Federalism Without Faith: Governors,
the Centre, and the Erosion of Democratic Conventions
Introduction: When Convention
Collapses into Crisis
The unprecedented
spectacle in the Karnataka Legislative Assembly—where the Governor refused to
read the address prepared by the elected Council of Ministers and instead
attempted to impose his own truncated version—marks a decisive rupture in
India’s constitutional practice. This was not merely a breach of legislative
decorum; it was a frontal assault on the foundational norms of parliamentary
democracy and federalism. The incident must be located within a longer and
deeply troubling history of the politicisation of the Governor’s office, a
trajectory that runs from the early years of the Republic to its present
authoritarian inflection.
What is unfolding today
is not an episodic constitutional aberration but the maturation of a structural
malaise: the conversion of Governors from constitutional heads into instruments
of central political control. To understand the gravity of this transformation,
one must return to the Constituent Assembly debates, Ambedkar’s anxieties about
federalism, and the judicial safeguards evolved to restrain central
excesses—many of which are now being hollowed out in practice.
Federalism in India: Design, Anxiety,
and Compromise
Indian federalism was
neither accidental nor idealistic. It emerged from the rubble of colonial
centralisation, the trauma of Partition, and the challenge of integrating
princely states into a constitutional republic. The framers consciously
rejected a confederal model. Article 1’s formulation—“India, that is Bharat,
shall be a Union of States”—was not semantic flourish but constitutional
strategy.
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar was
explicit: the Indian federation was indestructible, the states destructible.
Yet this centralisation was justified not as a license for political domination
but as a safeguard against social tyranny, economic fragmentation, and secessionist
impulses. Federalism, in Ambedkar’s scheme, was to function through
constitutional morality, not mechanical coercion.
The Governor, therefore,
was conceived as a constitutional sentinel, not a parallel authority.
Constituent Assembly Debates: Fear of
the Governor as an Agent
The Constituent Assembly repeatedly returned to the danger
inherent in appointing Governors from the Centre. Members such as H.V. Kamath,
K.T. Shah, and Mohammad Ismail expressed deep apprehension that Governors would
function as agents of the Union rather than impartial constitutional heads.
Kamath memorably warned that the Governor could become “a means of
strangling provincial autonomy.” K.T. Shah went further, describing the office
as a colonial relic designed for control rather than democracy.
Ambedkar did not dismiss these fears. Instead, he acknowledged
them candidly but argued that a constitution could not be framed on the
assumption of bad faith. The success of the system, he maintained, would depend
on conventions, restraint, and good sense, much as in Britain. The Governor,
Ambedkar insisted, would ordinarily act on the aid and advice of the Council of
Ministers, barring rare and exceptional situations.
This reliance on constitutional morality—rather than exhaustive
textual prohibition—now stands exposed as the Constitution’s most fragile
assumption.
Ambedkar’s Federation Versus Freedom (1939): A Misunderstood
Warning
Ambedkar’s Federation
Versus Freedom is often selectively invoked to justify a strong Centre, but
rarely read in its full argumentative depth. Ambedkar’s scepticism of
decentralisation stemmed from his fear that provincial autonomy in a
caste-ridden society could entrench social oppression and deny liberty to
minorities.
Crucially, Ambedkar did
not argue for centralisation for its own sake. He argued for central power as a
guarantor of freedom, not as an instrument of partisan domination. The Centre
was to intervene to protect rights—not to overturn electoral verdicts or
paralyse legislatures.
What Ambedkar feared was
local tyranny. What he did not envisage was the systematic weaponisation of
constitutional offices to discipline states for political dissent. Today’s
misuse of Governors represents a perverse inversion of Ambedkar’s logic: central
power is no longer protecting liberty but undermining democratic choice.
The First Shock to Federalism:
Kerala, 1959
The first major rupture
in Indian federalism came with the dismissal of E.M.S. Namboodiripad’s elected
Communist government in Kerala in 1959. Invoking Article 356, Jawaharlal
Nehru’s government dismissed a ministry that enjoyed a clear legislative majority,
citing law and order concerns amid political agitation.
