An Unequal Framework: The Indo US Interim Trade Deal and the Erosion of Reciprocity, Transparency and Strategic Autonomy

-Ramphal Kataria

From Strategic Autonomy to Managed Compliance: Reading the Indo–US Trade Framework

Abstract

The interim trade framework announced between India and the United States in 2025 marks a decisive departure from India’s long-standing trade diplomacy, agricultural protectionism, and claims of strategic autonomy. Unlike earlier trade negotiations—characterised by parliamentary debate, stakeholder consultations, and reciprocal tariff bargaining—this framework has emerged almost entirely through unilateral disclosures by the United States. Official statements from the White House, the US Trade Secretary, and former President Donald Trump’s social media account on Truth Social reveal commitments that stand in direct contradiction to assurances given by India’s Commerce Minister to Parliament and the public. This commentary argues that the framework is neither interim nor reciprocal, but an imposed arrangement shaped by coercive tariffs, geopolitical conditionalities, and surveillance of India’s foreign policy choices, particularly with regard to Russian oil imports. The opening of India’s agricultural sector to genetically modified (GM) soya oil, distillers dried grains (DDGs), maize by-products, sorghum, fruits, nuts, and pulses—confirmed in US fact sheets—signals a structural shift with profound implications for farmers, food sovereignty, and federalism. The paper situates the deal within a broader political economy of unequal exchange, executive secrecy, and declining credibility of India’s foreign and trade policy institutions.

Introduction

The interim trade framework announced between India and the United States in February 2026 has rapidly become one of the most contested economic agreements in recent Indian history. The controversy does not stem merely from opposition politics or farmer mobilization, but from the striking mismatch between what has been officially communicated by the Government of India and what has been revealed—often unilaterally—by the United States government. White House factsheets, Executive Orders, press briefings, and statements by President Donald Trump on his social media platform Truth Social have together painted a picture far more expansive and intrusive than the carefully worded joint statement issued on 6 February 2026.

This commentary argues that the agreement represents a qualitative shift in India–US economic relations: from negotiated reciprocity to imposed conditionality; from calibrated liberalization to sectorally asymmetric opening; and from strategic autonomy to externally monitored compliance. The opacity surrounding the deal has compounded its substantive asymmetry, undermining democratic accountability and eroding the credibility of ministerial assurances.

India–US Trade Relations Before Trump: Negotiated Asymmetry

India–US trade relations prior to the Trump administration were marked by persistent disagreements, particularly over tariffs, agriculture, intellectual property, and digital taxation. India maintained some of the highest applied tariffs among major economies—averaging 30–37% for agricultural goods and exceeding 100% for certain automobiles and dairy products. These tariffs were not accidental; they reflected deliberate policy choices rooted in food security, smallholder protection, and developmental space.

The United States repeatedly challenged these barriers, but disputes were addressed through multilateral forums, retaliatory tariffs, or prolonged negotiations. Crucially, India resisted opening politically sensitive sectors such as dairy, genetically modified food products, and mass-consumption staples like pulses and edible oils. Trade frictions existed, but they were embedded in a rules-based, negotiated framework.

This equilibrium began to unravel with Trump’s return to office and the unilateral imposition of punitive tariffs—reportedly up to 50%—on Indian exports. These tariffs were framed by Washington as “reciprocal”, but functioned in effect as economic coercion designed to force market access concessions.

The Interim Framework: Reciprocity Redefined

According to the White House factsheet dated 9 February 2026, India has agreed to eliminate or reduce tariffs on all US industrial goods and a wide range of food and agricultural products. These include dried distillers’ grains (DDGs), red sorghum, tree nuts, fresh and processed fruits, soybean oil, wine and spirits, and notably, “certain pulses”.

This language is materially broader than that contained in the joint India–US statement, which omitted pulses entirely and restricted red sorghum imports to animal feed. The disappearance of this qualifier in the US document is not a semantic detail; it has direct implications for domestic food markets and regulatory oversight.

In return, the United States has reduced its unilateral reciprocal tariff on Indian goods from 50% to 18%. This tariff continues to apply to roughly 55% of Indian exports. In other words, India has agreed to permanent tariff liberalization, while the US has merely partially rolled back a penalty it imposed unilaterally.

