raj Bhavan appears to have become the site of constitutional obstruction.
Critics therefore argue that the Governor’s conduct is not an exercise in constitutional caution but a calculated political intervention.
This perception gains strength when viewed against the historical background of Indian politics.
The Indian Republic has repeatedly witnessed situations where minority governments or fragile coalitions were allowed to assume office without prior demonstration of majority.
P.V. Narasimha Rao was invited to form government in 1991 despite lacking a clear majority. Atal Bihari Vajpayee was sworn in as Prime Minister in 1996 despite not having the numbers. B.S. Yediyurappa was invited in Karnataka in 2018 despite obvious numerical disadvantage. Countless state governments across decades were permitted to assume office and later prove majority on the floor.
Why then should Vijay be denied even the constitutional opportunity?
This selective constitutionalism is what fuels allegations of partisanship.
The Supreme Court over the last three decades has repeatedly attempted to restrain such political misuse of constitutional offices. Beginning with the landmark S.R. Bommai judgment in 1994, the judiciary steadily evolved the doctrine that legislative majority must always be determined on the floor of the House and not through gubernatorial speculation.
The Assembly — not Raj Bhavan — is the constitutional theatre where majority is tested.
The Governor is not expected to function as:
a political evaluator,
a stability assessor,
a partisan strategist,
or an ideological gatekeeper.
The Governor’s role is fundamentally transitional and constitutional.
In fact, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that democratic uncertainty must be resolved democratically — not administratively.
The Tamil Nadu crisis therefore raises an uncomfortable but unavoidable question:
Has the office of Governor drifted away from constitutional neutrality into partisan political management?
The reactions from various political formations indicate the seriousness of the issue.
The CPI(M) and CPI condemned the Governor’s conduct as anti-democratic and unconstitutional. Even political rivals such as the DMK reportedly criticized the refusal to invite Vijay, emphasizing that the democratic mandate cannot be subverted through procedural manipulation.
That ideological opponents of Vijay have defended his constitutional right to stake claim only strengthens the gravity of the constitutional concerns involved.
The present crisis also exposes the deeper contradiction within Indian federalism.
India constitutionally describes itself as a “Union of States,” yet the Governor — appointed by the Union government — often becomes the decisive authority during state political crises. This creates structural tension between democratic federalism and central supervision.
The Sarkaria Commission and Punchhi Commission repeatedly warned against this danger. Both commissions emphasized that Governors must remain politically detached and avoid functioning as agents of the Centre.
Unfortunately, constitutional practice has frequently diverged from constitutional ideal.
The Tamil Nadu episode therefore represents not merely a constitutional dispute but a larger democratic anxiety about institutional neutrality in contemporary India.
As constitutional scholar Granville Austin observed:
“The Constitution works only when those entrusted with power respect its spirit.”
The spirit of parliamentary democracy demands that the people’s verdict be respected, not filtered through partisan suspicion.
If Vijay lacks majority, the Assembly will reject him.
That is precisely how parliamentary democracy functions.
But denying him the opportunity even to face the House transforms constitutional discretion into democratic obstruction.
Such a precedent is profoundly dangerous.
If Governors can selectively decide who deserves the opportunity to prove majority, electoral mandates become vulnerable to political interpretation rather than constitutional procedure.
The consequences extend beyond Tamil Nadu.
They affect the future balance between:
elected governments and appointed authorities;
state autonomy and central influence;
democratic mandate and constitutional manipulation.
The controversy therefore deserves rigorous constitutional scrutiny.
This essay seeks to undertake that task through a detailed examination of constitutional provisions, judicial precedents, historical examples, political conventions, and federal principles. It argues that the Governor’s refusal to appoint Vijay is inconsistent with the constitutional ethos of parliamentary democracy and represents a deeply troubling misuse of gubernatorial discretion.
The issue is not whether Vijay ultimately survives a floor test.
The issue is whether democracy itself survives arbitrary constitutional obstruction.
Constitutional Framework Governing Formation of Government
Tamil Nadu once again finds itself at the center of a constitutional storm. The post-election uncertainty arising from a fractured mandate has triggered a fierce debate on the constitutional role of Governors in India’s parliamentary democracy. Vijay’s Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK), having emerged as the single largest party in the Assembly, has laid claim to form the government. Yet, in an unprecedented and controversial move, the Governor has reportedly refused to invite Vijay to take oath unless he first demonstrates majority support.
