— Ramphal Kataria
The caste system in India is not merely a social stigma or an ethical blemish: it has been a living mechanism of economic exclusion, social control and political instrumentality. Its roots are heterogeneous — textual prescriptions (e.g. Manu), local occupational and kinship rules (jāti), medieval social crystallization and colonial codification — and at each stage caste acquired new functions that protected privilege and channelled resources to dominant groups. The great 20th-century clash between B. R. Ambedkar and M. K. Gandhi over how to confront caste — annihilation vs. reform — crystallises deeper dilemmas: Who speaks for the oppressed? Should change be radical and structural or moral and gradual? Political parties and movements since have repeatedly co-opted, softened, or instrumentalised Ambedkar’s legacy — often privileging symbolism (statues, festivals, token benefits) over structural redistribution. This essay traces the historical origins, analyses the economic and political dimensions, examines Ambedkar’s arguments and Gandhi’s counter-positions (and critiques of them), and surveys how other forces — Congress, the Left, and the Sangh-Parivar — have interacted with caste politics up to present controversies.
1. How caste began — varṇa, jāti, occupation, texts and colonial re-making
There is no single origin story. Indian social historians map a complex, multi-layered formation: classical textual categories (varṇa) that offer an ideological schema; local occupational and kinship groups (jāti) that regulated marriage and work; gradual medieval crystallization of status and local hierarchies; and a crucial modern moment when British administration, censuses and legal categories froze, codified and politicised those boundaries. That “freezing” transformed fluid social etiquettes and local hierarchies into enumerable categories that could be used for recruitment, taxation and later electoral mobilization — and thus made caste a political resource.
Why this matters: an origin that mixes ritual prescriptions and material control explains why caste persists as both a symbolic stigma and a durable engine of economic exclusion — it supplies rules for marriage and ritual and rules for who gets land, guild membership, training and access to patronage. Where economic advantage attaches to status, status becomes self-perpetuating.
2. Caste as a mechanism of oppression and economic control
Think of caste not only as hierarchy but as institutionalised gatekeeping: occupational monopolies, denial of land, restricted access to wells, temples and public goods, and ritual rules that delegitimise claims to dignity. Ambedkar’s apt image — a “multi-storied tower with no staircase” — captures the hereditary immobility produced by that mixture of ritual and property rules. Where caste sorts people into categories that map onto property and political power, it becomes an economic system as much as a social one: upper castes capture administrative jobs, land rights and institutional access; lower castes are pushed into insecure labour and denied political voice.
3. Manusmṛti, prescriptions and the textual architecture of hierarchy
If we ask where doctrinal legitimacy came from, the Manusmṛti and other Dharmaśāstra texts offered concrete rules: penalties for inter-varṇa intercourse, rules on mixed-caste progeny (varṇa-saṃkara), graded punishments and ritual disabilities — all of which formalise social distance and impurity as legal-moral sanctions. Translations and commentaries make this painfully plain: the text prescribes differential penalties and treats the offspring of cross-varṇa unions as tainted — a textual grammar that rationalised exclusion. Those injunctions fed centuries of social practice and were repeatedly invoked by conservatives resisting egalitarian reform.
4. Ambedkar’s diagnosis: annihilation of caste (and why he rejected reform as enough)
Ambedkar’s Annihilation of Caste (the 1936 speech/essay) is the single most sustained critique of caste from within modern India: he argued caste is the warp and woof of the social order and cannot be reformed away from within the same religious and ritual framework that legitimises it. For Ambedkar, legal safeguards, political representation and anti-discrimination law were necessary but not sufficient: the system required structural, socio-economic transformation — land redistribution, affirmative economic measures and the social repudiation of the ritual ideas that undergird caste. His pamphlet (and his later reply to Gandhi) remains a polemic and a program.
Key Ambedkar points to remember:
Caste is systemic and institutional.
Ritual reform (e.g., better temple entry) does not abolish economic subordination.
Political representation was necessary — but the form of representation mattered (this is why separate electorates were a live demand).
