The Governor's office in India, a seemingly innocuous constitutional post, is at the heart of a bitter political and legal battle. The recent Supreme Court judgment setting a time limit on the Governor's and President's powers to act on bills has brought to the fore a critical question: is this office, a remnant of colonial rule, truly a constitutional post or a mere political tool? A comprehensive analysis reveals a long history of misuse, political patronage, and a consistent undermining of federal principles.
The Origins: A Nominated Head in a Federal System
The office of the Governor has a deep-seated colonial legacy. It was first institutionalized in the Government of India Act, 1935, where the Governor of a province, appointed by the British crown, was an agent of central control, not a representative of the people. While this model was widely criticized by freedom fighters, the Constituent Assembly chose to retain a nominated Governor, largely influenced by the Canadian Constitution's quasi-federal model. The primary reasoning, as articulated by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and other members during the debates, was to ensure a neutral, ceremonial head who would serve as a "lubricator" for the constitutional machinery and a link between the Union and the states.
The Constituent Assembly's decision was a deliberate rejection of an elected Governor. The members feared that an elected Governor would create a power struggle with the Chief Minister, both claiming a popular mandate. The intent was clear: the Governor's office was meant to be an ornamental one, lacking independent policy-making powers and acting on the "aid and advice" of the elected Council of Ministers. The original Constitution's provisions on the Governor's office—Article 155 (appointment by the President) and Article 156 (holding office "during the pleasure of the President")—were adopted with the understanding that they would not be used for partisan purposes.
The First Misuse: Undermining Elected Governments
Despite the noble intentions of the framers, the office of the Governor became a site of political maneuvering soon after independence. The first major instance of its misuse was in 1959, when the democratically elected Communist government in Kerala, led by E.M.S. Namboodiripad, was dismissed under Article 356 on the recommendation of Governor B. Ramakrishna Rao. This action set a notorious precedent for the central government to use the Governor's office as an instrument to topple opposition-ruled state governments.
This trend escalated over the decades. During the tumultuous period of 1966-1977, Indira Gandhi's government imposed President's Rule a staggering 39 times, often based on reports from Governors who were acting as agents of the Centre. In total, Article 356 has been used close to 90 times, with the majority of these instances involving a Governor's recommendation. While the landmark S.R. Bommai judgment of 1994 significantly curtailed this arbitrary power by mandating a floor test, the political weaponization of the office continued, albeit in new forms.
Governors as 'Rehabilitation Posts': A Quid Pro Quo Culture
The most significant contemporary issue concerning the Governor's office is its transformation into a post for political patronage and a reward for loyalty. The appointment of Governors has become a means of rehabilitating sidelined politicians or rewarding retired bureaucrats and judges who have been perceived to be favorable to the ruling party at the Centre. This practice deeply erodes the credibility of the office and raises serious questions about the impartiality of key state functionaries.
Judges Turned Governors
The appointment of retired judges as Governors is particularly controversial as it blurs the lines between the executive and the judiciary. It fosters a perception that judicial decisions could be influenced by the prospect of a prestigious post-retirement appointment.
Justice Fathima Beevi (Former SC Judge) – Governor of Tamil Nadu (1997–2001), whose decisions invited judicial scrutiny.
Justice P. Sathasivam: His appointment as Governor of Kerala in 2014, jusrt months after retiring as the Chief Justice of India, was unprecedented and sparked a nationwide debate on judicial independence. It was seen as a dangerous precedent, as it could incentivize a judge to deliver "pro-government" judgments in the hope of future rewards.
Justice S. Abdul Nazeer: His appointment as Governor of Andhra Pradesh in 2023, shortly after his retirement from the Supreme Court, similarly drew sharp criticism. Justice Nazeer was part of the Constitution Bench that delivered the verdict in the contentious Ayodhya land dispute case, and his appointment was widely perceived as a reward for his role.
Bureaucrats and Politicians as Appointees
The list of Governors is replete with former bureaucrats and politicians. This is a practice that turns the Raj Bhavan into a "rehabilitation post."
Gurbachan Jagat (IPS) – Former DG, J&K Police and BSF, served as Governor of Manipur (2007–2013).
E.S.L. Narasimhan (IPS) – Intelligence Bureau chief, later Governor of Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh.
