Epitaph of Non-Alignment: India’s Strategic Drift in the Shadow of the Iran–US–Israel War

A critique of imperial power, civilisational resistance, and the quiet erosion of India’s sovereign foreign policy

-Ramphal Kataria

Abstract

The Iran–US–Israel war, culminating in a fragile two-week truce, marks a watershed in global politics—the most systemically disruptive conflict since World War II. The war has exposed not only the limits of American hegemony but also the enduring resilience of Iran’s ideological state structure. At the same time, it has revealed a profound transformation in India’s foreign policy. Departing from its historic commitment to non-alignment, India appears to have aligned itself with the US–Israel axis, sacrificing strategic autonomy at the altar of geopolitical expediency. This essay interrogates the class character of global power, the imperialist logic underpinning the war, and India’s subordination within this order under Narendra Modi. It argues that India’s current trajectory represents not strategic pragmatism but ideological capitulation, with far-reaching consequences for its sovereignty, regional standing, and historical identity.

Keywords

Imperialism, Non-Alignment, Strategic Autonomy, Iran–US War, Indian Foreign Policy, Marxist Analysis, Global Capitalism, West Asia, Modi Doctrine

I. War, Capital, and the Global Order After 1945

The Iran–US–Israel war must be understood not as an isolated geopolitical rupture but as a manifestation of the contradictions of late-stage global capitalism. Since World War II, wars have largely remained regionally contained, serving as instruments for maintaining spheres of influence. However, this conflict has shattered that containment by directly threatening the arteries of global capital—most notably through Iran’s leverage over the Strait of Hormuz.

By effectively choking a route responsible for nearly one-fifth of global hydrocarbon flows, Iran transformed a regional war into a systemic crisis. Energy markets trembled, global supply chains wavered, and the myth of insulated Western prosperity was momentarily punctured. Iran struck not merely at military targets but at the material base of imperial power.

II. Iran’s Defiance: Resistance Beyond Material Loss

Contrary to the expectations of Donald Trump and his strategic establishment, Iran did not collapse under the weight of bombardment. The assumption that overwhelming force would yield swift capitulation reflects a deeply entrenched imperial arrogance—one that reduces societies to calculable variables while ignoring their ideological and cultural depth.

Even after the symbolic and political blow associated with attacks linked to the legacy of Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran refused to yield. The losses it suffered were not merely infrastructural but profoundly human—leaders, cadres, and civilians. Yet, the Iranian state drew upon the Shia tradition of shahadat, transforming loss into political resolve.

This is where the imperial calculus faltered. The United States, armed with unparalleled war-gaming capabilities, failed to grasp that resistance can be historically embedded and spiritually sustained. The expectation of a short war was not merely misplaced—it was structurally flawed.

III. The Truce: Negotiation as an Admission of Limits

The two-week truce, reluctantly embraced by Benjamin Netanyahu and cautiously accepted by Iran, is less a peace than a pause born of necessity. The most telling aspect of this development is the United States’ willingness to consider Iran’s 10-point proposal, effectively shelving its own 15-point framework.

This reversal is not procedural; it is political. It signifies that even at the height of its coercive power, the United States could not impose unilateral terms. Iran, despite suffering immense losses, has forced a negotiation on relatively equal footing.

This moment reveals a fissure in the structure of imperial dominance. The periphery, when strategically coordinated and ideologically mobilized, can compel the core to negotiate.

IV. India’s Historical Position: From Non-Alignment to Strategic Submission

India’s foreign policy, since independence under Jawaharlal Nehru, was anchored in the doctrine of non-alignment. This was not passive neutrality but an active assertion of sovereignty in a bipolar world. It allowed India to navigate competing blocs while retaining policy independence.

Over time, non-alignment evolved into strategic autonomy, enabling India to engage with diverse powers without subordination. This framework was not merely diplomatic; it was civilisational—a reflection of India’s anti-colonial ethos.

However, under Narendra Modi, this legacy appears to have been systematically dismantled. The shift is neither abrupt nor accidental; it is the culmination of a decade-long reorientation. Foreign policy has increasingly been personalized, reduced to optics and symbolism rather than grounded in institutional continuity.

V. Alignment Disguised as Strategy

India’s conduct during the Iran–US–Israel war reveals a clear departure from equidistance. The timing of Modi’s visit to Tel Aviv—just 48 hours before the outbreak of hostilities—was not diplomatically neutral. In international relations, symbolism is substance, and this gesture signalled alignment.