This stance has provoked outrage across political and constitutional circles. Critics argue that such a demand is constitutionally flawed because the mechanism to establish majority is the floor of the Legislative Assembly — not Raj Bhavan. Constitutional experts, opposition leaders, and even parties ideologically opposed to Vijay have condemned the Governor’s conduct as partisan and politically motivated.
The controversy is not merely about one individual or one political party. It concerns the larger constitutional architecture of India. At stake are the principles of parliamentary democracy, constitutional morality, cooperative federalism, and democratic legitimacy.
The Indian Constitution does not envisage Governors as political supervisors of electoral outcomes. Rather, they are expected to function as neutral constitutional heads. However, history demonstrates repeated allegations that Governors have acted under the influence of the Union government to destabilize opposition-ruled states.
The Tamil Nadu episode must therefore be understood not as an isolated constitutional disagreement but as part of a larger crisis in Indian federalism.
Constitutional Framework Governing Formation of Government
Article 163: Aid and Advice
Article 163 of the Constitution provides that the Governor shall act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers except in matters where the Constitution grants discretion.
However, the Constitution nowhere grants arbitrary discretion to deny a legitimate claimant an opportunity to form government.
The discretionary powers of the Governor are limited and subject to constitutional morality.
Article 164: Appointment of Chief Minister
Article 164(1) states:
“The Chief Minister shall be appointed by the Governor.”
Though the wording appears broad, constitutional conventions developed under the parliamentary system impose limitations on gubernatorial discretion.
The Governor is expected to invite:
1. A pre-poll alliance with majority;
2. The single largest party capable of securing support;
3. A post-poll coalition demonstrating majority;
4. Any formation most likely to command confidence.
Importantly, the Constitution does not require a Chief Minister-designate to prove majority before taking oath.
The majority is tested only after the government is sworn in.
Parliamentary Democracy and the Floor Test Principle
India follows the Westminster parliamentary model where the executive derives legitimacy from legislative confidence.
Therefore:
The Governor cannot become the adjudicator of legislative majority.
Raj Bhavan cannot substitute the Assembly.
Majority must be tested on the floor of the House.
This principle has repeatedly been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court.
The Governor’s Conduct in Tamil Nadu: A Constitutional Aberration
The Governor’s insistence that Vijay prove majority before being sworn in has generated intense criticism because:
1. TVK emerged as the single largest party.
2. No alternative claimant has staked claim.
3. No rival coalition has demonstrated numerical superiority.
4. Constitutional convention supports inviting the largest claimant.
5. Historical precedents overwhelmingly favor oath first and floor test later.
The Governor’s refusal therefore appears not as constitutional caution but political obstruction.
Several observers have alleged that the Governor is acting under pressure from the Union government to prevent Vijay from assuming office.
Such allegations gain strength because similar patterns have emerged in several opposition-ruled states in recent years.
The office of Governor increasingly stands accused of partisan intervention.
Historical Tradition of Minority Governments in India
India’s constitutional history is filled with examples where leaders lacking immediate numerical majority were invited to form governments.
P.V. Narasimha Rao Government (1991)
Following Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination and the 1991 election, Congress emerged short of majority.
President R. Venkataraman invited P.V. Narasimha Rao to form the government.
No prior demonstration of majority was demanded.
Rao later secured support in Parliament.
This became one of India’s most consequential governments, introducing economic liberalization.
If the Governor’s current logic in Tamil Nadu were applied retrospectively, Narasimha Rao may never have become Prime Minister.
Atal Bihari Vajpayee Government (1996)
In 1996, the BJP emerged as the single largest party.
President Shankar Dayal Sharma invited A.B. Vajpayee to form government despite lacking majority.
Vajpayee was sworn in as Prime Minister.
He was granted time to prove majority on the floor.
Unable to secure support, he resigned after 13 days.
No constitutional impropriety was alleged in inviting him.
This precedent directly undermines the Governor’s position in Tamil Nadu.
H.D. Deve Gowda and I.K. Gujral Governments
After Vajpayee’s resignation, the United Front coalition formed government with outside support from Congress.
Again, the constitutional mechanism was:
Oath first;
Floor test later.
