Bahujan Samaj Party: Genesis of social contradictions-Origin, voice of depressed section of society, growth and relevance in Indian politics
The scheduled castes, tribes, educationally and socially downtrodden classes, employees and workers of these classes are the members of this party. It claims that the Bahujan Samaj comprises vast section of the society yet its representation is low and role in political, social and economic life of the country, is minimal. The party drew inspiration from Sahu Maharaj Mahatma Phoole, Mahatma Ramaswami Nayuar and Dr. B.R. Ambedkar.
Ideology of BSP:
BSP is a political party which arisen on the idea of stark reality of historical oppression and exploitation of untouchables and oppressed sections of society. It’s the reality of predominated Hindu society in which these sections were treated worse than an animal. Although after independence some relief is realized in terms of socio-economic amelioration but not at a level where these sections could assert a position to intervene in the development process of the nation. Although untouchability declared a crime but untouchables are treated as such. Congress utilized these sections as a sure vote bank in the name of providing reservation and betterment oriented schemes but deliberately didn’t undertake any holistic program to raise the status of these sections socially and economically. Sections and people arisen from this segment to oppose the congress political questioning the role and efforts made by INC. Kanshi Ram spearheaded the popular discontent and inequality in the shape of organization first amongst employees and then created a definite political structure to rally the DALITSaround the goal of self assertion and attainment.
Thematic slogan ‘Tilak, Tarazu aur Talwar, Inko maaro jutey chaar’ in fact is the slogan to oppose the dominant castes such as Brahmin, Banias(traders) and Rajputs who are believed to oppress the lower castes. Basically existence and philosophy of the BSP revolves around the contradictions amongst the castes. A Phoenix like rise may be attributed to this historical perspective.
Program of BSP:
(i) It identifies itself with Dalit’s. Initially it started criticizing Manuism and the followers of Manu who constitute the members of the higher castes,
(ii) It aims at ending social and economic inequalities and also exploitation of the Dalit’s,
(iii) It always aspires to capture political power so that it could serve the Dalit Samaj,
(iv) Its immediate task is to become the arbiter and determinate of political power and make full use of the prevailing environment for its benefits,(v) To eliminate untouchability is its main goal,
(vi) To take special steps to protect the interests of the Dalit women is another goal in view,
(vii) To secure the end of Manuwadi and Brahmanwadi system are its cherished aims,
(viii) To establish institutions in the name of Baba Saheb B.R. Ambedkar is its effort,
(ix) To secure more places for Dalits in the administration is its main struggle. Its other notable plans are:
(x) To secure the interests of landless farmers(xiv) To end exploitation of Dalits by jagirdars, Sahukars and big landlords;
(xi) To strive for avoidance of ever increasing social violence;
Political growth:
BSP was formed in the year 1984 with one aim amongst many others to capture power in the country. It was beginning of electoral politics but it could not win even a single seat in elections held in 1985. In 1989 elections it could win only one seat in Lok Sabha and 12 in Punjab Vidhan Sabha. In 1993, it joined hands with Mulayam Singh Yadav’s Samajwadi Party and formed a government in U.P. It was a transient affair. In June 1995, it joined hands with the BJP to form a government. It worked only for four months.Later the BJP formed government with the BSP support. However the arrangement was a flop. In 1996 it formed an alliance with Akali Dal in Punjab. It won 3 Lok Sabha seats from Punjab 6 from U.P. and 2 from M.P. i.e. 11 seats in 10th Lok Sabha. In M.P. it could secure 8.18 per cent and in U.P. 20.8 per cent votes. However, it suffered a setback in 1997 in Punjab Assembly elections as it could get only one seat. In February-March 1998, it contested elections in alliance with the Congress and could win only 5 Lok Sabha seats. Even (its the then president)—Kanshi Ram was defeated. With the meagre victory at polls, it could play a nasty role for the BJP led alliance on April 17, 1999 and brought its fall.