5. Gandhi and Ambedkar — two competing grammars of reform
What Ambedkar asked for (in 1932): separate electoral rolls/electorates for the “Depressed Classes” (so Dalit representatives would be chosen by Dalit voters), plus broader socio-economic reforms.
What Gandhi feared: separate electorates would fragment the Hindu community and (he believed) play into colonial “divide and rule.” Gandhi called the Depressed Classes “Harijans” and insisted on moral reform of caste relations and uplift within a unified Hindu polity. When the British Government’s Communal Award (August 1932) proposed separate electorates, Gandhi — then jailed — announced a fast-unto-death against it. Negotiations led to the Poona Pact (September 1932): a compromise that enlarged reserved seats but abolished separate electorates, replacing them with reserved seats filled from the general electorate on a joint electorate basis. That concession is the political moment often read as Ambedkar’s painful compromise under intense moral pressure from Gandhi.
Was Gandhi “diluting” Ambedkar? Many scholars and critics — and Ambedkar himself in his replies — argued that Gandhi’s tactic effectively narrowed the scope of reform to questions of “untouchability” and moral uplift while avoiding the deeper economic and structural changes Ambedkar demanded. Arundhati Roy’s The Doctor and the Saint and Ambedkar’s own writings show the clash sharply: Ambedkar wanted abolition of caste as a social-economic order; Gandhi sought purification of practice and moral persuasion within a revived Hindu social ethic. The result was a tactic that delivered some gains (legal and representational concessions) but left the social foundations of caste largely intact.
6. Why Gandhi acted the way he did — motives, class links and contested readings
This is the hardest and most contested piece of the story. Gandhi’s practice combined radical personal austerity with conservative social prescriptions (e.g., acceptance of hereditary occupation in some of his writings). Critics (including Arundhati Roy and many Dalit intellectuals) argue that Gandhi’s social program — village-based swaraj, trusteeship, and emphasis on harmonious varṇic order — tended to favour small property holders and preserve hierarchies, rather than break them. Others defend Gandhi as a moral strategist who used symbolic language (Harijan, fasts, shaming upper castes) to win incremental gains in a highly stratified society. What’s indisputable is that Gandhi had intimate relationships with prominent industry patrons (e.g., Ghanshyam Das — G. D. Birla was a notable supporter/collaborator) and that his brand of moral persuasion often gave precedence to social unity over radical redistribution. Critics read those social-class linkages as shaping conservative choices in moments like the Poona Pact.
Gandhi did fight against untouchability and used his moral authority to force certain concessions; but Ambedkar’s charge — that Gandhi stopped short of demanding structural, economic reallocation and that he tried to sublimate Dalit political autonomy into a larger Hindu nationalism — has ample textual and historical support. Ambedkar’s insistence on separate political safeguards was rooted in a hardheaded analysis of power; Gandhi’s refusal was shaped both by strategy and by a conservative cultural imagination.
7. The Congress State after independence — concessions, reservations and the limits of reform
Independent India’s Constitution and early policy did enshrine affirmative action: reservations for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in legislatures, public employment and educational institutions; abolition of untouchability; and anti-discrimination laws. But two big limitations follow: first, the Constitution’s redistributive reach was limited by politics — land reforms stalled unevenly; directive principles offered guidance but were not directly enforceable. Second, the Congress as a broad-based party preferred incremental measures and nation-building, often favouring electoral conciliation over radical redistribution — a pattern critics say institutionalised half-measures that left caste as an organising structure of local patronage intact. The post-Mandal (1990s) era complicated this further by politicising OBC assertions and fragmenting anti-caste coalitions.