White House Fact Sheet on the India–US Interim Trade Framework

The following excerpts reproduce the language of the original White House fact sheet released in February 2026, as reported by multiple Indian newspapers before subsequent quiet revisions were made. These excerpts are crucial because they constitute the only authoritative public disclosure of India’s sectoral commitments under the interim framework.

“India will eliminate or reduce tariffs on all U.S. industrial goods and a wide range of U.S. food and agricultural products, including dried distillers’ grains (DDGs), red sorghum, tree nuts, fresh and processed fruit, certain pulses, soybean oil, wine and spirits, and additional products.”

“India committed to buy more American products and purchase over $500 billion worth of U.S. energy, information and communication technology, agricultural, coal and other products.”

The above wording was later altered by the White House—references to “certain pulses” were removed and the phrase “committed to buy” was softened to “intends to buy.” Notably, no corresponding clarification or disclosure was issued by the Government of India, even though these products fall squarely within politically sensitive and constitutionally shared domains such as agriculture and food policy.

The contradiction between this fact sheet and repeated public assurances by India’s Commerce Minister that “agriculture has not been opened” represents not a difference of interpretation, but a difference of record. In the absence of any Indian-authored text, the White House document effectively functions as the de facto trade agreement.

Agriculture as the Fault Line

Agriculture has emerged as the most politically and economically sensitive axis of the deal. Despite repeated assurances by the Commerce Minister that farmers’ interests—particularly in dairy and food staples—have been safeguarded, the White House factsheet tells a different story.

The inclusion of GM soybean oil and DDGs is especially contentious. DDGs, a by-product of maize-based ethanol production, have been associated with contamination risks and uncertain health impacts. GM soybean oil remains a politically contested commodity in India, where regulatory caution has traditionally prevailed.

The reference to “certain pulses” is perhaps the most alarming. Pulses are central to India’s nutrition security and farm economy. Even limited tariff reductions can depress domestic prices, as evidenced by India’s experience with edible oil liberalization over the past two decades. Farmer unions have warned that such concessions could undercut incomes and exacerbate agrarian distress.

Foreign Policy Conditionality and the Russian Oil Clause

The most unprecedented aspect of the framework lies outside traditional trade policy. The White House factsheet and subsequent Executive Order explicitly state that the rollback of the additional 25% tariff was granted in recognition of India’s commitment to stop purchasing Russian oil.

More significantly, the Executive Order mandates monitoring by a committee of US secretaries to assess whether India resumes Russian oil imports “directly or indirectly”, with the threat of reimposing tariffs. This represents an extraordinary intrusion into India’s sovereign energy policy and foreign relations. No previous trade agreement has subjected India’s external policy choices to external surveillance.

While Indian officials have insisted that energy procurement decisions remain guided by national interest, the absence of any explicit denial in the joint statement—and the detailed articulation of conditionality in US executive instruments—raises serious concerns about the erosion of strategic autonomy.

Why the Deal, and Why the Silence?

Three explanations help illuminate India’s acceptance of this framework. First, the immediate pressure created by punitive US tariffs threatened export-oriented sectors such as textiles, gems, leather and handicrafts. Second, the agreement reflects a broader geopolitical alignment in which economic concessions serve as signals of strategic compliance. Third, decision-making appears to have been highly centralized, with limited ministerial ownership or parliamentary scrutiny.

The opacity surrounding the deal is particularly troubling. The framework has not been tabled in Parliament. Detailed commitments have not been officially released. Instead, Indian stakeholders have been forced to rely on US disclosures to understand the scope of India’s obligations.

Comparative Perspective: Tariffs and Commitments

Sector / Item	Pre-Trump Indian Tariff on US Goods	Interim Framework Commitment	US Tariff on Indian Goods (Post-Deal)
Industrial Goods	7–15% average	Eliminated or sharply reduced	18% on ~55% exports
Agriculture (Average)	30–37%	Reduced/eliminated on listed items	18%
Pulses	30–50% (variable)	Included (“certain pulses”)	18%
GM Soybean Oil	High / restricted	Tariff reduction permitted	18%
DDGs	Restricted / high	Tariff reduction permitted	18%
Red Sorghum	Restricted; animal feed	No end-use qualifier	18%

Executive Order of the President of the United States – Trade Conditionality and Monitoring of Indian Oil Imports

The following passages are reproduced verbatim from the Executive Order signed by President Donald Trump in February 2026, modifying tariff duties applicable to India. This document formally links tariff relief to ongoing surveillance of India’s foreign policy choices, particularly with respect to Russian oil imports.