In 13th Lok Sabha elections it improved its tally from 5 to 14. In 14th Lok Sabha elections (2004) it could further improve its position by bagging 19 seats in Lok Sabha. It improved its vote percentage from 4.16 in 1999 to 5.08 in 2004. Its major triumphs have been in U.P. Its popular vote percentage went up by 2 per cent. In February 2002 elections it could not muster majority but it improved its strength in U.P. Vidhan Sabha as well as its share in the popular vote. It remained in power in U.P. as a part of BJP-BSP coalition. In February 2005 assembly election, it won 3 seats in Bihar Assembly as well. In other states, she played the role of a spoiler for the Congress in particular.In April 2004, the BSP contested 46 out of 48 Lok Sabha seats in Maharashtra. It garnered 10.46 lakh votes. However each of its candidates lost the security. In Bye election of 12 seats, it could capture 2 seats. In XVth Lok Sabh election it could win only 21 seats. The BSP has been recognized as a National Party in the Indian Political system and its popularity under Mayawati has been gradually on the ascendance. Despite the fact that BSP has been trying to woo the other communities by giving them party tickets yet it is identified as the party of the Dalits. The party has been playing the role of a spoiler to damage the National parties in the elections.
U.P. Elections (May, 2007), and Image of Dalit Leader on Mystical Height:
In the UP election held in May, 2007. BSP captured 206 seats out of total 403. Its main rival—The SP under M.S. Yadav could muster the strength of 97 only. The BJP was also trounced and could bag 51 seats. The Congress could manage to get only 22 seats despite Rahul Gandhi’s efforts to the maximum.Such a monumental triumph in UP elections shook the Samajwadi Party’s stalwarts to the last fibre. Both the national parties stood shaken. M.S. Yadav was vanquished as he failed to control ever deteriorating law and order situation in UP. The critics attributed this victory to her strategic role. She managed to keep Dalits happy and succeeded in building bridges with upper castes and Muslims.
Concept of Social engineering:
Besides, she could sense the public ire and resentful mood against the SP Government. She publicly promised to punish Mulayam Singh Yadav and restore law and order in the state. She brought state politics out of the Mandal and Kamandal straight jackets. She built-bridges with Brahmins whom she had been vehemently denouncing in the past. Before the election she had stated, “You will see astounding results, we will not need any coalition partner.”BSP was successful in effectively implementation of its scheme to gel Brahamins and Dalits in electoral politics to the dismay of political pundits. Her prediction came out to be true. In her concluding speech on the election eve she said, “People now realize we did not compromise on ideology to stay in power. We are honest to Dr. Ambedkar’s ideal of social equality. Now the other castes have also acknowledged our commitment.”
A newspaper commented in editorial on the victory of BSP, “Mayawati’s inclusive politics having paid off at the hustings, the BSP now has the Dalits, Muslims and upper castes—pretty much the pre-Mandal-Kamandal Congress combination cutting across communities—as its audience…. The people of UP tasted the fruits of identity politics and have found them unsavory. What they now want is real development electricity infrastructure and safety from criminal elements. …It is tall task for Mayawati the perennial kingmaker. But as monarch in 2007 she now has the overwhelming mandate to act. "The BSP leader is hoping to spread her net wider by contesting a few seats in the ensuing assembly elections. She may not be able to fare well but she can be a good spoiler especially for the Congress which banked upon Dalit and Muslim votes considerably.
Challenges before BSP to make itself relevant in the present scenario of Indian polity:
To retain relevance, the BSP will have to return to the early investments in constructing a Bahujan ideology and organization that it lost along the way. With only 19 seats in the U.P. Assembly in 2017, and repeated losses in parliamentary and Assembly elections in the last 10 years, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) is fighting for its life. The plunge in seats is not accompanied by a similar plunge in votes. But in a ‘first past the post’ electoral system, minor shifts in votes can cause massive shifts in seats. The BSP’s survival crisis is about something more than the party: it is about the nature of identity-based politics that the BSP represents. To understand why, consider the way in which the two main alternatives, the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), appeal to Dalits.
Appeals to Dalits by mainstream political parties like Congress and BJP:
The Congress appeals to Dalits by promising assimilation into a national mainstream. Its most prominent Dalit leader, Meira Kumar, personifies this promise. The soft-spoken Ms. Kumar, who rose to become India’s first woman Speaker, has opposed a caste census on the grounds that it would deepen caste divisions. “We must mainstream them,” she says of Dalits in her election speeches. In referring to Dalits as "them” rather than “us”, she distances herself not just from some attributes associated with a Dalit identity, but from the identity itself. Moreover, this statement implies that the mainstream is already defined, and that Dalits are passive subjects who must be “brought into” it by more autonomous others.
