Tuesday, July 15, 2025

Scaling the Wall: Omar Abdullah, the Martyrs’ Graveyard, and the Democratic Question in Post-370 Kashmir

 On July 13, 2025, a day of deep historic and political significance in Jammu and Kashmir, the state’s elected Chief Minister Omar Abdullah was prevented by police from entering the Martyrs’ Graveyard in Srinagar to pay tributes to the 1931 martyrs. In an act that quickly went viral on social media and sparked national debate, Abdullah scaled the graveyard’s locked gate—defying what he called “unconstitutional obstruction” by the police.

"This is unheard of in free India—where an elected Chief Minister is stopped by the police from paying homage to martyrs."
Omar Abdullah, July 13, 2025, via Press Conference & X (formerly Twitter)

This singular event captured the central paradox of post-abrogation Jammu and Kashmir: a region projected as fully integrated into India, yet where even the elected head of government is subordinate to unelected authority.

1. Historical Roots: Accession and Autonomy

At the time of the 1947 Partition, the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir occupied a uniquely sensitive position. With a Muslim-majority population (about 77%) and direct borders with the newly created Pakistan, it was widely assumed in Pakistan that Kashmir would naturally accede to it. Yet the situation on the ground was far from straightforward.

Princely states technically had three options: join India, join Pakistan, or in theory remain independent. The Indian Independence Act of 1947, however, offered no practical framework for fully sovereign independence outside the two dominions; Mountbatten’s advice was clear that independence would be untenable. Still, Maharaja Hari Singh initially tried to avoid choosing either side, issuing a “standstill agreement” request to both India and Pakistan to maintain the status quo while he considered options. Pakistan agreed, India demurred.

Meanwhile, internal dynamics in Kashmir were critical. The Dogra monarchy, ruling since the mid-19th century, faced strong opposition from its majority Muslim subjects. Major uprisings in 1865, 1924, and especially 1931 reflected widespread discontent. By the 1940s, the National Conference under Sheikh Abdullah—originating from the Muslim Conference and the Reading Room Party—had emerged as the dominant mass political force. Although originally communal in character, the National Conference had embraced secular nationalism and was ideologically aligned with Nehru’s Indian National Congress.

Why did Kashmir not join Pakistan?

Political alignment: The National Conference distrusted Pakistan’s Muslim League leadership, seeing it as feudal, sectarian, and opposed to their vision of social reform.

Autocratic rule: The Maharaja himself was keen on independence, disliking the idea of being answerable to either dominion.

Lack of consent: There was no plebiscite or formal consultation of the population before the crisis, leaving the question of popular will unresolved.
In October 1947, tribesmen from Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province, with support from Pakistani officials, invaded Kashmir. They quickly overran much of the state, committing atrocities that terrorized the population. Facing the imminent fall of Srinagar, Hari Singh turned to India for military assistance.

India agreed on the condition that the Maharaja sign the Instrument of Accession on October 26, 1947, formally ceding defense, foreign affairs, and communications. Lord Mountbatten accepted the accession but recommended that the “will of the people” be determined later through a plebiscite once order was restored—a commitment acknowledged but never fulfilled.
Initially, India granted Jammu and Kashmir special constitutional status under Article 370, promising extensive internal autonomy and its own constitution. Article 370, drafted in 1949 and incorporated into the Constitution, was designed to honor the unique political history of J&K and allowed the state to have its own Constitution and substantial autonomy, barring three subjects: defense, external affairs, and communication [2]. However:

Over time, successive Indian governments undermined this autonomy through presidential orders and political interventions. In August 2019, the Government of India revoked Article 370 and split the state into two Union Territories, removing its residual autonomy altogether. Critics argue this was a fundamental breach of the promise of autonomy that formed part of the basis for accession.

Jammu and Kashmir’s accession to India was shaped by complex factors: demographic realities, internal political movements, the secular versus communal visions of its leadership, and Pakistan’s military intervention. While legally valid under the conditions of 1947, the accession was predicated on promises of autonomy and self-determination that were steadily eroded. The failure to resolve these contradictions laid the foundation for the protracted conflict and alienation that have haunted the region ever since.