“Sec. 2. Tariff Modifications.
Effective with respect to goods entered for consumption, or withdrawn from the warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time on February 7, 2026, products of India imported into the United States shall no longer be subject to the additional ad valorem rate of duty of 25 percent imposed pursuant to Executive Order 14329.”

“Monitoring and Recommendations.”
“The Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and any other senior official the Secretary of Commerce deems appropriate, shall monitor whether India resumes directly or indirectly importing Russian Federation oil… If the Secretary of Commerce finds that India has resumed directly or indirectly importing Russian Federation oil… the Secretary of State shall recommend whether and to what extent I should take additional action as to India, including whether I should reimpose the additional ad valorem rate of duty of 25 percent on imports of articles of India.”

This language is unprecedented in India–US trade relations. For the first time, tariff relief granted to India is explicitly conditional on compliance with US preferences in matters of foreign and energy policy. The constitution of a multi-secretary monitoring mechanism to oversee India’s oil sourcing decisions amounts to a formalization of external supervision over sovereign economic choices.

No Indian official statement, cabinet note, or parliamentary disclosure has acknowledged this provision. The absence of denial is as significant as the absence of explanation. Taken together with India’s withdrawal from Chabahar-related engagements under US pressure and its compliance with sanctions regimes against Iran and Russia, the executive order confirms that the interim trade framework is not merely commercial in nature, but disciplinary in design.

Credibility, Democracy and Strategic Autonomy

Claims that India’s 18% tariff is among the lowest faced by US trading partners obscure the broader context. China continues to import discounted Russian oil without external monitoring, enhancing its industrial competitiveness. India, by contrast, faces higher energy costs and external scrutiny.

The cumulative effect is an erosion of credibility—of ministerial statements, of parliamentary accountability, and of India’s claim to independent foreign policy. Agreements may be unequal; diplomacy often is. But secrecy compounds inequality with indignity.

Conclusion

The interim Indo–US trade framework represents not merely a commercial arrangement, but a structural reordering of India’s economic and strategic posture. Its asymmetries may or may not be defensible. Its opacity is not. What has been agreed must be placed before Parliament and the public in full. Transparency is not a concession—it is the minimum requirement of democratic governance.

References

1. Bown, C (2024): Trade Wars and Tariff Power, Peterson Institute.

2. Chand, R (2017): “Indian Agriculture and Trade Liberalisation,” EPW, Vol 52, No 10.

3. Das, D K (2015): The WTO and India, Oxford University Press.

4. Downs, E (2024): “Russia–China Energy Trade,” Energy Policy.

5. Ganguly, S (2001): Conflict Unending, Columbia University Press.

6. Kohli, A (2023): Imperialism and the State, Oxford.

7. Mohan, C R (2022): India’s Changing Strategic Culture, Brookings.

8. Panagariya, A (2004): “India in the WTO,” EPW, Vol 39, No 32.

9. Strange, S (1988): States and Markets, Pinter.

 

 

Policing Land, Governing by Suspicion:Revenue Administration, Registration Law, and the Expanding Reach of the Police in Haryana

-Ramphal Kataria

From Civil Administration to Criminal Suspicion: Police Overreach in Haryana’s Land Governance

Abstract

Land administration has historically constituted the administrative core of the Indian State. From colonial revenue extraction to post-Independence redistribution and contemporary digital governance, revenue officers have functioned as the State’s primary interface with property, agrarian relations, and fiscal authority. Recent developments in Haryana—particularly police directives invoking criminal liability in matters of land registration, stamp valuation, and urban regulatory compliance—signal a significant institutional shift. Under the politically resonant rubric of “anti-corruption,” policing has begun to intrude into domains statutorily assigned to revenue authorities. This article examines the historical rationale for vesting land administration in the revenue bureaucracy, analyses the legal architecture governing registration and stamp duties, and critically evaluates the constitutional and administrative implications of police overreach. It argues that indiscriminate criminalisation of civil administration risks undermining statutory governance, institutional balance, and the rule of law.

1. Introduction: Land Administration and the Architecture of the Indian State

Land has never been merely an economic asset in India. It is simultaneously a source of livelihood, social identity, political power, and fiscal authority. Control over land records and revenue has historically underpinned the legitimacy and capacity of the State. From the Mauryan system of bhaga (produce share) to the Mughal zabt settlements and the British colonial revenue regimes, land administration has functioned as the spine of governance, enabling rulers to extract revenue, regulate agrarian relations, and maintain political order.