8. The Left / Marxists and the caste question — a principled dilemma, a political failure
Marxist theory foregrounds class (bourgeoisie vs. proletariat); caste adds an orthogonal axis of social identity and ritual status. Early Indian communists often treated caste as a secondary, residual problem to be overcome through class struggle; at times they distrusted or even attacked Ambedkar’s autonomous Dalit politics (the historical record contains episodes of active hostility to Ambedkar’s movement by some Communist leaders). The problem was twofold: theoretical — Marxist class analysis did not have ready categories to handle ritualized hierarchies that cut across class lines — and political — Communist movements in India often failed to build autonomous Dalit leadership and were sometimes dominated by upper-caste cadres. The result: an uneasy relation between left politics and Dalit assertion that left open the field for both Ambedkarite and identity-based mobilisations.
9. The Sangh-Parivar, “Sanātanism”, and the politics of co-optation
The RSS and its offshoots have a complicated relationship with caste. On the one hand, the Sangh historically emerged in a milieu where Brahminical elites resisted anti-Brahmin and anti-caste assertions; on the other hand, the Sangh’s strategy of pan-Hindu mobilisation required outreach to lower castes and offered a rhetoric of ‘one Hindu family’ that could domesticate caste dissent. Scholars note that the RSS’s entry-strategy was often to incorporate lower-caste groups into a larger Hindutva bloc while not fundamentally challenging the hierarchical order of Hindu orthodoxy; critics therefore see it as a political project that neutralises radical Dalit politics while maintaining upper-caste influence. In recent decades the Sangh-Parivar’s attempt to appropriate Ambedkar’s legacy for political ends has been well documented.
10. A contemporary flashpoint: political rhetoric, symbolic appropriation and the Ambedkar row
Contemporary politics repeatedly re-enacts the same dilemmas: symbolic appropriation vs structural change. A recent flashpoint (Home Minister Amit Shah’s December 2024 Rajya Sabha remarks mocking the repetitive invocation of Ambedkar’s name — “Abhi ek fashion ho gaya hai — Ambedkar, Ambedkar…” — and the protests and political storm that followed) illustrates how Ambedkar’s name is now a political token deployed by all sides. That episode shows why Ambedkar remains a live political symbol and why debates about whether his ideas are respected or co-opted remain urgent.
11. Why caste persists politically: incentives, fragmentation and the limits of single-axis politics
Three structural reasons help explain persistence:
1. Material incentives for elites. Where caste maps onto land, jobs and patronage, dominant groups resist abolition because it threatens tangible advantages.
2. Fragmentation of the oppressed. Dalits, OBCs and other disadvantaged groups are internally diverse and often not united; political parties exploit these cleavages.
3. Institutional inertia and symbolic politics. Laws, courts and quotas mitigate discrimination but do not automatically reconfigure land ownership, social capital or local power networks. That combination makes “annihilation” hard; symbolic gains are easier and politically attractive.
12. Reading the Gandhi–Ambedkar split: who was “right”?
From an independent perspective, the Gandhi–Ambedkar conflict was not simply about tactics of reform but about class interest and the reproduction of hegemony within colonial India.
Gandhi’s role:
Gandhi mobilized the masses but always within the ideological bounds of bourgeois nationalism. His emphasis on moral persuasion, village self-sufficiency, and “purification” of Hindu society kept intact the material dominance of upper-caste landed and mercantile elites.
By opposing separate electorates for Dalits and insisting on their absorption within a Hindu fold, Gandhi defended the organic unity of the national bourgeoisie. His strategy subordinated caste emancipation to the “larger” goal of national independence, which in practice meant consolidating elite power in the soon-to-be postcolonial state.
Ambedkar’s challenge:
Ambedkar exposed caste as a mode of production and reproduction of labor hierarchy, not just a cultural problem. His insistence on separate political representation, land redistribution, and annihilation of caste relations clashed with both Congress nationalism and Left orthodoxy.
To a Marxist, Ambedkar represents the incipient proletarian critique from the Dalit standpoint—an awareness that without dismantling caste, the working class could never unify against capital.
The Left’s historical failure:
Indian Communists of Ambedkar’s time often dismissed him as a reformist because he worked through constitutional channels. But from today’s Marxist vantage point, this was a serious misreading. Ambedkar’s politics addressed the “base” of social reproduction—who labors, under what humiliations, and with what access to land and resources.