The absence of a strong condemnation following attacks on Iran’s leadership and killing of Ayatollah Khomeini further deepened this perception. Even symbolic acts of condolence were delayed and diluted, reflecting a hesitation rooted not in caution but in political alignment.

Simultaneously, India’s criticism of instability in the Gulf, without addressing the structural causes of the conflict, reinforced the impression that it had internalized the narrative of the US–Israel axis.

This alignment is not merely geopolitical but ideological. The affinity between sections of India’s ruling establishment and the Israeli state reflects a convergence of nationalist projects—each seeking legitimacy through exclusionary narratives.

VI. The Subordination to Imperial Power

The broader context of India’s foreign policy under Modi reveals patterns of subordination to American interests. Trade arrangements perceived as asymmetrical, compliance with directives on energy imports, and visible deference to US strategic priorities indicate a shift from autonomy to alignment.

The role of Donald Trump in shaping these dynamics cannot be overlooked. The oscillation in India’s policy—whether on tariffs, oil imports, or diplomatic positioning—suggests a reactive rather than proactive approach.

This subordination becomes particularly evident during crises. As the war escalated, India appeared less as an independent actor and more as a peripheral observer, its choices constrained by external expectations.

VII. Pakistan’s Strategic Insertion

In stark contrast, Pakistan has managed to position itself as a facilitator in the evolving diplomatic landscape. By maintaining engagement with multiple actors—including the US, Iran, and China—it has occupied a space that India historically claimed.

This development is not merely ironic; it is indicative of a broader shift. A state often marginalized in global discourse has leveraged the crisis to enhance its diplomatic relevance, while India, despite its economic and strategic weight, remains on the margins.

VIII. Operation Sindoor and the Myth of Global Support

The pattern of isolation is further reflected in the context of Operation Sindoor, where India reportedly found limited international backing. Countries such as Turkey, China, and Azerbaijan aligned more closely with Pakistan’s position.

The intervention of Washington in shaping ceasefire outcomes underscores a troubling reality: India’s strategic autonomy has been compromised to the extent that external powers can influence outcomes in its immediate neighbourhood.

IX. The Illusion of Vishva Guru

The dissonance between rhetoric and reality is perhaps most evident in the claim of India as a “Vishva Guru.” If India were indeed a guiding force in global affairs, its role in a crisis of this magnitude would not be peripheral.

The dispatch of parliamentary delegations to multiple countries in the aftermath of diplomatic setbacks during operation sindoor reflects an implicit acknowledgment of this gap. It suggests a reactive attempt to rebuild credibility rather than a confident assertion of influence.

X. Conclusion: The Cost of Abandoning Autonomy

The Iran–US–Israel war has exposed the fault lines of the contemporary global order. It has demonstrated that even in an era of overwhelming military power, resistance remains possible, and negotiation remains necessary.

For India, however, the conflict has revealed a deeper crisis—a crisis of orientation. The abandonment of non-alignment, the erosion of strategic autonomy, and the visible tilt towards a particular bloc have collectively diminished its global standing.

To describe this moment as the writing of an epitaph may appear stark, but it captures a profound truth: the essence of India’s foreign policy—its independence—stands at risk.

The future consequences of this shift will not be immediate, but they will be enduring. In a multipolar world, where power is fluid and alliances transient, the ability to maintain balance is not a luxury; it is a necessity.

India must decide whether it will reclaim this balance or continue along a path where its voice is subsumed within the chorus of greater powers.

Footnotes

1. The World War II (1939–1945) marked the last conflict with truly systemic global impact; subsequent wars, including those in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Ukraine, remained regionally contained despite wider implications.

2. The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints, through which approximately 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption passes, making it central to global economic stability.

3. The doctrine of Non-Alignment was articulated by Jawaharlal Nehru and institutionalized through the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, alongside leaders like Tito and Nasser, as a strategy to maintain independence from Cold War blocs.

4. The concept of Vilayat-e-Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), institutionalized after the Iranian Revolution of 1979 under Ruhollah Khomeini, forms the ideological backbone of the Iranian state.

5. Iran’s reported “10-point proposal” includes demands such as sanctions relief, non-aggression guarantees, recognition of nuclear enrichment rights, and security assurances for its regional allies; the US “15-point proposal” is believed to have included stricter compliance and disarmament conditions.