Post-Independence India inherited not only colonial land laws but also the institutional assumption that revenue administration is the most intimate interface between the State and society. Despite constitutional commitments to social justice and land reform, the basic architecture of land records, revenue courts, and registration offices remains largely intact. What has changed, however, is the growing tendency to view land administration not as a civil regulatory domain, but as a potential site of criminality warranting police intervention.

Recent developments in Haryana exemplify this shift. Police directives invoking criminal liability against Sub-Registrars for alleged violations under planning laws, stamp statutes, and municipal regulations represent a qualitative departure from established administrative practice. This article situates these developments within a longer historical and legal framework, arguing that such expansion of policing authority threatens the foundational logic of civil governance.

2. Historical Evolution of Land and Revenue Administration

2.1 Pre-Colonial Foundations

In pre-colonial India, land rights were rarely absolute or freely alienable. Ownership was embedded in cultivation, lineage, and community recognition. The sovereign’s claim over land was not proprietary but fiscal—the right to a share of produce in return for protection and administration. The Mauryan and Gupta empires institutionalised land measurement, record maintenance, and tax assessment through salaried officials, laying the foundations of a proto-revenue bureaucracy.¹

The Mughal period, particularly under Sher Shah Suri and Emperor Akbar, introduced scientific land measurement and systematic record-keeping. Raja Todar Mal’s revenue reforms formalised the Patwari–Qanungo system, with village-level record keepers responsible for maintaining cultivation and ownership details.² Crucially, even in this centralised system, land administration remained a civil function, oriented toward assessment and regulation rather than coercion.

2.2 Colonial Transformation: Revenue as the Engine of Empire

The British colonial state fundamentally altered India’s land regime. Revenue extraction became the principal motive of governance, and land was transformed into a marketable commodity. The Permanent Settlement of 1793 (Zamindari system) converted intermediaries into absolute proprietors, while Ryotwari and Mahalwari systems created direct fiscal relationships between cultivators and the State.³

The introduction of codified land revenue laws and deed registration was not aimed at justice or equity but at certainty of revenue. The Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887—still applicable in Haryana—emerged from this context. It established a hierarchy of revenue officers and formalised the Record of Rights (Jamabandi), providing a presumptive but rebuttable basis of land ownership.⁴

Registration of deeds was introduced to secure transactions and prevent fraud, not to adjudicate title. The registrar’s role was intentionally limited, reflecting the colonial state’s concern with efficiency rather than dispute resolution.

3. Post-Independence Reorientation: From Extraction to Equity

After 1947, land administration was reoriented toward constitutional goals of equity and redistribution. Zamindari abolition, land ceiling laws, tenancy reforms, and consolidation of holdings sought to dismantle feudal structures and democratise access to land.⁵

Despite these reforms, the administrative machinery remained revenue-centric. This continuity was neither accidental nor regressive. Land records, revenue courts, and registration offices were recognised as essential instruments for implementing reform and maintaining fiscal stability. In states like Haryana, carved out of Punjab in 1966, the inherited revenue structure became central to governance, particularly given the state’s agrarian economy and rapid urbanisation.

4. Dual Architecture of Land Governance: Records and Registration

India follows a hybrid land administration system comprising two distinct but interconnected subsystems:

4.1 Record of Rights (RoR)

Maintained under state land revenue laws, the RoR documents ownership, cultivation, tenancy, and encumbrances, linked to cadastral maps. Entries carry a presumption of correctness until rebutted.⁶ Mutation proceedings update these records following transactions or inheritance. While RoR entries are not conclusive proof of title, they serve as the primary operational evidence of land rights.

4.2 Registration of Deeds

Governed by the Registration Act, 1908, registration provides public notice of transactions involving immovable property. Sections 17 and 18 distinguish between compulsory and optional registration. Importantly, registration does not guarantee title, nor does it require the registrar to investigate ownership.⁷

The Supreme Court has repeatedly clarified this distinction, holding that registration is evidence of a transaction, not of valid title.⁸

5. Why Revenue Officers Administer Land

The vesting of land administration and registration in revenue officers reflects deep institutional logic:

1. Integrated Knowledge Base: Revenue officers control land records, maps, mutations, consolidation, ceiling proceedings, and acquisition.

