Showing posts with label Live-in relationships. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Live-in relationships. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 17, 2026

When Judges Speak Like Rulers: The Judiciary’s Drift from Constitutional Morality to Majoritarian Common Sense

 From calling unemployed youth “cockroaches” to questioning workers, activists, women, voters and intimate choices, the higher judiciary's recent language reveals a disturbing shift from constitutional guardianship to moral policing.

By Ramphal Kataria

“Courts are not expected to echo the prejudices of society; they are expected to correct them.”

“Constitutional courts derive legitimacy not from the power to punish but from the confidence people repose in them.”

“When judges begin to speak like governments, citizens begin to fear courts rather than trust them.”

Introduction: When Remarks Become Constitutional Signals

Courts do not speak only through judgments. They speak through questions, observations, insinuations, metaphors and passing comments. In a constitutional democracy, especially one as unequal and polarized as India, the language of the higher judiciary carries immense moral authority. Every sentence uttered from the Bench becomes a signal to governments, bureaucracies, police officers, lower courts, media institutions and citizens.

That is precisely why the growing pattern of controversial observations emanating from India's higher judiciary deserves serious scrutiny.

A stray comment can be dismissed as human error. Two comments may be attributed to personal bias. But when a pattern emerges—where unemployed youth are described as “cockroaches”, RTI activists are portrayed as nuisances, trade unions are blamed for economic stagnation, rape survivors are asked whether they would marry their assailants, live-in relationships are viewed through moralistic lenses, and disenfranchised voters are told to seek bureaucratic remedies rather than immediate constitutional protection—the question becomes unavoidable:

Is the higher judiciary increasingly speaking the language of authority rather than the language of constitutional liberty?

The Constitutional Role of the Judiciary

The Indian judiciary was never conceived as an extension of executive power.

The Constitution envisages courts as:

· Protectors of fundamental rights.

· Guardians of minorities.

· Defenders of dissent.

· Custodians of procedural fairness.

· Counter-majoritarian institutions.

Constitutional Anchors

· Article 14: Equality before law.

· Article 19(1)(a): Freedom of speech and expression.

· Article 19(1)(b) & (c): Freedom of association and assembly.

· Article 21: Right to life and dignity.

· Article 32: Right to constitutional remedies.

· Preamble: Justice, liberty, equality and fraternity.

The judiciary exists not to discipline citizens but to discipline power.

When judges begin sounding more suspicious of citizens than of state authority, constitutional equilibrium begins to shift.

The Republic Needs Judges, Not Moral Guardians

The legitimacy of the Supreme Court rests neither upon the sword nor the purse. It rests upon public faith. Alexander Hamilton described the judiciary as possessing “neither force nor will, but merely judgment”. In India, that judgment carries an even greater responsibility because constitutional courts are not merely legal institutions; they are guardians of liberty, dissent and equality.

Yet a disturbing trend has emerged in recent years.

Oral observations and even judicial reasoning increasingly reveal a pattern of impatience with dissent, suspicion towards activists, hostility towards labour rights, moral anxiety over relationships, and an inclination to validate state authority over citizen freedoms.

Viewed individually, each remark may appear innocuous or merely offhand. Viewed together, they reveal something more troubling: a judicial culture gradually moving away from constitutional morality towards social conservatism and executive deference.

A Series, Not Isolated Incidents

1. Unemployed Youth as “Cockroaches”

Bench:

Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi

Context:

Petition concerning Senior Advocate designation and fake law degrees.

Observation:

“There are youngsters like cockroaches, who don't get any employment… some become media, social media, RTI activists and attack everyone.”

India is home to one of the world's highest youth unemployment rates.

Article 41 speaks of securing the right to work.

The Constitution views unemployment as a social problem requiring state action.

The language of "cockroaches" transforms victims of structural unemployment into objects of contempt.

Such language echoes authoritarian instincts rather than constitutional compassion.