6. The assumption within US strategic circles, particularly under Donald Trump, that rapid military escalation would force Iranian capitulation reflects a pattern seen in earlier interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

7. Benjamin Netanyahu has historically advocated a hardline stance against Iran, particularly regarding its nuclear programme and regional influence through proxy groups.

8. India–Iran relations have traditionally included cooperation in energy (notably crude oil imports), infrastructure (such as the Chabahar Port project), and diplomatic coordination in multilateral forums, though Iran’s support on Kashmir-related issues has been cautious and not uniformly pro-India.

9. Narendra Modi’s foreign policy has been characterized by increased engagement with the United States and Israel, including high-profile visits and strategic agreements, marking a shift from earlier doctrinal positions.

10. Pakistan has historically leveraged its geopolitical position to act as an intermediary in regional conflicts, maintaining ties with the US, China, and key Islamic nations despite internal challenges.

11. Reports of large-scale casualties in the Gaza Strip conflict have been widely documented by international organizations, though figures vary and remain contested in politically charged narratives.

12. Turkey, China, and Azerbaijan have, in recent geopolitical alignments, shown varying degrees of support for Pakistan in regional disputes, reflecting shifting alliances.

13. The term “Operation Sindoor” is used contextually to describe recent India–Pakistan tensions; details remain fluid and subject to differing national narratives and interpretations.

14. The phrase “Vishva Guru” is a political and cultural articulation used in contemporary Indian discourse to signify India’s aspiration for global leadership based on its civilisational heritage.

15. The concept of shahadat (martyrdom) in Shia Islam plays a significant role in shaping political resistance, drawing from historical events such as the Battle of Karbala.

16. India’s compliance with US sanctions regimes—particularly regarding oil imports from Iran and Venezuela—has been documented in policy shifts following American withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) in 2018.

17. The Chabahar Port project in Iran has been a strategic investment by India to access Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan, and its progress has been affected by US sanctions and shifting diplomatic priorities.

 

An Unequal Framework: The Indo US Interim Trade Deal and the Erosion of Reciprocity, Transparency and Strategic Autonomy

-Ramphal Kataria

From Strategic Autonomy to Managed Compliance: Reading the Indo–US Trade Framework

Abstract

The interim trade framework announced between India and the United States in 2025 marks a decisive departure from India’s long-standing trade diplomacy, agricultural protectionism, and claims of strategic autonomy. Unlike earlier trade negotiations—characterised by parliamentary debate, stakeholder consultations, and reciprocal tariff bargaining—this framework has emerged almost entirely through unilateral disclosures by the United States. Official statements from the White House, the US Trade Secretary, and former President Donald Trump’s social media account on Truth Social reveal commitments that stand in direct contradiction to assurances given by India’s Commerce Minister to Parliament and the public. This commentary argues that the framework is neither interim nor reciprocal, but an imposed arrangement shaped by coercive tariffs, geopolitical conditionalities, and surveillance of India’s foreign policy choices, particularly with regard to Russian oil imports. The opening of India’s agricultural sector to genetically modified (GM) soya oil, distillers dried grains (DDGs), maize by-products, sorghum, fruits, nuts, and pulses—confirmed in US fact sheets—signals a structural shift with profound implications for farmers, food sovereignty, and federalism. The paper situates the deal within a broader political economy of unequal exchange, executive secrecy, and declining credibility of India’s foreign and trade policy institutions.

Introduction

The interim trade framework announced between India and the United States in February 2026 has rapidly become one of the most contested economic agreements in recent Indian history. The controversy does not stem merely from opposition politics or farmer mobilization, but from the striking mismatch between what has been officially communicated by the Government of India and what has been revealed—often unilaterally—by the United States government. White House factsheets, Executive Orders, press briefings, and statements by President Donald Trump on his social media platform Truth Social have together painted a picture far more expansive and intrusive than the carefully worded joint statement issued on 6 February 2026.

This commentary argues that the agreement represents a qualitative shift in India–US economic relations: from negotiated reciprocity to imposed conditionality; from calibrated liberalization to sectorally asymmetric opening; and from strategic autonomy to externally monitored compliance. The opacity surrounding the deal has compounded its substantive asymmetry, undermining democratic accountability and eroding the credibility of ministerial assurances.