2. Quasi-Judicial Tradition: From Assistant Collector to Collector, revenue officers adjudicate disputes under statutory frameworks.

3. Fiscal Responsibility: Stamp duty and registration fees constitute major non-tax revenue streams.

4. Administrative Neutrality: Revenue officers operate within civil service hierarchies, subject to departmental discipline and judicial review.

5. Village-Level Intelligence: Historically, revenue officers have served as the State’s primary interface with rural society.

In Haryana, a Tehsildar exercises powers as Assistant Collector Grade II and, in partition matters, Grade I, while also functioning as Sub-Registrar and Executive Magistrate. This concentration of functions ensures administrative coherence rather than arbitrariness.

6. Registration Law: Statutory Limits and Judicial Interpretation

The Registration Act, 1908 deliberately circumscribes the registrar’s role. Sections 34 and 35 require verification of identity and execution, not title. Section 71 allows refusal of registration only on statutory grounds, subject to appellate review.⁹

Judicial precedent reinforces this limited mandate. In Narandas Karsondas v S A Kamtam (1977), the Supreme Court held that a registered sale deed does not by itself convey title unless the transferor has valid ownership.¹⁰ In Suraj Lamp & Industries v State of Haryana (2012), the Court reiterated that registration is not a substitute for title adjudication.¹¹

These rulings underscore a fundamental principle: registration is facilitative, not adjudicatory.

7. Stamp Duty, Section 47A, and Civil Enforcement

The Indian Stamp Act, 1899, as amended in Haryana, provides a comprehensive mechanism to address undervaluation through Section 47A. The provision empowers the Collector—not the police—to determine market value and recover deficient duty.¹²

This design reflects legislative intent to treat valuation disputes as fiscal matters, resolved through adjudication and recovery rather than criminal prosecution. The Sub-Registrar’s duty is limited to forwarding suspect documents for valuation. Criminalising this process collapses the distinction between civil enforcement and penal sanction.

8. Urban Regulation and Section 7A of the 1975 Act

Section 7A of the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 restricts registration of small urban plots without a No Objection Certificate from the planning authority. The provision targets unauthorised colonisation by regulating transferors. It does not criminalise registration per se, nor does it impose investigative duties on registrars beyond statutory compliance.¹³

Nevertheless, police action has increasingly treated alleged violations as criminal conspiracies, disregarding the regulatory nature of the statute.

9. The Rise of Police Intrusion into Land Administration

Recent police directives in Haryana invoking criminal liability under stamp, municipal, and planning laws represent a significant institutional departure. By framing administrative lapses as criminal misconduct, policing authority is extended into domains governed by revenue statutes and civil procedures.

This expansion raises critical concerns:

9.1 Jurisdictional Overreach

Police authority is investigative, not supervisory over civil administration. Sub-Registrars are governed by revenue hierarchies, with appellate mechanisms under the Registration Act. Police directives seeking to discipline or prosecute registration officials bypass statutory governance.

9.2 Presumption of Corruption

Treating revenue officers as presumptively corrupt undermines the principles of administrative law, which presume bona fide action unless proven otherwise.¹⁴

9.3 Institutional Destabilisation

Fear-driven administration encourages risk avoidance, delays, and informal practices, paradoxically increasing opportunities for rent-seeking.

10. Digital Registration and Reduced Discretion

Haryana’s adoption of integrated digital platforms (HARIS and HALRIS) has significantly reduced individual discretion. Land records, valuation benchmarks, and planning restrictions are now algorithmically linked. In such a system, the Sub-Registrar functions largely as a process validator. To attribute personalised criminal intent in a system-driven environment reflects institutional myopia.

11. Revenue Contribution and Institutional Credibility

Between 2014–15 and 2024–25, Haryana collected approximately ₹75,000 crore in stamp duty and registration fees. This consistent growth undermines narratives of systemic corruption within the revenue administration. A department generating such revenue cannot plausibly be characterised as structurally corrupt without compelling evidence.

12. Civil State vs Police State

India’s constitutional design rests on functional separation and statutory governance. The police play a crucial role in criminal justice, but they are not arbiters of all administrative morality. When policing extends into revenue adjudication and fiscal assessment, the balance between civil governance and coercive power is disturbed.

Haryana, like the rest of India, is governed through civil administration—not police fiat.