While Nehru personally
agonised over the decision, the precedent was disastrous. It normalised the
idea that ideological divergence could justify central intervention. What began
as an exception soon became routine.
Article
356: From Emergency Provision to Political Weapon
From the 1960s onward,
Article 356 was used with increasing abandon. The Congress, during its period
of dominance, imposed President’s Rule over a hundred times, often for nakedly
political reasons. Elected governments were dismissed, assemblies dissolved,
and Governors played decisive roles in engineering regime change.
The Haryana episode under
Governor G.D. Tapase, where a minority government led by Bhajan Lal was invited
to form the government despite lacking numbers, exemplifies this manipulation.
Similar practices occurred across Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and the Northeast.
Federalism was reduced to
arithmetic managed by Raj Bhavans.
Judicial Correction: The Bommai
Doctrine
The constitutional nadir produced
its own corrective. In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court
decisively altered Centre–State relations. The Court held that:
Article 356 is
subject to judicial review
Majority must
be tested on the floor of the House
Federalism is
part of the basic structure of the Constitution
Bommai was not merely a verdict;
it was a constitutional warning. It marked a rare moment when judicial doctrine
restored democratic balance. For a time, the abuse of Article 356 abated.
But constitutional creativity
found new pathways.
Post-2014 Federalism: Obstruction
Without Dismissal
After 2014, a subtler but
equally corrosive strategy emerged. Instead of dismissing governments,
Governors began paralysing them. Bills passed by elected legislatures were
withheld indefinitely. Re-passed Bills were referred to the President.
Administrative appointments were stalled. Public confrontations replaced
private constitutional dialogue.
The Tamil Nadu case,
where multiple Bills were kept pending for years, forced the Supreme Court to
intervene. The Court held that Governors cannot exercise a pocket veto and
prescribed reasonable timelines for assent or return of Bills. It extended
similar obligations to the President when Bills are reserved.
Yet, significantly, this
assertiveness was later diluted in review—revealing the Court’s own
institutional vulnerability in the face of executive pressure.
Karnataka and the Collapse of
Convention
The Karnataka Governor’s
refusal to read the Council of Ministers’ address represents an escalation from
obstruction to open defiance. The Governor’s address is not discretionary. It
is the formal voice of the elected government. To substitute it with a self-authored
text is to negate the very principle of responsible government.
This act violates not
only convention but constitutional logic. It converts the Governor from trustee
to sovereign—from constitutional head to political superior.
The West Bengal Template: Rewarding
Constitutional Transgression
The tenure of Jagdeep Dhankhar as
Governor of West Bengal offers a template for this new politics. Through
constant public commentary, social-media interventions, and direct attacks on
the elected government, the Governor functioned as a parallel executive
authority. The subsequent elevation of Dhankhar to the Vice-Presidency sends an
unmistakable signal: constitutional aggression is not punished; it is rewarded.
Sarkaria Commission and the Forgotten
Consensus
The Sarkaria Commission
had warned precisely against this degeneration. It emphasised that Governors
must act as neutral constitutional heads, avoid public confrontation, and
respect the primacy of elected governments. These recommendations, accepted in principle,
are now systematically ignored.
Conclusion: Federalism as
Constitutional Morality
Indian
federalism was never meant to be frictionless, but it was meant to be ethical.
Its survival depends not merely on textual provisions but on constitutional
morality—a concept Ambedkar repeatedly foregrounded.
What
we are witnessing today is not the assertion of a strong Centre but the
corrosion of democratic restraint. The Governor, once envisioned as a
constitutional bridge, has been transformed into a political battering ram.
In
defending federalism, one is not opposing the Union. One is defending the
Republic.
If
constitutional conventions collapse entirely, the Constitution may survive in
text—but democracy will not survive in spirit.
References
1.
Ambedkar, B.R. (1939). Federation Versus
Freedom. Bombay: Thacker & Co.
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S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3
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