India–US Trade Relations Before Trump: Negotiated Asymmetry

India–US trade relations prior to the Trump administration were marked by persistent disagreements, particularly over tariffs, agriculture, intellectual property, and digital taxation. India maintained some of the highest applied tariffs among major economies—averaging 30–37% for agricultural goods and exceeding 100% for certain automobiles and dairy products. These tariffs were not accidental; they reflected deliberate policy choices rooted in food security, smallholder protection, and developmental space.

The United States repeatedly challenged these barriers, but disputes were addressed through multilateral forums, retaliatory tariffs, or prolonged negotiations. Crucially, India resisted opening politically sensitive sectors such as dairy, genetically modified food products, and mass-consumption staples like pulses and edible oils. Trade frictions existed, but they were embedded in a rules-based, negotiated framework.

This equilibrium began to unravel with Trump’s return to office and the unilateral imposition of punitive tariffs—reportedly up to 50%—on Indian exports. These tariffs were framed by Washington as “reciprocal”, but functioned in effect as economic coercion designed to force market access concessions.

The Interim Framework: Reciprocity Redefined

According to the White House factsheet dated 9 February 2026, India has agreed to eliminate or reduce tariffs on all US industrial goods and a wide range of food and agricultural products. These include dried distillers’ grains (DDGs), red sorghum, tree nuts, fresh and processed fruits, soybean oil, wine and spirits, and notably, “certain pulses”.

This language is materially broader than that contained in the joint India–US statement, which omitted pulses entirely and restricted red sorghum imports to animal feed. The disappearance of this qualifier in the US document is not a semantic detail; it has direct implications for domestic food markets and regulatory oversight.

In return, the United States has reduced its unilateral reciprocal tariff on Indian goods from 50% to 18%. This tariff continues to apply to roughly 55% of Indian exports. In other words, India has agreed to permanent tariff liberalization, while the US has merely partially rolled back a penalty it imposed unilaterally.

White House Fact Sheet on the India–US Interim Trade Framework

The following excerpts reproduce the language of the original White House fact sheet released in February 2026, as reported by multiple Indian newspapers before subsequent quiet revisions were made. These excerpts are crucial because they constitute the only authoritative public disclosure of India’s sectoral commitments under the interim framework.

“India will eliminate or reduce tariffs on all U.S. industrial goods and a wide range of U.S. food and agricultural products, including dried distillers’ grains (DDGs), red sorghum, tree nuts, fresh and processed fruit, certain pulses, soybean oil, wine and spirits, and additional products.”

“India committed to buy more American products and purchase over $500 billion worth of U.S. energy, information and communication technology, agricultural, coal and other products.”

The above wording was later altered by the White House—references to “certain pulses” were removed and the phrase “committed to buy” was softened to “intends to buy.” Notably, no corresponding clarification or disclosure was issued by the Government of India, even though these products fall squarely within politically sensitive and constitutionally shared domains such as agriculture and food policy.

The contradiction between this fact sheet and repeated public assurances by India’s Commerce Minister that “agriculture has not been opened” represents not a difference of interpretation, but a difference of record. In the absence of any Indian-authored text, the White House document effectively functions as the de facto trade agreement.

Agriculture as the Fault Line

Agriculture has emerged as the most politically and economically sensitive axis of the deal. Despite repeated assurances by the Commerce Minister that farmers’ interests—particularly in dairy and food staples—have been safeguarded, the White House factsheet tells a different story.

The inclusion of GM soybean oil and DDGs is especially contentious. DDGs, a by-product of maize-based ethanol production, have been associated with contamination risks and uncertain health impacts. GM soybean oil remains a politically contested commodity in India, where regulatory caution has traditionally prevailed.

The reference to “certain pulses” is perhaps the most alarming. Pulses are central to India’s nutrition security and farm economy. Even limited tariff reductions can depress domestic prices, as evidenced by India’s experience with edible oil liberalization over the past two decades. Farmer unions have warned that such concessions could undercut incomes and exacerbate agrarian distress.

Foreign Policy Conditionality and the Russian Oil Clause

The most unprecedented aspect of the framework lies outside traditional trade policy. The White House factsheet and subsequent Executive Order explicitly state that the rollback of the additional 25% tariff was granted in recognition of India’s commitment to stop purchasing Russian oil.