By neglecting caste as a determinant of class structure, the Left alienated Dalits, who otherwise might have been the strongest revolutionary force.
Gandhi was the ideologue of a bourgeois revolution in India, ensuring that colonial transfer of power did not overturn the entrenched class-caste order. Ambedkar, though constrained by institutions, pointed towards a radical social revolution that combined the struggle against capital with the annihilation of caste. His program of structural redistribution (land, resources, representation) is far closer to a Marxist conception of social transformation. The tragedy is that Ambedkar’s project was co-opted into parliamentary democracy, producing symbolic recognition but little material reordering of caste-class hierarchies.
13. What would effective abolition (not just mitigation) require? — a programmatic sketch
Learning from Ambedkar and from post-colonial experience, abolition must be more than good laws and slogans:
Redistribution of productive assets (land reform, secure tenancy, support for non-land livelihoods).
Universal, quality public education targeted at structural disadvantage (not just quotas).
Enforcement of anti-atrocity statutes and institutions empowered to act locally.
Political decentralisation with real inclusion: ensure Dalit political agency rather than symbolic representation.
Reform of labour markets: dismantle occupational monopolies where they persist.
Cultural and curricular transformation: public history, textbooks and media that dismantle ritualised inferiority.
Implementation will require coalitions that include Dalit leadership at the centre, an honest Left that integrates caste into class politics, and a mainstream that is willing to redistribute power — not only symbolically, but materially.
13. Why history matters for politics today
Caste’s endurance is not an accident of culture; it is the outcome of successive historical choices — textual sanction, local crystallization, colonial classification, and post-colonial political bargains. Ambedkar’s call for annihilation remains the moral and programmatic lodestar: if we treat caste as merely stigma or as a site for occasional symbolic remedies, we will keep repeating the same compromises. If we accept his diagnosis — that ritual hierarchy and economic exclusion are interlinked — then policy must be bold, redistributive and democratic.
15. Ambedkar as a Political Necessity: Why Every Party Needs Him
One of the ironies of Indian democracy is that Dr. B. R. Ambedkar—who was isolated, opposed, and even vilified during his lifetime by Congress, Left and Hindu conservatives alike—has become indispensable to every political formation today. His legacy is not just moral but electoral: Dalit identity, rights, and representation are tied to his name, and no party can afford to appear hostile to him.
Congress: Once Ambedkar’s fiercest opponent in the arena of separate electorates and representation, Congress now projects him as a “modern lawgiver” and the architect of the Constitution. Statues, memorials, and official commemorations abound. Yet critics note this embrace is often symbolic, since Congress governments historically preferred incremental concessions over the structural transformation Ambedkar demanded.
Samajwadi Party (SP) and Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD): These OBC-based socialist parties initially built their mobilization on Mandal politics, sometimes sidelining Dalit interests. But Ambedkar’s symbolic capital has made them adopt him as a rallying figure, using his image to expand their social base beyond OBCs to Dalits. Leaders from Mulayam Singh Yadav to Lalu Prasad Yadav invoked Ambedkar to authenticate their politics of “social justice.”
Left Parties: During Ambedkar’s own lifetime, Communists and Socialists opposed or dismissed him—labeling him a bourgeois collaborator because of his role in constitution-making and because his caste-centered politics seemed to fragment class unity. Yet, in the post-Mandal era and with the collapse of Communist influence in key states, Left parties too deploy Ambedkar’s iconography to reconnect with marginalized constituencies. His statues dot Kerala and Bengal today, and Ambedkar Jayanti is part of Left-led popular mobilisations.
BJP and RSS: Historically rooted in Hindu revivalism and resistant to Ambedkar’s trenchant anti-Manusmriti critique, the Sangh has nonetheless appropriated Ambedkar vigorously in recent decades. Memorials, digitisation projects, and even reinterpretations of his conversion to Buddhism have been sponsored by BJP governments. The strategy is clear: to neutralise Ambedkar’s radical critique of Hinduism and caste, and to claim him as a “nationalist” figure who stood against Congress domination.