The BJP appeals to Dalits by promising immersion in a Hindu mainstream. This does not imply passivity as the Congress model does. It calls for self-transformation on the part of all members of the emergent Hindu nation. But in the past, self-transformation has for many Dalits in the BJP taken the form of self-sanitization. As one BJP regional leader previously told me: “I am neat and clean, not dirty like many other SCs. We are the caste that is nearest to Savarna (upper caste) Hindus. We do clean work.” He had, in his many years in the Bharatiya Jana Sangh and BJP, internalized stereotypes about both Dalits and upper castes, and come to accept that the model Hindu was an upper caste Hindu.
The BSP’s form of identity-based assertion, by contrast, is based on pride in Dalit identity as it exists in the present, not on the promise of assimilation or transformation in the future. The contrast was spelt out by Mayawati in her 1985 by-election campaign against Ms. Kumar when she declared flatly, “Main Chamar ki beti hoon (I am the daughter of a Chamar).” This has been a recurring refrain in her election campaigns although she sometimes switches to calling herself a “Dalit ki beti (daughter of a Dalit)”.
There is no transformation required to claim this identity. The only transformation that she and Kanshi Ram called for is for Dalits to become more vigilant in the defence of their interests. When I once asked her if she had ever experienced discrimination herself, she said no: “Main to hoshiar thi (I was vigilant).” The implication was clear. In order to be treated better, fellow Dalits must become vigilant too. This did not require them to alter something fundamental about their identity. In fact, many Dalits who attended BSP meetings in the early years told me about the thrill of self-recognition that they experienced in these meetings. They did not have to become someone else in order to take pride in themselves.
The BSP is not the first to articulate this form of Dalit assertion — it has been voiced earlier, and more consistently, by social reform movements, in a large body of Dalit literature, and by parties and organizations including the Republican Party of India and the Dalit Panthers. But because the BSP repeatedly won control of government, it has had a deeper and wider impact in challenging discrimination against Dalits and in reshaping public discourse.
Altering the public discourse:
When the BSP first came to power, Dalits in most parts of India were called Harijans. The BSP focused attention on the patronizing assumptions hidden behind the use of that word, popularizing the term “Dalit”, once restricted to Maharashtra and parts of the south, nationwide. When the BSP first came to power, B.R. Ambedkar was still portrayed primarily as a Dalit leader. The BSP stimulated a rewriting of history that recognized him as a national, and not only Dalit, icon. When the BSP first came to power, the practice of naming thousands of roads and bridges and airports and buildings and government schemes after a single family — the Nehru-Gandhis — had become so routine as to be unremarkable. But when the BSP began erecting statues to Kanshi Ram and Ms. Mayawati, any criticism of this as a self-aggrandising move had to acknowledge also the older forms of self-aggrandisation that had become acceptable in democratic politics. When the BSP came to power there were only the beginnings of awareness about the upper caste bias in the English-language media. But when the BSP began to ignore the English media altogether — and to win elections despite that — it brought the question of media bias front and centre. The BSP’s form of Dalit assertion, in other words, changed the mainstream discourse rather than simply “being brought into it”.
So why did the BSP lose, especially when its healthy vote share suggests that it likely retained much of its core, predominantly Dalit, vote base? The answer lies in its failure and the BJP’s success, in crafting the right caste-based combinations.
For the BSP, the winning of elections has always depended on what its workers call the “plus” factor. In every constituency, it counted on the votes of Dalits plus some section of others (backward castes and Muslims initially, and upper castes eventually). For the BJP, it has depended on what could be called the “minus” factor. As one party worker in U.P said to me: “Hum Muslims ko minus karke chaltein hain (We proceed by subtracting Muslims).” The BJP aimed to build a winning vote by cobbling together the support of Hindu upper castes, backward castes and Dalits — everyone but the Muslims. This is an old strategy for the BJP, taken to a new, more systematic, level in 2017.
But a substantial difference has emerged over time in the terms in which both parties construct these combinations.
Weakened infrastructure:
In the beginning, the BSP sought to construct these combinations through painstaking ideological mobilisation. Under Kanshi Ram’s leadership, the BSP held regular cadre camps, study sessions and political rallies in which it propagated a vision of the Bahujan Samaj as a rainbow coalition of subaltern groups. The BSP’s cultural pantheon has from its inception included important figures from across these groups: in addition to Ambedkar, it includes Jyotiba Phule, Narayana Guru, Chhatrapati Sahuji Maharaj, and Periyar. It also built a second- and third-line leadership from among backward castes and other Bahujan categories through the allocation of posts in the party organization.