Minority Governments in States
Numerous states have witnessed minority governments:
Uttar Pradesh;
Bihar;
Jharkhand;
Karnataka;
Goa;
Delhi.
None were asked to demonstrate majority before swearing-in.
Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Floor Tests and Majority
The constitutional history of India after the decline of one-party dominance is, in many ways, a history of judicial intervention against political misuse of constitutional offices.
Beginning from the late 1960s and intensifying during the coalition era after 1989, Governors repeatedly became central actors in political instability. Raj Bhavans increasingly emerged as controversial arenas where governments were dismissed, alliances engineered, and legislative majorities interpreted through subjective political lenses.
The Supreme Court was therefore compelled, step by step, to evolve constitutional safeguards.
What emerged through these judgments was a clear constitutional doctrine:
The floor of the House — and only the floor of the House — determines majority.
This doctrine did not emerge suddenly.
It evolved through repeated constitutional crises where Governors either dismissed governments, denied opportunities, delayed floor tests, or attempted to influence political outcomes.
The Tamil Nadu controversy must therefore be examined against this long constitutional struggle between democratic legitimacy and gubernatorial discretion.
As Justice Jeevan Reddy observed in the Bommai judgment:
“The proper forum to test majority is the floor of the House, not the subjective assessment of the Governor.”
That principle became the constitutional shield protecting Indian federalism from political arbitrariness.
Yet the Tamil Nadu episode suggests that despite decades of judicial warnings, the temptation to manipulate constitutional offices for political objectives remains deeply entrenched.
The following cases collectively form the constitutional backbone against such gubernatorial overreach.
1. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)
Background
Several state governments were dismissed under Article 356 on grounds that they had lost majority.
Supreme Court Ruling
The Supreme Court held:
Majority must be tested on the floor of the House.
Governors cannot rely on subjective satisfaction.
Federalism is a basic feature of the Constitution.
Article 356 cannot be misused for political purposes.
Relevance to Tamil Nadu
The Bommai judgment established a foundational constitutional doctrine:
Legislative majority belongs to the Assembly, not Raj Bhavan.
Thus, the Governor cannot pre-judge whether Vijay possesses majority.
The Assembly alone can decide.
2. Jagdambika Pal Case (1998)
Background
A constitutional crisis erupted in Uttar Pradesh after competing claims to majority.
Supreme Court Intervention
The Court ordered an immediate floor test.
Significance
This was among the earliest judicial affirmations that constitutional uncertainty must be resolved democratically on the Assembly floor.
3. Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006)
Background
In Bihar, the Assembly was dissolved before any government formation on suspicion of horse-trading.
Supreme Court Ruling
The Court condemned the premature dissolution.
It held:
Constitutional authorities cannot act on political suspicion.
Democratic processes cannot be preempted.
Relevance
The Governor in Tamil Nadu similarly appears to be preempting democratic possibility.
4. Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016)
Background
The Arunachal Pradesh Governor advanced Assembly proceedings without cabinet advice.
Supreme Court Ruling
The Court held:
Governors cannot interfere arbitrarily in legislative functioning.
Discretion is not unlimited.
Importance
The judgment severely restricted gubernatorial overreach.
5. Karnataka Constitutional Crisis (2018)
Political Context
The BJP emerged as the single largest party but lacked majority.
Congress and JD(S) quickly formed a post-poll alliance.
Governor Vajubhai Vala invited B.S. Yediyurappa to form government and granted 15 days for floor test.
Supreme Court Intervention
The Court ordered an immediate floor test.
Yediyurappa resigned before the vote.
Constitutional Significance
Even though BJP lacked majority, the Governor still invited Yediyurappa.
No prior demonstration of majority was demanded.
Thus, denying Vijay even the opportunity to take oath contradicts this precedent.
6. Shivraj Singh Chouhan v. Speaker, Madhya Pradesh Assembly (2020)
Background
The Kamal Nath government faced resignations of MLAs.
Governor Lalji Tandon sought a floor test.
Supreme Court Judgment
The Court reiterated:
Floor test is the ultimate constitutional method.
Democratic legitimacy must be tested in the House.
Relevance
The Governor cannot become the site of majority determination.
7. Maharashtra Government Formation Case (2019)
Background
In a dramatic political development, Devendra Fadnavis was sworn in early morning as Chief Minister.
Supreme Court Order
The Court ordered an expedited floor test.
