From Asymmetry to Arm-Twisting:The India–US Trade “Deal” and the Unravelling of Strategic Autonomy

-Ramphal Kataria

Trade under Duress: India–US Tariffs and the Erosion of Strategic Autonomy

Abstract

The trade “deal” announced by US President Donald Trump in February 2026, purportedly resetting tariffs on Indian exports and rebalancing bilateral trade, marks a significant rupture in India’s trade and foreign policy posture. Announced unilaterally by the US President on social media, without a published text or parliamentary scrutiny in India, the agreement follows a year of punitive tariff escalation by the United States linked explicitly to India’s energy purchases from Russia. This article examines the evolution of the India–US trade relationship from its earlier asymmetrical but rules-based structure to a coercive tariff regime and finally to the present opaque “deal”. It argues that the agreement, far from representing a strategic or economic gain for India, reflects negotiated retreat under duress, raises serious concerns about transparency, parliamentary sovereignty and policy autonomy, and risks long-term damage to India’s agriculture, trade diversification and independent foreign policy.

1. Introduction: A Deal Announced Elsewhere

On 2 February 2026, US President Donald Trump announced on his Truth Social platform that he had concluded a “trade deal” with India following a telephone conversation with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The announcement claimed that US tariffs on Indian goods would be reduced from 50% to 18%, that India would eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers on US goods, purchase over $500 billion worth of American products, and cease buying Russian oil. Within hours, US officials echoed these claims, framing the agreement as a major victory for American farmers and energy producers.

What was striking was not merely the content of the announcement, but the venue and process: no joint statement, no released text, no prior parliamentary briefing in India, and a conspicuous divergence between the US narrative and India’s own official statements. While Prime Minister Modi welcomed the reduction in tariffs on Indian goods, he made no reference to Russian oil, zero tariffs on US imports, agriculture or the purported $500 billion import commitment.

This episode invites deeper scrutiny. How did a trade relationship that once operated within multilateral rules descend into tariff warfare? What exactly has changed under the new “deal”? And what does this tell us about India’s evolving trade and foreign policy orientation?

2. The Pre-Crisis Trade Regime: Asymmetry without Coercion

Before the tariff crisis of 2025, India–US trade was characterised by asymmetrical but predictable tariff structures under WTO rules.

According to WTO data, the average applied US tariff on Indian goods was approximately 2–3%, reflecting the low industrial tariffs of advanced economies.¹ By contrast, India’s average applied tariff on US goods was significantly higher, around 12–15%, with much steeper protection in agriculture, dairy, livestock products and processed foods.²

This asymmetry was neither accidental nor clandestine. India’s tariff structure reflected its developmental priorities, the vulnerability of its agrarian economy, and long-standing political economy constraints. Crucially, these tariffs were WTO-consistent and applied on a Most Favoured Nation (MFN) basis.

Despite frequent US complaints about market access—particularly regarding dairy, medical devices and digital trade—disputes were pursued through negotiations and, occasionally, WTO mechanisms. The relationship, while unequal, remained rules-based rather than coercive.

3. The Turning Point: Energy, Geopolitics and Tariff Weaponisation

The equilibrium collapsed in 2025. Following the escalation of the Ukraine war and tightening Western sanctions on Russia, India sharply increased imports of discounted Russian crude oil to secure energy affordability and inflation control. By mid-2024, Russia had become one of India’s largest oil suppliers.

The Trump administration explicitly linked trade retaliation to this energy relationship. In early 2025, the US imposed a 25% “reciprocal tariff” on a wide range of Indian exports. Later that year, it added an additional 25% punitive tariff, explicitly framed as a penalty for India’s continued purchase of Russian oil.³

This escalation pushed total tariffs on Indian goods to nearly 50%, rendering large segments of Indian exports—textiles, garments, leather, gems and jewellery—commercially unviable in the US market. The move was unilateral, extraterritorial in intent, and difficult to reconcile with WTO principles.