2. Abrogation of Article 370: The Turning Point

On August 5, 2019, the Government of India abrogated Article 370 through Presidential Order C.O. 272 and Parliament’s resolution, followed by the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, which bifurcated the state into two Union Territories: Jammu & Kashmir (with legislature) and Ladakh (without one) [3].

This move was challenged in the Supreme Court, and in December 2023, a five-judge Constitution Bench upheld the abrogation but directed that:

üAssembly elections must be held by September 2024

üStatehood must be restored "as soon as possible" [4]

 

3. Governance Under the Lieutenant Governor: The Real Power?

Despite the 2024 elections and Omar Abdullah’s appointment as CM, governance remains heavily influenced by the Lieutenant Governor (LG), who controls law and order, land administration, and several key departments under the J&K Reorganisation Act, 2019.

The July 13 incident, where police reportedly under LG’s command barred the CM from attending a public commemoration, starkly illustrates this imbalance. Legal experts and former bureaucrats have criticized this as a “constitutional anomaly” undermining federalism and democratic accountability [5].

“This is not democracy; this is colonial-style administration.”
Justice (Retd.) A.P. Shah, former Chief Justice, Delhi HC, on NDTV Debate, July 14, 2025

4. Infrastructure and Investment: Development with Discontent

Government Claims:

ØOver 2,200 infrastructure projects worth ₹25,000 crore completed or underway (source: Ministry of Home Affairs, MHA Annual Report 2023-24) [6]

ØInvestment proposals worth ₹1.17 lakh crore received, potentially creating 4.5 lakh jobs (source: J&K Industrial Policy Report, 2024) [7]

ØUnemployment rate down from 6.7% in 2019-20 to 4.4% in 2022-23 (source: Periodic Labour Force Survey, MoSPI) [8]

Ground Realities:

ØCMIE (June 2025) places J&K’s actual unemployment at 15.6%, with youth unemployment even higher [9]

ØTourism losses of over ₹1,200 crore reported after Pahalgam and Reasi terror incidents (source: Chamber of Tourism, Trade & Industry Katra - CTTIK press release, July 5, 2025) [10]

ØTraditional sectors (handicrafts, apple exports) continue to face losses due to supply chain disruptions and internet blackouts (report: Kashmir Chamber of Commerce & Industry, March 2024) [11]

5. Education and Security: Mixed Outcomes

v₹500+ crore invested in education infrastructure; over 250 schools renovated (source: Ministry of Education Dashboard, 2024) [12]

vCurriculum aligned with NCERT standards, and central scholarships now available to J&K students [13]

Yet challenges persist:

üTeacher-student ratios remain skewed in rural areas

üInternet shutdowns (180+ days in 2019–2021) disrupted academics and triggered mental health crises (source: UNESCO Report on Global Education, 2023) [14]

On the security front:

üTerror-related incidents dropped by 35% since 2019, per MHA [15]

üBut targeted killings continue: 12 civilians killed in 2025 so far (source: South Asia Terrorism Portal - SATP) [16]

üRise in "hybrid" terrorism—local youth with no formal affiliations—signals evolving threats (source: Indian Army Intelligence Brief, Q1 2025) [17]

6. The Kashmiri Pandit Question

üOver 3,800 migrant youth employed under PM Package

üTransit accommodations built in Budgam, Anantnag, and Baramulla (source: MoHUA, 2024) [18]

Yet:

üMass return to ancestral homes hasn’t occurred

üContinued targeted killings (e.g., Rahul Bhat, 2022; Puran Krishan, 2023) deepen fears [19]

7. Political Footprint of BJP and the Role of Regionalism

The BJP, though instrumental in the abrogation, did not field candidates in many Valley constituencies in 2024, instead tacitly supporting independents. This suggests limited electoral traction in Muslim-majority Kashmir and a strategic reliance on proxy politics, despite proclaiming full integration [20].

8. The Call for Statehood and Reunification

The Supreme Court’s December 2023 order [4] and widespread public sentiment have reignited the demand to:

ü Restore full statehood

ü Reconsider the bifurcation of Ladakh and J&K, or at least allow local consultation for future integration

Surveys by Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) show 62% of J&K respondents favor reunification and full statehood with empowered local governance [21].