Principle Established
Judicial insistence on transparency and floor verification became stronger.
8. Uttarakhand Crisis (2016)
Background
The Congress government was dismissed amid claims of lost majority.
High Court and Supreme Court
The judiciary restored democratic process through a floor test.
Significance
The courts consistently favored legislative determination over executive discretion.
Sarkaria Commission Recommendations on Governors
The Sarkaria Commission (1983–1988) examined Centre-State relations extensively.
It recommended:
1. Governors should be politically neutral.
2. They should not function as agents of the Centre.
3. In hung Assemblies, preference should be:
a. Pre-poll alliance;
b. Single largest party with support;
c. Post-poll coalition.
The Governor’s current conduct appears inconsistent with these recommendations.
Punchhi Commission Observations
The Punchhi Commission further emphasized:
Governors must avoid partisan behavior.
Federal balance must be protected.
Raj Bhavan should not become an extension of central politics.
The Tamil Nadu controversy reflects precisely the dangers the Commission warned against.
Constitutional Morality and Democratic Ethics
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar repeatedly warned that constitutional success depends not merely on written provisions but on constitutional morality.
Constitutional morality requires:
Respect for democratic outcomes;
Institutional neutrality;
Non-partisan conduct;
Faith in representative government.
The Governor’s conduct undermines all four.
The refusal to allow Vijay to take oath despite being the principal claimant reflects distrust of the Assembly itself.
This weakens parliamentary democracy.
Why Vijay Must Be Allowed to Take Oath
1. He Is the Single Largest Claimant
In the absence of any rival coalition, constitutional convention supports inviting the largest party.
2. Floor Test Is the Constitutional Mechanism
The Constitution does not mandate pre-swearing proof.
3. Historical Precedents Favor Him
From Vajpayee to Narasimha Rao to Yediyurappa, leaders lacking majority were invited first.
4. Democratic Stability Requires Immediate Government Formation
Prolonged uncertainty damages governance and public confidence.
5. Refusal Encourages Political Manipulation
Delays create opportunities for:
defections;
coercion;
horse-trading;
destabilization.
Ironically, the Governor’s actions may produce the very instability supposedly being prevented.
Political Reactions and Condemnation
The Governor’s stance has reportedly attracted criticism from across ideological lines.
CPI(M) and CPI Reactions
Left parties have condemned the Governor’s conduct as:
unconstitutional;
anti-federal;
politically motivated.
The CPI(M) has historically opposed misuse of gubernatorial authority.
Its criticism reflects wider anxieties regarding democratic backsliding.
DMK and M.K. Stalin
Even political opponents of Vijay reportedly criticized the Governor’s approach.
This is significant.
When rival parties defend democratic procedure despite political competition, it strengthens the legitimacy of constitutional concerns.
The DMK’s condemnation indicates that the issue transcends partisan politics.
Federalism Under Threat
India’s federal structure depends on mutual constitutional respect between the Centre and states.
Governors occupy a sensitive position in this balance.
However, repeated controversies have generated perceptions that Raj Bhavans are increasingly used to:
delay opposition governments;
engineer defections;
destabilize state administrations;
interfere in legislative functioning.
The Tamil Nadu episode reinforces these fears.
If Governors can indefinitely deny oath to legitimate claimants, electoral mandates become meaningless.
This damages the democratic compact between citizens and institutions.
The Politics of Raj Bhavan: Historical Pattern of Controversies
The Tamil Nadu controversy is not isolated.
Several states have experienced similar tensions.
Goa (2017)
Congress emerged as the single largest party.
Governor Mridula Sinha invited the BJP-led coalition because it presented support earlier.
The issue demonstrated how speed and discretion can shape outcomes.
Karnataka (2018)
Governor invited BJP despite lacking majority.
Maharashtra (2019)
A controversial early morning swearing-in triggered national outrage.
Arunachal Pradesh (2016)
Governor interfered in Assembly proceedings.
Uttarakhand (2016)
Central intervention triggered constitutional litigation.
Collectively, these episodes indicate growing mistrust regarding gubernatorial neutrality.
Can the Governor Demand Proof Before Oath?
Constitutionally, the answer appears weak.
There is:
no explicit constitutional provision;
no binding precedent;
no established convention requiring it.