Reuters reported that the measures affected Indian exports worth tens of billions of dollars and triggered strong protests from New Delhi, which argued that energy security decisions were sovereign and market-based.⁴

4. India–US Trade Deal 2026: From Asymmetry to Arm-Twisting

Table 1: India–US Trade Regimes Compared

Parameter	Pre-Trade War (till 2024)	US Unilateral Tariff Regime (2025)	Trump-Announced “Deal” (Feb 2026)
Average US tariff on Indian goods	~2–3% (WTO MFN rates)	25% + additional 25% penalty = ~50%	18%
Legal basis	WTO-consistent	Unilateral, punitive, non-WTO	Executive announcement; text not public
Trigger	Normal trade	India buying Russian oil	“Friendship with Modi” (Trump’s words)
Indian tariff on US goods	~12–15% average; higher on agri/dairy	Unchanged	Trump claims ZERO tariffs; India denies
Agriculture & dairy imports from US	Effectively excluded / highly protected	Excluded	US claims entry; India claims exclusion
Energy commitments	Market-based diversification	Penalised for Russian oil	Trump: stop Russian oil, buy US & Venezuela
Transparency	Parliamentary oversight	Publicly notified	Announced on Truth Social, not Parliament

 

5. India’s Parallel Trade Strategy: Russia and the European Union

While trade tensions with the US intensified, India pursued diversification elsewhere.

5.1 India–Russia Trade

India’s trade engagement with Russia expanded significantly after 2022, anchored primarily in energy. The arrangement involved:

Long-term crude oil supply contracts at discounted rates

Settlement mechanisms outside the US dollar

Increased imports of fertilisers and coal

Prospective cooperation in pharmaceuticals, defence spares and shipping insurance

This trade was not ideological alignment but pragmatic energy economics. The US tariff penalty effectively criminalised this pragmatism.

5.2 India–EU Free Trade Agreement

In January 2026, India and the European Union concluded negotiations on a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA), described as the most ambitious trade opening India has ever offered.⁵ The agreement promises:

Progressive elimination or reduction of tariffs on over 90% of traded goods

Significant access for EU automobiles, machinery, chemicals and pharmaceuticals

Expanded access for Indian textiles, leather, marine products and services

EU Deal vs US Deal: The Stark Contrast

EU–India FTA	US–India “Deal”
Negotiated over years	Announced via social media
Text released	Text absent
Parliamentary ratification required	Parliament bypassed
Gradual tariff reduction	Immediate coercive reset
Reciprocity	One-sided leverage

 

Crucially, the EU–India FTA requires ratification by the European Parliament and national parliaments of EU member states, as well as India’s Parliament. Until then, it has no legal force.

This contrast in process is instructive.

6. The February 2026 Announcement: What Was Claimed

On 2 February 2026, President Trump wrote on Truth Social:

“Prime Minister Modi agreed to stop buying Russian Oil, and to buy much more from the United States and, potentially, Venezuela… We agreed to a Trade Deal… lowering tariffs from 25% to 18%. India will reduce their Tariffs and Non Tariff Barriers against the United States, to ZERO… and buy over $500 BILLION DOLLARS of U.S. Energy, Technology, Agricultural, Coal, and many other products.”⁶

The White House subsequently described the deal as a “major win” for US farmers and exporters, while the US Secretary of Agriculture publicly thanked Trump for opening India’s market to American agricultural products.⁷

7. India’s Official Response: Precision through Silence

Prime Minister Modi’s public statement was markedly restrained. He confirmed that tariffs on Indian exports to the US would be reduced to 18% and praised President Trump’s leadership, but omitted any reference to:

Russian oil

Zero tariffs on US goods

Agriculture and dairy access

A $500 billion import commitment

Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal later told Parliament that India’s sensitive sectors, including agriculture and dairy, were protected and that energy security decisions would remain market-based.⁸

The divergence between the two narratives has not been resolved by the release of a signed text or tariff schedule.

8. Import Arithmetic: The Implausibility of $500 Billion

India’s macro-trade data renders the US claim of $500 billion imports deeply questionable.

According to the Union Budget 2026–27 and official trade statistics:

India’s total annual imports are approximately $720–750 billion (about ₹49 lakh crore).⁹

Imports from the United States in recent years have averaged $45–50 billion annually.

A commitment to import $500 billion worth of US goods would imply:

Nearly two-thirds of India’s total imports sourced from one country

A dramatic displacement of imports from the EU, China, ASEAN, the Gulf and Africa

No timeline or disaggregation has been provided. Without such clarity, the figure appears rhetorical rather than contractual.