More significantly, the Executive Order mandates monitoring by a committee of US secretaries to assess whether India resumes Russian oil imports “directly or indirectly”, with the threat of reimposing tariffs. This represents an extraordinary intrusion into India’s sovereign energy policy and foreign relations. No previous trade agreement has subjected India’s external policy choices to external surveillance.

While Indian officials have insisted that energy procurement decisions remain guided by national interest, the absence of any explicit denial in the joint statement—and the detailed articulation of conditionality in US executive instruments—raises serious concerns about the erosion of strategic autonomy.

Why the Deal, and Why the Silence?

Three explanations help illuminate India’s acceptance of this framework. First, the immediate pressure created by punitive US tariffs threatened export-oriented sectors such as textiles, gems, leather and handicrafts. Second, the agreement reflects a broader geopolitical alignment in which economic concessions serve as signals of strategic compliance. Third, decision-making appears to have been highly centralized, with limited ministerial ownership or parliamentary scrutiny.

The opacity surrounding the deal is particularly troubling. The framework has not been tabled in Parliament. Detailed commitments have not been officially released. Instead, Indian stakeholders have been forced to rely on US disclosures to understand the scope of India’s obligations.

Comparative Perspective: Tariffs and Commitments

Sector / Item	Pre-Trump Indian Tariff on US Goods	Interim Framework Commitment	US Tariff on Indian Goods (Post-Deal)
Industrial Goods	7–15% average	Eliminated or sharply reduced	18% on ~55% exports
Agriculture (Average)	30–37%	Reduced/eliminated on listed items	18%
Pulses	30–50% (variable)	Included (“certain pulses”)	18%
GM Soybean Oil	High / restricted	Tariff reduction permitted	18%
DDGs	Restricted / high	Tariff reduction permitted	18%
Red Sorghum	Restricted; animal feed	No end-use qualifier	18%

Executive Order of the President of the United States – Trade Conditionality and Monitoring of Indian Oil Imports

The following passages are reproduced verbatim from the Executive Order signed by President Donald Trump in February 2026, modifying tariff duties applicable to India. This document formally links tariff relief to ongoing surveillance of India’s foreign policy choices, particularly with respect to Russian oil imports.

“Sec. 2. Tariff Modifications.
Effective with respect to goods entered for consumption, or withdrawn from the warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time on February 7, 2026, products of India imported into the United States shall no longer be subject to the additional ad valorem rate of duty of 25 percent imposed pursuant to Executive Order 14329.”

“Monitoring and Recommendations.”
“The Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and any other senior official the Secretary of Commerce deems appropriate, shall monitor whether India resumes directly or indirectly importing Russian Federation oil… If the Secretary of Commerce finds that India has resumed directly or indirectly importing Russian Federation oil… the Secretary of State shall recommend whether and to what extent I should take additional action as to India, including whether I should reimpose the additional ad valorem rate of duty of 25 percent on imports of articles of India.”

This language is unprecedented in India–US trade relations. For the first time, tariff relief granted to India is explicitly conditional on compliance with US preferences in matters of foreign and energy policy. The constitution of a multi-secretary monitoring mechanism to oversee India’s oil sourcing decisions amounts to a formalization of external supervision over sovereign economic choices.

No Indian official statement, cabinet note, or parliamentary disclosure has acknowledged this provision. The absence of denial is as significant as the absence of explanation. Taken together with India’s withdrawal from Chabahar-related engagements under US pressure and its compliance with sanctions regimes against Iran and Russia, the executive order confirms that the interim trade framework is not merely commercial in nature, but disciplinary in design.

Credibility, Democracy and Strategic Autonomy

Claims that India’s 18% tariff is among the lowest faced by US trading partners obscure the broader context. China continues to import discounted Russian oil without external monitoring, enhancing its industrial competitiveness. India, by contrast, faces higher energy costs and external scrutiny.

The cumulative effect is an erosion of credibility—of ministerial statements, of parliamentary accountability, and of India’s claim to independent foreign policy. Agreements may be unequal; diplomacy often is. But secrecy compounds inequality with indignity.

Conclusion

The interim Indo–US trade framework represents not merely a commercial arrangement, but a structural reordering of India’s economic and strategic posture. Its asymmetries may or may not be defensible. Its opacity is not. What has been agreed must be placed before Parliament and the public in full. Transparency is not a concession—it is the minimum requirement of democratic governance.

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