The normal constitutional sequence is:
1. Invitation to form government;
2. Oath-taking;
3. Floor test.
Reversing this order fundamentally alters parliamentary democracy.
The Danger of Constitutional Innovation Without Authority
The Governor’s conduct represents a dangerous constitutional innovation.
If normalized, future Governors may:
indefinitely delay governments;
demand arbitrary proofs;
act selectively against opposition parties.
This would transform Governors from ceremonial heads into political gatekeepers.
The Constitution never intended such concentration of power.
Judicial Review and Possible Remedies
If Vijay approaches the judiciary, several remedies are possible:
1. Direction to Invite the Largest Party
Courts may direct the Governor to allow government formation.
2. Time-Bound Floor Test
The judiciary may order a floor test within 24–48 hours.
3. Protection Against Defections
The Court may supervise the process.
4. Live Telecast of Proceedings
As seen in Karnataka, transparency mechanisms may be used.
Democratic Mandate and Moral Legitimacy
Electoral mandates cannot be interpreted selectively.
If the people have made TVK the largest force in the Assembly, denying its leader the opportunity to govern appears deeply undemocratic.
In parliamentary systems, governments rise and fall on legislative confidence.
The Governor cannot prevent this process merely because majority is uncertain.
Uncertainty is resolved democratically — not administratively.
The Ethical Crisis of Constitutional Offices
The controversy also raises broader ethical concerns.
Constitutional offices survive not merely on legal provisions but on public trust.
When Governors are perceived as partisan actors:
institutional credibility declines;
public faith weakens;
federal tensions intensify.
The constitutional office of Governor was designed to preserve stability, not manufacture crises.
Comparative Perspective: Westminster Democracies
In Westminster systems like:
the United Kingdom;
Canada;
Australia;
New Zealand,
constitutional heads generally invite the largest claimant to attempt government formation.
The legislature then determines survival.
India inherited this convention.
Departing from it without constitutional basis risks institutional instability.
Minority Governments Are Not Constitutional Abnormalities
One of the strongest arguments against the Governor’s conduct lies in India’s own political history.
Minority governments have repeatedly functioned successfully.
Examples include:
P.V. Narasimha Rao;
V.P. Singh;
Chandra Shekhar;
Deve Gowda;
I.K. Gujral;
AAP in Delhi.
Thus, numerical uncertainty cannot justify refusal.
Raj Bhavan Versus the Assembly: Who Decides?
The fundamental constitutional issue is simple:
Who determines majority?
The answer repeatedly given by courts is:
The Legislative Assembly.
Not:
Raj Bhavan;
the Governor;
intelligence reports;
political speculation.
The Governor’s conduct effectively attempts to transfer legislative power into executive discretion.
This is constitutionally unsustainable.
Constitutional Experts on Gubernatorial Neutrality
H.M. Seervai
The eminent constitutional scholar warned against misuse of discretionary powers by Governors.
Granville Austin
Austin described Indian federalism as “cooperative federalism.”
Partisan gubernatorial conduct undermines this cooperation.
Nani Palkhivala
Palkhivala argued that constitutional morality requires restraint from unelected authorities.
M.P. Jain
Jain emphasized that Governors are constitutional heads, not political supervisors.
The Political Psychology Behind Delayed Invitations
Historically, delays in inviting governments often create opportunities for:
defections;
inducements;
fragmentation;
political engineering.
Critics argue that constitutional delays are rarely politically neutral.
The Tamil Nadu episode therefore raises fears of attempted destabilization.
Why the Governor’s Conduct Appears Partisan
Several aspects create perception of bias:
1. No rival claimant exists.
2. Largest party denied opportunity.
3. Historical precedents ignored.
4. Constitutional conventions bypassed.
5. Delay potentially benefits rival political interests.
In constitutional democracies, perception matters enormously.
Even appearance of bias damages institutional legitimacy.
Democratic Consequences of Gubernatorial Overreach
If such practices continue:
elections may lose meaning;
Governors may become political arbiters;
state autonomy may weaken;
federal trust may collapse.
The long-term consequences could be severe.
The Role of Judiciary as Constitutional Sentinel
The judiciary has repeatedly intervened to protect democracy during constitutional crises.
From Bommai to Karnataka to Maharashtra, courts have:
prevented arbitrary dismissals;
ordered floor tests;
restored constitutional balance.