BSP and Dalit-oriented parties: For the Bahujan Samaj Party and other SC-based political platforms, Ambedkar is not just an icon but the ideological cornerstone. Kanshi Ram and Mayawati explicitly built their party as the political instrument to fulfill Ambedkar’s mission. The BSP’s elephant symbol and “Bahujan Hitay, Bahujan Sukhay” slogan derive directly from Ambedkarite discourse.
Why this consensus? Because Ambedkar is no longer only a philosopher of caste abolition; he is the symbol of Dalit dignity and empowerment. To reject Ambedkar is to risk alienating a critical electorate. His face is on posters from Uttar Pradesh to Tamil Nadu; his name adorns universities, airports, and welfare schemes. Yet this ubiquity also comes at a cost: parties reduce Ambedkar to a token, stripping his radical critique of caste and economic inequality.
In a sense, Ambedkar has become both universal and unusable: universal because every party needs him; unusable because his actual writings demand a revolution few parties are willing to risk.
16. Ambedkar’s Radical Indispensability vs. Gandhi’s Symbolic Centrality
Indian politics today is still haunted by the clash of the Doctor and the Saint. Gandhi remains the moral icon of non-violence, simplicity, and national unity—his memory sanctified in rituals of the state and the independence story. Yet his interventions on caste, often confined to untouchability and moral persuasion, diluted the demand for annihilation and left deeper hierarchies intact. His legacy is central, but mostly symbolic.
Ambedkar, by contrast, was—and remains—the thinker of rupture. His insistence that caste is not just stigma but structure, not just culture but economy, means his program still speaks to India’s deepest inequalities. Though resisted in life, he is now indispensable to every party—from Congress to BJP, from socialists to the Left, from BSP to regional outfits—because his name is the passport to Dalit legitimacy. Yet, this indispensability is largely symbolic, while his radical program of social and economic reordering remains unfulfilled.
The tragedy and challenge of India’s democracy is that Ambedkar has been canonised but not realised, Gandhi has been deified but not interrogated, and caste continues to structure both society and politics. To truly honour Ambedkar—and to transcend the limits of Gandhi’s cautious reformism—India must move beyond the politics of symbols to the politics of structural justice. Only then can the annihilation of caste move from manifesto to material reality.
Select references (sources used for key claims and quotations)
1. B. R. Ambedkar, Annihilation of Caste (full text). Marxists
2. “Poona Pact” — Britannica entry and summary of Gandhi’s fast and the Pact (September 1932). Encyclopedia Britannica
3. Mahatma Gandhi, Harijan (Gandhi’s journal); archival issues and discussion of Gandhi’s campaign against untouchability. Internet Archive
4. Arundhati Roy, The Doctor and the Saint: The Ambedkar–Gandhi Debate (introduction / critique). Wikipedia
5. Times of India / national reports on the December 2024 Ambedkar controversy (Amit Shah quote: “Abhi ek fashion ho gaya hai — Ambedkar, Ambedkar, Ambedkar… Itna naam agar bhagwan ka lete to saat janmon tak swarg mil jata”). The Times of India
6. Wisdom Library / Buhler translations and excerpts from Manusmṛti on mixed-caste progeny and sexual sanctions. Wisdom Library+1
7. Christophe Jaffrelot, India’s Silent Revolution (scholarship on caste politics and the rise of low castes); for contemporary political dynamics and OBC mobilization. charansingh.org
8. Caravan Magazine: “The Early Indian Communists’ ‘Unremitting Criticism’ of BR Ambedkar” (analysis of Communist engagements with Ambedkar). The Caravan
9. Britannica: Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) — history and ideology. Encyclopedia Britannica
10. Sources on Gandhi’s financial and social links: profiles of G. D. Birla and his relations with Gandhi (Gandhi Heritage / biographies). Mahatma Gandhi Museum+1