9. Tariff Outcomes: Relief Disguised as Concession

The reduction of US tariffs on Indian goods from 50% to 18% has been widely portrayed as a diplomatic success. In reality, it represents:

A partial rollback of punitive measures

Not a restoration of pre-crisis tariff levels

Certainly not a structural gain

At 18%, US tariffs on Indian exports remain six to nine times higher than their pre-2025 levels.

Meanwhile, the claim that India will reduce tariffs on US goods to zero—if realised—would represent a far more radical departure from India’s historical trade policy, particularly if extended to agriculture and dairy.

10. Agriculture: The Silent Fault Line

Agriculture remains the most politically sensitive sector in India. The US has long sought access for:

Dairy products

Poultry

Processed foods

Genetically modified crops

US officials have explicitly framed the deal as a victory for American farmers.⁷ Indian officials deny any such opening.

Without a published annex or tariff schedule, this contradiction cannot be independently verified. What is clear is that opacity itself becomes a policy risk, especially for a sector already burdened by debt, price volatility and agrarian distress.

11. Trade, Energy and Strategic Autonomy

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the announcement is its implication for India’s foreign policy.

Trump’s assertion that India agreed to stop buying Russian oil—and instead buy oil from the US and Venezuela—raises fundamental questions:

When did Venezuela, previously sanctioned, become acceptable?

Why is India’s energy policy being announced by a foreign leader?

Can India still claim strategic autonomy if trade sanctions dictate its energy choices?

The use of tariffs to compel foreign policy alignment represents a shift from partnership to discipline.

12. Parliament and the Democratic Deficit

Trade agreements reshape domestic economies and livelihoods. In constitutional democracies, they are subject to scrutiny and debate.

The EU–India FTA awaits ratification. The India–US “deal” was announced while Parliament was in session, without a statement, debate or document. Opposition demands for clarification were met with general assurances, not evidence.

This bypassing of Parliament marks a worrying erosion of democratic oversight in trade and foreign policy.

13. The Butter-and-Bread Analogy (Child Demanding butter, snatched the bread by mom)

India once had:

low US tariffs

policy autonomy

After the trade war:

tariffs were snatched away

autonomy was put on the table

Now, India is being told to celebrate getting back part of what it already had — at the cost of future concessions.

This is not a deal.
It is damage control under duress.

14. Conclusion: Retreat, Not Realignment

The February 2026 India–US trade “deal” does not represent a strategic breakthrough. It represents a negotiated retreat from an artificially created crisis.

India regained partial market access it should never have lost, at the cost of:

Policy ambiguity

Strategic silence

Potential future concessions

For a country aspiring to be a pole in a multipolar world, this episode signals vulnerability rather than confidence. Trade conducted under threat ceases to be trade; it becomes compliance.

Footnotes

1. WTO, World Tariff Profiles, latest edition. ↩

2. WTO, Tariff Analysis Online, India profile. ↩

3. Reuters, “U.S. raises tariffs on Indian goods over Russian oil purchases,” 2025. ↩

4. Reuters, “India protests U.S. tariff penalties linked to Russia trade,” 2025. ↩

5. Financial Times, “EU and India conclude landmark free trade agreement,” January 2026. ↩

6. Reuters, “Trump says U.S. agreed trade deal with India,” 2 February 2026. ↩

7. Reuters, statements by US Secretary of Agriculture, February 2026. ↩ ↩²

8. Reuters, “India says farm sector protected in U.S. trade deal,” February 2026.

9. Union Budget of India 2026–27, Budget Documents, Ministry of Finance. ↩

 

 

When Politics Overruns the Pitch: Cricket, Boycotts and the Erosion of Sporting Neutrality

-Ramphal Kataria

When Sport Becomes a Political Veto: The India–Pakistan Cricket Impasse

Abstract

The boycott by Pakistan of its scheduled India–Pakistan match in the ICC Men’s T20 World Cup 2026 represents a decisive rupture in the already fragile separation between sport and geopolitics in South Asia. Unlike earlier disruptions driven by security exigencies or bilateral breakdowns, the present episode is marked by selective participation, proxy decision-making, and the erosion of institutional autonomy within global cricket governance. Triggered by the withdrawal of Bangladeshi cricketer Mustafizur Rahman from the Indian Premier League and Bangladesh’s subsequent exit from the tournament, the crisis exposes how sporting bodies have increasingly become conduits for political signalling rather than neutral custodians of the game. Situating the episode within the longer history of sporting boycotts and sports diplomacy, this article argues that the present escalation undermines cricket’s role as a medium of people-to-people contact and weakens India’s soft-power credibility as a leader in international cricket. The normalisation of political intervention in sporting competition threatens not only the integrity of global tournaments but also the very idea of sport as a shared, rule-bound public good.