2. RTI Activism Reduced to “Business”

Bench:

Justice Sandeep Mehta and Justice Vijay Bishnoi

Context:

Anticipatory bail plea involving an RTI activist.

Remarks:

"RTI activism has become a new business."

"Who are you to monitor roads? Are you an engineer?"

Article 19 guarantees freedom of expression.

The RTI Act institutionalised citizen oversight precisely because corruption flourishes without scrutiny.

The judiciary itself has repeatedly celebrated transparency.

To dismiss activism as nuisance undermines democratic accountability.

3. Trade Unions Blamed for Industrial Backwardness

Bench:

Chief Justice Surya Kant

Context:

Minimum wages for domestic workers.

Observation:

Trade unions are largely responsible for stalling industrial growth.

Article 19(1)(c) guarantees association.

Article 43A mandates workers' participation.

Trade unionism is not an obstacle to democracy; it is democracy entering the workplace.

From the Ahmedabad Textile Strike to Bombay Mill movements, labour rights have built modern India.

Judicial suspicion towards unions reflects neoliberal economics rather than constitutional socialism.

Ambedkar's Warning

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar repeatedly warned that political democracy without social and economic democracy would remain fragile.

Labour rights are not obstacles to democracy.

They are among its foundations.

4. Reconsidering the Broad Definition of "Industry"

Nine-Judge Constitution Bench

Context:

Review of Bangalore Water Supply judgment.

Government argued that hospitals, educational institutions and welfare departments should not be industries.

If narrowed, millions may lose protection under labour laws.

The Constitution does not place efficiency above dignity.

Article 21 guarantees dignified life.

Article 39 directs protection against exploitation.

Yet labour protections increasingly appear burdensome in judicial discourse.

5. "Will You Marry Her?" – Rape and Marriage

Bench:

Chief Justice S.A. Bobde

Context:

POCSO rape case involving a minor.

Question:

“Will you marry her?”

This triggered nationwide outrage.

Marriage cannot erase rape.

Article 21 protects dignity.

A rape survivor is not an object to be rehabilitated through marriage.

The Supreme Court itself later acknowledged that compromise cannot extinguish sexual violence.

Feminist Critique

The idea of “marry your rapist” reflects what feminist scholars identify as the transfer of concern from the victim's autonomy to society's notions of honour.

The Constitution protects dignity.

Patriarchy protects reputation.

The two are not the same.

“A constitutional court must ask whether justice is done, not whether social respectability is restored.”

But the damage was already done.

6. Live-In Relationships and Marital Assumptions

Repeated judicial observations have questioned whether sexual intercourse between live-in partners can amount to rape.

Such comments revive patriarchal assumptions that intimacy implies perpetual consent.

Against:

· Article 21

· Bodily autonomy jurisprudence

· Puttaswamy

· Navtej Johar

Consent is continuous, not permanent.

Marriage or cohabitation does not extinguish autonomy.

7. Voters Can Wait

Bench:

Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi

Context:

Deletion of names during electoral revisions.

The Court observed that rights cannot be "washed away forever" but refused interim voting rights.

The right to vote may be statutory, but democracy itself is constitutional.

Missing one election means losing political voice for five years.

Justice delayed in electoral matters often becomes justice denied.

8. Women Asked to Control Their Sexual Urges

Calcutta High Court

The Court advised adolescent girls to resist "two minutes of pleasure."

The Supreme Court later overturned these observations.

Victim-blaming dressed as morality has repeatedly surfaced in Indian courts.

The Constitution does not protect chastity; it protects liberty.

9. Career Women and Desertion

Lower courts treated a woman's professional aspirations as cruelty.

The Supreme Court corrected these feudal assumptions.

Yet the frequency with which such ideas emerge shows how patriarchy remains embedded within legal consciousness.

The Larger Pattern

Seen together, these comments share common characteristics:

Suspicion towards:

· Activists

· Media

· Labour unions

· Civil society

Paternalism towards:

· Women

· Relationships

· Sexual autonomy

Preference for:

· Order over liberty

· State authority over citizen participation

· Efficiency over rights

Constitutional Morality Versus Popular Morality

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar warned:

"Constitutional morality is not a natural sentiment."