Electoral arithmetic — alliances and tickets — was always an important part of this effort. In fact, Kanshi Ram chose the name “Bahujan”, or “majority”, for his new party, not only because of its association with non-Brahmin social movements but also because the name signalled that this party had the numbers to be a viable winner. The arithmetic was backed by an ideological and organisational infrastructure. Over the years, the BSP stopped investing in this infrastructure, relying on the promise of power to compensate. But a party that depends only on winning cannot withstand repeated losses and that is why the party is now in such dire straits.
BJP outreach, Modi resonance:
The BJP and the Sangh Parivar, by contrast, back their appeal to Dalits and backward castes by a strong ideological and organizational infrastructure. This infrastructure has become stronger and more innovative at a time when the BSP’s infrastructure has weakened. The Sangh Parivar has also begun to redefine the model Hindu in a way that incorporates Dalit and backward caste cultural symbols. In 1983, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh created the Samajik Samrasta Manch (Social Assimilation Platform), with the goal of harmonising “the Phule-Ambedkar thought with the Hindutva philosophy”. In 1989, the Vishva Hindu Parishad ensured that it was a Dalit who laid the first brick for the Ram temple at Ayodhya. The Sangh Parivar also has a large network of service organizations for Dalits and other subaltern groups. The BJP also has a strong organization which has produced a credible second- and third-line leadership from these groups.
he has said repeatedly, “will belong to the Dalits and the backwards.” This is a remarkable statement for the leader of India’s largest upper caste-dominated party to make. It is responsible in no small measure for the BJP’s success in crafting coalitions between subaltern castes and upper castes that would have been unthinkable 20 years ago.
At the same time, Mr. Modi’s public persona reinvents the notion of self-transformation embedded in BJP ideology. He acknowledges his caste identity without being defined by it, illustrating by example a way to transcend caste without denial or distancing. Further, the narrative of his own transformation from a tea seller’s son to Prime Minister suggests that it need not mean self-sanitization, or a disowning of identity, but self-realization: an honoring of the deepest aspirations associated with that identity. It is a powerful appeal especially in the new economy. And Ms. Mayawati’s persona does not have the same power against it that it did against Ms. Kumar in the pre-liberalization India of 1985.
If the BSP is not to become just another blip in the political landscape, it will have to return to the early investments in constructing a Bahujan ideology and organization that it lost along the way. What is more, it will also have to adapt its ideology in the face of a new political opponent. This is difficult, maybe unlikely. But, given the small shift in votes required for a large shift in seats, it is not impossible. If the BSP preserves a space in the political arena, the gainer will be not just the BSP but a healthy democratic discourse. If it does not, the loser will also be not just the BSP, but that discourse and all of the rest of us.
Role and challenge posed by left parties:
In fact communists and left parities organize and work in the weaker section from the very beginning. There program and ideology oriented around making the society equal for all by demolishing the feudal and capital structures both in terms of idea and policies. They oppose any caste fragmentation of society. According to them there is only two classes viz; oppressed and oppressors. They are working for equity based on the ideology of Karl Marx. There effect and relevance is challenged by the caste politics and they are inherently opposed to caste politics on which BSP survives. This contradiction make these two big political players to come together to assert and oppose the communal and congress ideology. This led to fragmentation of efforts and constituency oriented around so-called Dalits and oppressed sections of the society.
How to struck relevance in present scenario:
Parliamentary election in 2014 and assembly election recently in Uttar Pradesh raise a big question on the politics of BSP. BSP was badly decimated against the popular expectation of its coming to power in the state and win the handsome seats of MPs. BJP is a political front of RSS-a Hindu organization of known and well known structure at all levels. It is a known fact that it indulges in experimentation to influence the people and voting behavior. It also experiments how to create a nudge and discord between different religions and castes. This time it experimented with Dalit disintegration and created a model around non-Jatav(non-Chamar) and backward castes to defeat the politics of BSP and Samajwadi Party. After election results it was clear that a new conglomeration was developed benefiting the BJP. Now it’s a huge challenge before BJP to fight out this powerful Hindu cultural Organization. It shattered the backbone of Dalit politics in India particularly in north India. This new design couldn’t be defeated by sloganeering and tantrums but definite alternate has to be identified and worked upon. Coalition politics is one area of which till now BSP was a conscious opponent. To save the relevancy of itself it has to remodel its tactical and strategic line of action. BSP can’t blame the other political organizations for dismantling its unilateral hold over Dalit voters. It stolen this base from congress merely on the name of caste and misadventures. If BSP to stay alive in the Indian politics it has to reorganize it’s organizational and ideological resources.