Ajay Kumar Bhalla (IAS): A former Union Home Secretary, his appointment as Governor of Manipur in late 2024 is an example of a top bureaucrat being rewarded with a high-profile constitutional role. Such appointments can be seen as a way of acknowledging years of loyal service.
Pusapati Ashok Gajapathi Raju (TDP Leader): His appointment as Governor of Goa in 2025 exemplifies the use of the office to accommodate senior political leaders from allied parties or to manage political equations. This practice, while common, directly contradicts the principle of a non-partisan Governor.
Prof. Ashim Kumar Ghosh (BJP Leader & Academician) – Governor of Haryana (2025).
Kavinder Gupta (Former Deputy CM, J&K) – Appointed Lieutenant Governor of Ladakh (2025).
The Sarkaria Commission (1988) and the Punchhi Commission (2010), both tasked with reforming Centre-State relations, had strongly advised against this practice. The Sarkaria Commission recommended that the Governor should be an eminent person from outside the state, not an active politician, and should be appointed in consultation with the Chief Minister of the concerned state. The Punchhi Commission went a step further, suggesting that the Governor should be removed only by a resolution of the State Legislature, and not merely at the "pleasure of the President," a recommendation that remains unimplemented.
The Supreme Court's Intervention: A Constitutional Safeguard ⚖️
The recent Supreme Court judgment, which sets a time-limit for gubernatorial action on bills, is a direct response to the Governor's office becoming a tool for legislative obstruction. In states like Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Punjab, Governors have indefinitely delayed bills, frustrating the will of elected legislatures. The Court's ruling on April 8, 2025, a landmark decision, held that the constitutional silence on a deadline for assent to bills cannot be a justification for indefinite delay. It mandated that:
Governors must act on bills within a three-month period under Article 200.
The President must decide on bills reserved for assent within three months under Article 201.
Any delay must be justified and recorded in writing. The Court also affirmed that a Governor's inaction is subject to judicial review.
The Centre's response to this judgment was a Presidential Reference under Article 143(1), which allows the President to seek the Supreme Court's opinion on questions of law. The reference argues that the Court cannot "legislate" a procedure where the Constitution is silent and that judicially imposed timelines would encroach upon the discretionary powers of the Governor and the President.
Independence vs. Accountability
The ongoing legal battle is a critical test of India's federalism. While the Centre argues that Governors' discretion is a "high prerogative" function, the states, supported by the Supreme Court's judgment, counter that an unelected functionary cannot be allowed to subvert a democratically elected government. The judgment is not about diminishing the Governor's independence; it is about establishing accountability. It prevents the Governor from acting as a political gatekeeper and ensures that the legislative process, the very essence of a democracy, is not held hostage by a single individual.
Conclusion
The Governor’s office, conceived as ceremonial and impartial, has often been reduced to a political instrument. From the colonial legacy of the 1935 Act to today’s rehabilitation of retired judges, bureaucrats, and politicians, the Raj Bhavan has strayed from constitutional ideals. The Supreme Court’s intervention, though controversial, is a democratic safeguard—ensuring that legislatures do not remain hostage to unelected appointees. The ongoing Presidential reference may yet redefine the delicate equilibrium between constitutional offices, political practice, and the sovereignty of the people’s mandate.
References
1. Constituent Assembly Debates, May 30-31, 1949: The official records of the Constituent Assembly of India, Volume VIII, which detail the extensive discussions on the appointment and role of the Governor.
2. Government of India Act, 1935: The colonial statute that served as the foundational blueprint for the Governor's office in the Indian Constitution.
3. Sarkaria Commission Report (1988): A detailed report by the Commission on Centre-State Relations, which made key recommendations on the appointment and functioning of Governors.
4. Punchhi Commission Report (2010): A more recent report on the same subject, which reiterated and expanded upon the recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission.
5. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994): The landmark Supreme Court judgment that curtailed the arbitrary use of Article 356 and re-emphasized the principles of federalism.
6. Shamsher Singh & Anr. vs. State of Punjab (1974): A pivotal Supreme Court ruling that clarified that the Governor, like the President, must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in all but a few exceptional cases.
7. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2024): The recent Supreme Court case that led to the landmark judgment on the time limits for gubernatorial assent to bills.
8. The Constitution of India, Articles 155, 156, 200, and 201.
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