Judges are expected to defend constitutional morality even against popular prejudice.

In:

Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018)

the Court held:

Constitutional morality must prevail over social morality.

Yet recent observations increasingly mirror social conservatism rather than constitutional values.

What the Constitution Demands

Article 14

Equality before law.

Article 19

Speech, association and dissent.

Article 21

Dignity and personal liberty.

Article 23

Protection against exploitation.

Directive Principles

Social and economic justice.

Preamble

Justice—social, economic and political.

Judges are expected to be:

· Counter-majoritarian.

· Protectors of minorities.

· Guardians of dissent.

· Defenders of labour.

· Champions of liberty.

Not managers of social morality.

Why Such Remarks Matter

Many argue these are merely oral observations.

That argument misses the point.

Oral remarks:

· Shape public discourse.

· Influence subordinate courts.

· Affect police behaviour.

· Legitimize prejudices.

· Create fear among citizens.

When a Chief Justice calls unemployed youth "cockroaches," millions hear contempt.

When RTI activists are treated as irritants, transparency suffers.

When rape survivors are asked about marriage, patriarchy receives judicial sanction.

When labour rights are viewed as impediments, capital gains moral legitimacy.

Pleasing Power?

Indian constitutional history remembers courts for moments of courage:

· Kesavananda Bharati.

· Maneka Gandhi.

· Puttaswamy.

· Navtej Johar.

· Vishaka.

But it also remembers failures:

· ADM Jabalpur.

· Habeas corpus during Emergency.

· Excessive deference to executive authority.

The concern today is not merely conservative language.

It is the appearance of judicial attitudes increasingly aligned with governmental narratives:

· Activists as troublemakers.

· Labour as obstruction.

· Dissent as nuisance.

· Citizens as subjects.

The Constitution envisioned judges as checks upon power, not its cultural allies.

A Crisis of Confidence

Courts possess no army.

Their authority rests upon trust.

Once citizens begin to believe that judges mock the unemployed, distrust activists, moralise women, and sympathise more with authority than liberty, something deeper than individual cases is damaged.

The moral legitimacy of constitutional democracy begins to erode.

And unlike governments, courts cannot win back legitimacy through elections.

Conclusion: The Constitution Requires Empathy, Not Contempt

A constitutional court must speak with restraint because its words carry the weight of the Republic.

Judges are entitled to opinions, but constitutional judges are not ordinary commentators.

They are trustees of the people's faith.

History remembers judges not for how loudly they defended institutions, but for how courageously they defended citizens.

India does not need philosopher-kings on the bench.

It needs constitutional sentinels.

For when courts begin to speak the language of power rather than the language of rights, democracy may survive procedurally, but its moral soul begins to wither.

References

1. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII (Dr. B.R. Ambedkar).

2. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973).

3. ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976).

4. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978).

5. Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa (1978).

6. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997).

7. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017).

8. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018).

9. Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2018).

10. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963).

11. Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (1966).

12. Upendra Baxi, The Crisis of the Indian Legal System (1982).

13. A.G. Noorani, Constitutional Questions in India (2000).

14. LiveLaw reports on oral observations of the Supreme Court (2021–2026).

15. Frontline, “Banality of Evil and Violence Against Women” (2021).

16. Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, Report on Crimes Against Women and Children.

17. Articles 14, 19, 21, 23, 39, 41 and 43A of the Constitution of India.

Keywords

Supreme Court, Surya Kant, Judicial Activism, Constitutional Morality, RTI Activists, Unemployment, Labour Rights, Live-in Relationships, Rape Jurisprudence, Voter Rights, Judicial Independence, Constitutional Culture, Rule of Law, Democracy

 

 

Wednesday, April 1, 2026

Marriage, Liberty and the Woman: From Primordial Freedom to Modern Precarity

 When Freedom Seeks Space, Does Marriage Lose Meaning—or Reveal Its Unfinished Justice?