Introduction

Sport has long mirrored political conflict, but it has also, at crucial moments, offered a space of partial insulation from it. In South Asia, cricket has occupied this paradoxical position more visibly than any other cultural practice. India–Pakistan matches, whether bilateral or within multilateral tournaments, have functioned as symbolic encounters where rivalry was ritualised rather than militarised, and antagonism channelled into rule-bound competition.

The decision of Pakistan to boycott its scheduled match against India in the ICC Men’s T20 World Cup on 15 February 2026 signals a departure from this uneasy equilibrium. It is not merely another chapter in the history of sporting disruption between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. Rather, it represents a qualitative shift: the transformation of cricket from a contested but shared arena into an explicit site of political veto.

What makes this episode particularly significant is not the boycott itself—sporting boycotts are hardly unprecedented—but its selective character, its proximate triggers outside the India–Pakistan dyad, and the manner in which formal sporting institutions appear to have functioned as proxies for political authority. Together, these elements raise fundamental questions about the future of sporting neutrality, the autonomy of global sporting governance, and the limits of using sport as an instrument of political signalling.

Cricket, Conflict and the Fragile Logic of Neutrality

For much of the past decade, India–Pakistan cricket has survived through a pragmatic compromise: the staging of matches at neutral venues under multilateral tournament frameworks. This arrangement acknowledged political hostility while preserving the minimal conditions for sporting engagement. Cricket thus remained one of the few remaining channels of symbolic contact between the two societies.

This compromise rested on two implicit assumptions. First, that sporting institutions such as the ICC would act as neutral arbiters, enforcing uniform rules irrespective of political pressure. Second, that states would recognise the distinct value of sport as a space apart from formal diplomacy. The events surrounding the 2026 T20 World Cup suggest that both assumptions are now under strain.

The Immediate Trigger: Mustafizur Rahman and the IPL

The chain of events leading to the present crisis did not originate in Islamabad or New Delhi, but in the Indian Premier League. The withdrawal of Bangladeshi fast bowler Mustafizur Rahman from his IPL franchise became the catalyst for a broader diplomatic escalation. While officially justified on contractual and logistical grounds, the decision unfolded against the backdrop of domestic political mobilisation in India following communal violence in Bangladesh.

The politicisation of Rahman’s participation exposed a recurring pattern in contemporary sport: the increasing permeability of professional leagues to nationalist sentiment and extra-sporting pressures. What might otherwise have remained an internal franchise matter was allowed to acquire diplomatic significance, with limited effort to contain its ramifications.

Bangladesh’s Withdrawal and the Breakdown of Multilateralism

Bangladesh’s subsequent refusal to travel to India for its World Cup fixtures marked the first formal rupture in the tournament’s integrity. Framed as a security concern, the decision also reflected a broader perception that Bangladeshi interests and dignity had been compromised within Indian sporting space.

The ICC’s refusal to relocate Bangladesh’s matches, followed by the induction of a replacement team, transformed a bilateral grievance into a multilateral crisis. While the ICC’s position was formally consistent with tournament regulations, its inflexibility highlighted the tension between administrative uniformity and political sensitivity. Bangladesh’s removal from the tournament effectively normalised the idea that participation in global sporting events could be conditional on geopolitical alignments.

Pakistan’s Selective Boycott: Protest Without Withdrawal

Pakistan’s decision to boycott only the India match while participating in the remainder of the tournament represents a novel and troubling development. Unlike historical boycotts that involved full withdrawal and attendant costs, this approach combines political signalling with competitive and commercial retention.

Such selectivity undermines the principle of equal competition that underpins international sport. If teams are permitted to refuse specific opponents without forfeiting tournament participation, the logic of multilateral sport collapses. Cricket becomes a menu of political choices rather than a structured contest governed by shared rules.

The Pakistan government’s explicit role in directing this decision further blurs the boundary between state policy and sporting autonomy. While the Pakistan Cricket Board executed the boycott, the locus of authority lay elsewhere, reinforcing the perception that sporting bodies have become instruments of geopolitical messaging.