13. Conclusion

The fight against corruption is both necessary and legitimate. However, when anti-corruption rhetoric becomes a vehicle for institutional overreach, it risks undermining the rule of law. Land administration in India has evolved over centuries as a specialised, statute-bound civil function. Indiscriminate criminalisation of this domain weakens governance rather than strengthening it.

The challenge lies not in policing land administration, but in governing it better—through transparency, accountability, and respect for statutory boundaries.

Footnotes

1. Thapar, R (2002): Early India, Penguin.

2. Habib, I (1999): The Agrarian System of Mughal India, OUP.

3. Stokes, E (1959): The English Utilitarians and India, OUP.

4. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887.

5. Government of India (1951): Report of the Agrarian Reforms Committee.

6. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, Sections 31–44.

7. Registration Act, 1908, Sections 17–18.

8. Narandas Karsondas v S A Kamtam (1977) 3 SCC 247.

9. Registration Act, 1908, Sections 71–77.

10. Suraj Lamp & Industries v State of Haryana (2012) 1 SCC 656.

11. Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (Haryana Amendment), Section 47A.

12. Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975, Section 7A.

13. State of Punjab v Baldev Singh (1999) 6 SCC 172.

 

 

Groundwater Stress Worsens in Haryana: A Looming Water Catastrophe

-Ramphal Kataria

From Breadbasket to Water Bankruptcy: Haryana’s Groundwater Reckoning

“When water hides beneath our feet, we forget its value—until the wells run dry and the fields crack.”
This proverb has tragically become true in Haryana, where groundwater—a lifeline for agriculture, drinking water, and rural livelihoods—is being extracted far faster than nature can replenish it. Recent data shows the state is extracting water at about 136–137% of its annual extractable resources, leading to an alarming situation where 88 out of 143 blocks are over-exploited* and several others are categorised as critical by scientific assessment.

Haryana, once a flourishing agrarian state and a pillar of India’s Green Revolution, now faces an existential water crisis. Recent assessments show that about 64%–62% of Haryana’s blocks have crossed the threshold of groundwater sustainability, classified as over-exploited — meaning that extraction exceeds natural recharge annually.⁽1⁾ Similarly, extraction is currently running at approximately 136% of the state’s annual extractable groundwater resources — a clear indicator that water is being consumed faster than it can be replenished.

The Present Crisis: Facts and Figures

Haryana’s groundwater situation reflects an unsustainable extraction model:

Of 143 assessment units (blocks/urban), ~62% are over-exploited, ~8% critical, and only ~25% safe.

Total annual recharge is around 10.32 billion cubic meters (BCM), yet extraction reaches ~12.7 BCM—far outstripping what nature can replenish.

Agriculture is the primary consumer: over 1.12 million hectares of cultivated land are irrigated by tubewells, supported by approximately 850,000 irrigation tubewells.

Independent research indicates that Haryana, along with neighbouring Punjab, has lost tens of billions of cubic meters of groundwater over the past two decades, affecting aquifers deeply.

This unsustainable pattern has crippled the groundwater regime, especially in south-western districts like Hisar, Bhiwani, Jind, Dadri and Mahendragarh, where water tables have been dropping consistently because of high extraction and poor recharge.

Why This Crisis Happened: Root Causes

1. Water-Intensive Agriculture

Haryana’s agricultural success story is also a paradoxical water tragedy:

The Green Revolution’s emphasis on wheat and especially rice—one of the most water-thirsty crops—significantly increased irrigation demand.

Paddy cultivation has expanded many times over since the 1960s, while traditional millets and pulses have shrunk, despite these crops being far more water-efficient.

Even regions with sandy soils and naturally low water retention (e.g., western Haryana) have witnessed paddy cultivation, leading to greater water waste and faster aquifer depletion.

This has created a rigid cropping pattern that is difficult to shift without strong economic incentives or policy nudges.

2. Inefficient Field Irrigation Practices

Farmers predominantly use flood irrigation, where fields are intentionally inundated and water is lost to evaporation or lateral flow rather than being used efficiently by crops. Uneven bunding, lack of micro-irrigation techniques (like drip or sprinkler), and poor soil moisture practices exacerbate water loss.

3. Failed Policy & Institution Response

Despite widespread recognition of the problem, policy and implementation gaps persist:

Attempts to diversify cropping patterns have not succeeded at scale due to lack of incentives, weak extension education, and insufficient farmer engagement.