-Ramphal Kataria

Abstract

This essay undertakes a longue durée exploration of the relationship between man and woman—from pre-historic fluidity to the institutional rigidity of marriage and its contemporary contestation through live-in relationships. It examines how marriage evolved as both a stabilizing and controlling institution, simultaneously granting legitimacy and imposing subordination upon women. Drawing upon the works of Friedrich Engels, Simone de Beauvoir, and B. R. Ambedkar, alongside recent judicial trends of the Allahabad High Court, the essay critically interrogates whether expanding personal liberty risks reviving older hierarchies in subtler forms. It argues for a morally anchored liberalism—one that protects freedom of choice while ensuring justice, dignity and compensatory safeguards for women within and beyond marriage.

Keywords

Marriage, patriarchy, live-in relationships, endogamy, Ambedkar, women’s rights, autonomy, sociology of family, India

I. In the Beginning: Before Marriage, Before Morality

Human relationships did not begin with law, ritual or contract. They began with proximity, survival and instinct. In early hunter-gatherer societies, the bond between man and woman was neither fixed nor sanctified. It was fluid, adaptive and largely free from institutional control.

Anthropological readings, particularly those advanced by Friedrich Engels in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, suggest that early societies recognized maternal lineage. Women, as central contributors to subsistence, were not subordinated but socially integral.

“The overthrow of mother right was the world-historic defeat of the female sex.” — Engels

There was no anxiety over paternity, no rigid notion of exclusivity, no moral condemnation of desire. What existed was a form of relational autonomy that modern societies often claim, but rarely achieve.

II. The Turning Point: Property, Lineage and the Birth of Marriage

The shift from nomadic life to settled agriculture transformed human relationships irreversibly. Property emerged, and with it, the need to control inheritance. This necessitated certainty of paternity—something only possible through the regulation of women’s sexuality.

Marriage, thus, was born not merely out of affection, but out of economic necessity and social control.

What began as a flexible arrangement gradually hardened into a rule-bound institution. Sexuality was moralized, fidelity demanded, and women’s bodies became sites of lineage preservation.

III. Many Marriages, Many Worlds

Marriage, even in its early institutional forms, was not singular. It adapted to geography, economy and culture:

Polyandry in resource-scarce Himalayan regions

Polygyny among ruling elites

Monogamy as a later moral ideal

Matrilineal systems among Khasis and Nairs

The Forgotten Alternative: When Men Entered Women’s Homes

In matrilineal societies, the husband was a visitor, not the owner. Property belonged to the woman’s lineage. The child carried the mother’s name.

“Patriarchy is not nature—it is a historical arrangement.”

These systems disrupt the assumption that marriage must necessarily subordinate women. Yet, they remain exceptions, overshadowed by the dominance of patriarchy.

IV. Marriage as Shelter: Legitimacy, Security and Continuity

Marriage provided structure to human life. It transformed biological reproduction into social legitimacy. Women, within marriage, gained:

Recognized status

Economic support

Protection within a defined framework

Children gained identity, inheritance and belonging.

In this sense, marriage civilized relationships—it brought predictability and order.

V. Marriage as Cage: The Quiet Erosion of Freedom

But what marriage gave with one hand, it often took away with the other.

“One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman.” — Simone de Beauvoir

As patriarchy deepened, marriage confined women to the domestic sphere. The “home” became her universe. Her labour became invisible; her desires secondary; her identity derivative.

She was no longer an autonomous individual, but:

A wife defined by her husband

A mother defined by her children

A body regulated by society

Marriage, thus, became an institution where protection and possession coexisted uneasily.

VI. Endogamy: Marriage as Social Policing

Marriage did not merely regulate individuals—it preserved hierarchies.

B. R. Ambedkar identified endogamy as the core mechanism of caste:

“Endogamy is the essence of caste.”