Sporting Boycotts in Historical Perspective

Sporting boycotts have historically derived their moral force from collective action and principled sacrifice. The isolation of apartheid South Africa, the Olympic boycotts of the Cold War era, and contemporary sanctions against Russia following the invasion of Ukraine all involved tangible costs borne by boycotting states and athletes.

By contrast, selective participation dilutes the ethical clarity of boycott. It transforms protest into performance, allowing states to claim moral positioning without relinquishing competitive or financial benefits. This shift reflects a broader trend in international politics: the preference for symbolic gestures over substantive commitment.

From IPL to World Cup Boycott — A Timeline of Escalation

Late 2025
Mustafizur Rahman, Bangladeshi international cricketer, is withdrawn from his IPL franchise amid domestic political protests in India following communal violence in Bangladesh.

December 2025
The issue escalates diplomatically as Bangladeshi media and political actors frame the decision as discriminatory and unsafe for Bangladeshi players.

January 2026
Bangladesh Cricket Board refuses to send its team to India for ICC T20 World Cup fixtures, citing security concerns and loss of confidence.

Mid-January 2026
ICC declines Bangladesh’s request to relocate matches; Bangladesh is subsequently removed from the tournament and replaced.

Late January 2026
Pakistan publicly criticises ICC’s handling of the Bangladesh issue and signals solidarity.

1 February 2026
India and Pakistan Under-19 teams play each other at the Youth World Cup in Bulawayo, drawing high global viewership and no security incidents.

Early February 2026
Pakistan announces it will participate in the T20 World Cup but boycott the scheduled India match on 15 February in Colombo.

15 February 2026
India–Pakistan senior men’s match does not take place, marking the first selective boycott of its kind in ICC tournament history.

The Erosion of People-to-People Contact

Cricket’s political significance in South Asia cannot be reduced to elite diplomacy. For decades, it has functioned as a medium of popular engagement, enabling millions to participate in a shared cultural ritual that transcends national boundaries. Even when bilateral relations were frozen, cricket sustained a minimal form of dialogue through spectacle.

The cancellation of the India–Pakistan match thus represents a loss not only to broadcasters and sponsors, but to ordinary spectators whose emotional investment in the game exceeds political allegiance. That India and Pakistan’s Under-19 teams competed in the Youth World Cup on 1 February 2026 without incident underscores the artificiality of the rupture at the senior level. It also reveals how political decisions selectively target high-visibility platforms while leaving less prominent exchanges intact.

Institutional Autonomy and Governance by Proxy

Perhaps the most consequential implication of the present crisis lies in what it reveals about global cricket governance. The BCCI and the ICC are formally autonomous bodies, yet their decisions increasingly reflect national political priorities. The Mustafizur Rahman episode, the handling of Bangladesh’s withdrawal, and the response to Pakistan’s boycott all point to a governance structure vulnerable to state influence.

This erosion of autonomy raises normative concerns. If sporting bodies function as proxies for government policy, democratic accountability demands transparency. The current arrangement—where political decisions are disavowed while being operationalised through sporting institutions—undermines both institutional credibility and public trust.

India’s Leadership Role and Soft-Power Costs

India’s position as the dominant economic and administrative force in world cricket confers not only influence but responsibility. The perception that global cricket governance has become excessively India-centric risks delegitimising the ICC itself. More importantly, it undermines India’s long-standing use of cricket as a tool of soft power and regional engagement.

While short-term commercial losses may be absorbed, the long-term reputational cost is harder to quantify. The normalisation of politicised sporting decisions diminishes India’s ability to project itself as a responsible steward of global sport and a proponent of rule-based internationalism.

Conclusion

The boycott of the India–Pakistan match at the 2026 T20 World Cup marks a critical moment in the political history of cricket. It reflects not only the intensification of regional tensions, but a deeper transformation in how sport is governed and instrumentalised. As sporting institutions lose autonomy and states increasingly treat competition as a site of political veto, the foundational ideals of fairness, neutrality, and shared participation are eroded.

Cricket has historically endured precisely because it offered a space where conflict could be ritualised rather than escalated. Preserving that space now requires political restraint and institutional courage. Without it, the game risks becoming another arena where diplomacy fails and symbolism substitutes for engagement.

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