Conclusion: A Wall Between Symbolism and Sovereignty

The July 13 incident was more than an isolated conflict between a Chief Minister and the police—it was a symbolic indictment of the structural imbalance that continues to define post-Article 370 governance in Jammu and Kashmir.The post-abrogation situation in Jammu & Kashmir is a continuous work in progress, fraught with historical baggage and contemporary challenges. While the government highlights strides in infrastructure and economic potential, the core issues of employment, comprehensive educational reform, lasting security, and critically, rebuilding public faith, remain paramount. The lingering plight of Kashmiri Pandits is a poignant reminder of the unresolved historical wounds.

For lasting peace and genuine integration, the central government must move beyond the "political figment" narrative and demonstrate concrete commitment to its promises. This means:

1. Full Empowerment of the Elected Government: Curtailing the extraordinary powers of the Lieutenant Governor and ensuring the Chief Minister functions with the full authority accorded to any other elected state head in India.

2. Restoration of Statehood: Fulfilling the parliamentary promise and the Supreme Court's directive to restore full statehood to Jammu and Kashmir "as soon as possible," ideally unifying the erstwhile state into its original form, subject to local aspirations.

3. Inclusive Development: Moving beyond statistics to ensure gainful employment opportunities, particularly for the youth, and fostering an education system that is both nationally integrated and locally relevant.

4. Addressing Alienation: Engaging in sincere dialogue with all sections of society, including those who feel alienated, to understand and address their concerns. This is vital for winning hearts and minds and truly integrating the people, not just the territory.

5. Sustainable Security: While counter-terrorism operations are essential, the long-term solution lies in creating an environment where security concerns do not overshadow the aspirations for normalcy, development, and democratic participation.

Jammu and Kashmir is not merely a piece of land but a vibrant community with a rich history and distinct identity. Its future prosperity and integration depend on building a strong foundation of trust, empowering its people, and honoring the democratic principles that underpin the Indian Union.Because no amount of investment can substitute for dignity. And no democracy can thrive where an elected Chief Minister must scale a wall to perform his constitutional and moral duty.

References

1. Ministry of External Affairs Archives, Instrument of Accession – October 26, 1947

2. Constitution of India, Article 370 (Prior to August 2019 Amendment)

3. Gazette of India, The Constitution (Application to J&K) Order, 2019 (C.O. 272)

4. Supreme Court of India, In Re: Article 370 Verdict, December 11, 2023

5. NDTV, "Omar Scales Wall: Is LG Above CM in Kashmir?", July 14, 2025

6. MHA Annual Report 2023-24, Chapter 7: Jammu & Kashmir Development

7. J&K UT Administration, Industrial Development Policy Document, 2024

8. MoSPI, Periodic Labour Force Survey, 2022-23

9. Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), State-wise Unemployment Report, June 2025

10. CTTIK Press Statement, Tourism Wipeout Post-Reasi Incident, July 5, 2025

11. Kashmir Chamber of Commerce & Industry (KCCI), Annual Economic Impact Report, March 2024

12. Ministry of Education, PM SHRI Data Dashboard – J&K Region, 2024

13. National Scholarship Portal (NSP), J&K Student Beneficiaries Data, 2024

14. UNESCO, Global Education Monitoring Report: India Case Study, 2023

15. Ministry of Home Affairs, Security Situation Summary Report – Q4 2024

16. South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), India Fatalities Dashboard – 2025 (J&K)

17. Indian Army Briefing Note, Hybrid Terrorism in Kashmir, January 2025

18. Ministry of Housing & Urban Affairs, Status Report: Transit Accommodations for Migrants, 2024

19. Indian Express, Targeted Killings of Kashmiri Pandits: Timeline, 2022–2024

20. Scroll.in, BJP’s Tactical Absence in Kashmir Polls, May 2024

21. CSDS-Lokniti Survey, J&K Public Sentiment on Article 370 and Statehood, Feb 2025

 

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