Water harvesting proposals remain largely unimplemented; stormwater and monsoon runoff—which could significantly recharge aquifers—are not being captured systematically.

No effective regulation exists on tubewell drilling or extraction limits, meaning farmers and industries can extract without restriction.

There is no statewide institutional plan that coordinates the Agriculture Department, Irrigation Department, water boards, and universities to mobilise scientific best practices and enforce sustainable water use.

4. Rainwater Mismanagement & Floods

In the rainy season, surface water flows unchanneled across the state, often inundating low-lying zones of Jind, Hisar, Bhiwani and Rohtak. Severe rain events, particularly in Ghaggar and Yamuna sub-basins, regularly cause flooding, stagnation, and crop damage.

Instead of harvesting and diverting this rainwater to water-deficit zones in south-west Haryana, much of it is lost as floods or stagnation. Blocked drains, silted channels, and poor canal management often worsen flooding—which is the flip side of the groundwater imbalance.

Historical Policy Failures

Despite multiple groundwater assessments by CGWB and state bodies over decades, strategic action has lagged:

No mandatory groundwater licensing or quotas for tubewells exist in most rural areas.

Farmers receive electricity subsidies for tube well operation, inadvertently encouraging extraction with little cost.

Crop MSP and procurement policies continue to favour water-intensive crops.

Haryana has repeatedly introduced schemes like Mera Pani, Meri Virasat with limited reach and uptake.

Universities and research institutions (e.g., agricultural universities) have not been properly mobilised to train farmers in water-saving techniques at scale or to develop alternatives adapted to local agro-ecologies.

What Must Be Done: A Scientific Roadmap

Addressing this crisis requires urgent, coordinated, and science-based policies:

1. Restrict & Regulate Extraction

Implement groundwater licensing and limits tied to aquifer health.

Enforce penalties for illegal drilling and over-extraction.

2. Shift Cropping Patterns

Offer remunerative incentives to grow millets, oilseeds, pulses, cotton and other low-water crops.

Reform MSP and procurement to reduce rice dominance.

3. Water-Efficient Farming

Subsidise micro-irrigation systems (drip/sprinkler) especially in water-stressed blocks.

Strengthen extension services to teach crop rotations and soil moisture conservation.

4. Rainwater & Runoff Harvesting

Develop statewide rainwater harvesting plans to capture monsoon runoff and flood flows into recharge basins.

Enhance drainage network maintenance to prevent stagnation and channel water to recharge structures.

5. Institutional Coordination

Create an empowered Haryana Water Commission integrating Irrigation, Agriculture, Rural Development, and Science Institutions.

Mandate annual data-driven groundwater health reporting and adaptive management.

Areas Most Affected: Stark Contrasts

Region / Block Type	Water Status
~61–62% Blocks (88+)	Over-exploited – extraction > recharge
~8% Blocks (~11)	Critical – severe stress
~25% Blocks (~36)	Safe or semi-critical
Gurgaon, Faridabad, Panipat	Very high extraction rates (200%+)
South-West (Hisar, Bhiwani, Jind)	Deepening water table, limited surface inflow
Eastern & North zones	Occasional floods, poor runoff management

(Exact block names and data available in CGWB’s full Haryana assessment reports.)

The Bottom Line: A Water Reckoning for Haryana

Haryana’s groundwater crisis did not arise overnight—it is the outcome of decades of policy inertia, agricultural preferences, and institutional fragmentation. The state stands at a crossroads: continue with the same model and witness deeper water insecurity, or pivot decisively toward sustainability.

This is not just an environmental issue—it threatens food security, rural livelihoods, economic resilience, and social stability. With aquifers declining and surface droughts juxtaposed with floods, the time for comprehensive action is now.

If we fail to build a scientific, community-anchored water management system, the next generation could inherit a landscape where water is no longer a guaranteed right but a dwindling resource.

Footnotes

1. Central Ground Water Board (CGWB) Dynamic Ground Water Resources Assessment 2024: groundwater extraction ~135.96% of extractable resources; 88 of 143 blocks classified as over-exploited.

2. Tribune India, groundwater category and conservation program Mera Pani Meri Virasat details.

3. The Week – Haryana groundwater and irrigated area statistics.

4. India Environment Portal – Groundwater use in agriculture context.