Through marriage, society enforced:

Caste purity

Religious boundaries

Economic stratification

Women became the custodians of this system—not by choice, but by compulsion. Their freedom to choose love was curtailed in the name of social order.

VII. Reforming the Sacred: The Hindu Code Bill

Independent India confronted this contradiction. Could a democratic nation sustain an unequal family structure?

Ambedkar’s answer was unequivocal.

“I measure the progress of a community by the degree of progress which women have achieved.”

The Hindu Code Bill sought to:

Legalize divorce

Grant property rights

Recognize women as legal persons

Though diluted, it marked a radical shift—from sacrament to contract, from subordination to rights.

VIII. Women Across Faiths: A Comparative Unease

Across religions, marriage has oscillated between protection and control:

Islamic law recognizes mehr and inheritance but permits polygyny

Christian law historically restricted divorce

Hindu traditions sanctified indissolubility

In each, reform has been gradual, contested and incomplete.

IX. The Return of Informality: Live-in Relationships

In modern India, live-in relationships emerge as a challenge to rigid marriage norms. They claim freedom without ritual, companionship without contract.

Though often seen as new, informal unions have existed historically. Claims associating figures like Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Ram Manohar Lohia, and George Fernandes with such relationships remain largely anecdotal and not firmly established, and thus cannot serve as normative precedents.

X. Law Steps In: Protection and Paradox

Indian courts have extended limited recognition to live-in relationships under the right to life and liberty. Women in such arrangements may seek protection under domestic violence laws.

Yet, new complexities arise:

Relationships end without legal closure

Women face abandonment

Men face allegations of rape based on “false promise of marriage”

The law struggles to distinguish between broken trust and criminal intent.

XI. The Allahabad High Court and the Crisis of Consistency

Recent pronouncements of the Allahabad High Court reflect this tension.

In cases such as X vs State of Uttar Pradesh (2024–2025 protection petitions), the Court observed:

“Consensual relationships between adults, even if socially unacceptable, do not constitute a criminal offence.”

Yet, in similar matters, it has held:

“The rights of a legally wedded spouse cannot be defeated under the guise of personal liberty.”

This duality reveals not contradiction, but absence of a coherent legal framework.

XII. A Dangerous Echo: Freedom or Feudal Return?

If a married individual enters a live-in relationship without dissolving marriage, what emerges?

Not freedom—but fragmentation.

It resembles an older order where rulers could bring multiple women into their households without accountability.

“When liberty ignores justice, it begins to resemble privilege.”

XIII. The Invisible Woman: Left Without Closure

At the Centre of this debate stands the most neglected figure—the lawful spouse, often a woman:

Without emotional closure

Without economic compensation

Without social dignity

A liberal discourse that celebrates choice must also confront abandonment.

XIV. Towards a Responsible Liberalism

Freedom must not be denied—but neither must it be unregulated.

A just framework must ensure:

Dissolution of prior marriage before new unions

Compensation and maintenance for affected spouses

Legal recognition and protection of children

Clear standards distinguishing consent from coercion

Conclusion: Between Past and Future

Marriage is neither wholly sacred nor wholly obsolete. It is a living institution—shaped by history, contested by modernity.

The challenge is not to choose between marriage and liberty, but to reconcile them.

“A society that expands freedom must also deepen justice—else freedom itself becomes unequal.”

Footnotes

1. Friedrich Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (1884).

2. Lewis Henry Morgan, Ancient Society (1877).

3. Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (1949).

4. B. R. Ambedkar, Annihilation of Caste (1936); Constituent Assembly Debates on Hindu Code Bill.

5. Kathleen Gough, “Nayar: Central Kerala” in Matrilineal Kinship studies.

6. Allahabad High Court, various habeas corpus and protection petitions (2024–2025) concerning live-in relationships and marital subsistence.

7. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (India).

8. Flavia Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality: The Politics of Women’s Rights in India.

9. Uma Chakravarti, Gendering Caste: Through a Feminist Lens.

10. Amartya Sen, The Argumentative Indian (sections on gender and social justice).