Tamil Nadu may become another crucial constitutional moment.
Media, Public Opinion, and Democratic Pressure
Public scrutiny plays an essential role during constitutional crises.
Media debates, civil society interventions, and academic commentary help preserve constitutional accountability.
The Tamil Nadu controversy has generated widespread discussion because it touches the core of democratic legitimacy.
Constitutional Conventions Matter
Many democratic norms survive not through written law but through convention.
Examples include:
inviting largest claimant;
neutral conduct by constitutional heads;
floor test principle.
Violating conventions repeatedly eventually damages constitutional culture.
Federalism and Tamil Nadu’s Political Identity
Tamil Nadu has historically defended federal autonomy.
From anti-Hindi agitations to opposition against central overreach, the state has cultivated strong regional political consciousness.
Thus, perceived interference through Raj Bhavan is likely to trigger wider political resistance.
The controversy therefore carries emotional, political, and constitutional dimensions.
The Governor’s Oath and Constitutional Duty
Governors swear to:
preserve;
protect;
defend the Constitution.
This requires neutrality.
When constitutional offices appear politically aligned, democratic credibility erodes.
The Governor must function above partisan considerations.
Is the Refusal Constitutionally Sustainable?
Legally, the Governor may attempt to justify caution.
However, constitutional sustainability depends on:
precedent;
convention;
democratic morality;
judicial principles.
On all four counts, the refusal appears weak.
Restoring Constitutional Balance
The solution is straightforward:
1. Invite Vijay to form government.
2. Administer oath.
3. Order floor test within a short period.
4. Allow Assembly to decide.
This approach:
respects democracy;
follows precedent;
preserves neutrality;
protects federalism.
Conclusion
The Tamil Nadu constitutional controversy represents far more than a dispute over government formation. It is a test of India’s democratic maturity, federal integrity, and constitutional morality.
The Governor’s refusal to invite Vijay to form the government despite his emergence as the single largest claimant — and despite the absence of any rival coalition — appears inconsistent with constitutional conventions, judicial precedents, and parliamentary principles developed over decades.
From P.V. Narasimha Rao to A.B. Vajpayee, from Yediyurappa to numerous minority governments across states, India’s constitutional history demonstrates a clear pattern: leaders are sworn in first and tested later on the floor of the House.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that majority cannot be determined in Raj Bhavan. It must be tested in the Assembly.
The Governor’s present approach therefore raises legitimate concerns regarding partisan intervention, federal imbalance, and democratic distortion.
Federalism is not merely an administrative arrangement. It is a constitutional philosophy rooted in respect for regional mandates and democratic choice.
If Governors begin selectively denying opportunities to elected claimants, the office itself risks losing constitutional credibility.
The anger expressed by opposition parties, constitutional scholars, and civil society is therefore not simply political rhetoric. It reflects deeper anxiety about the health of Indian democracy.
The path forward is constitutionally clear.
Vijay should be invited to take oath as Chief Minister.
The Assembly should then decide whether he commands majority.
Anything else risks converting constitutional discretion into political weaponry.
In the final analysis, democracy survives not when institutions favor particular outcomes, but when they faithfully uphold constitutional process.
The floor of the Tamil Nadu Assembly — not the corridors of Raj Bhavan — must determine who governs the state.
References
1. Austin, Granville. The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation. Oxford University Press.
2. Austin, Granville. Working a Democratic Constitution. Oxford University Press.
3. Seervai, H.M. Constitutional Law of India. Universal Law Publishing.
4. Jain, M.P. Indian Constitutional Law. LexisNexis.
5. Palkhivala, Nani. We the Nation. UBS Publishers.
6. Basu, D.D. Introduction to the Constitution of India. LexisNexis.
7. Noorani, A.G. Constitutional Questions in India. Oxford University Press.
8. Kashyap, Subhash C. Our Constitution. National Book Trust.
9. Sarkaria Commission Report on Centre-State Relations.
10. Punchhi Commission Report on Centre-State Relations.
11. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1.
12. Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006) 2 SCC 1.
13. Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016) 8 SCC 1.
14. Shivraj Singh Chouhan v. Speaker, Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly (2020).
15. Jagdambika Pal Case (1998).
16. Anil Kumar Jha v. Union of India.
17. Union of India v. Harish Rawat (Uttarakhand Crisis).
