Policing Land, Governing by Suspicion:Revenue Administration, Registration Law, and the Expanding Reach of the Police in Haryana

-Ramphal Kataria

From Civil Administration to Criminal Suspicion: Police Overreach in Haryana’s Land Governance

Abstract

Land administration has historically constituted the administrative core of the Indian State. From colonial revenue extraction to post-Independence redistribution and contemporary digital governance, revenue officers have functioned as the State’s primary interface with property, agrarian relations, and fiscal authority. Recent developments in Haryana—particularly police directives invoking criminal liability in matters of land registration, stamp valuation, and urban regulatory compliance—signal a significant institutional shift. Under the politically resonant rubric of “anti-corruption,” policing has begun to intrude into domains statutorily assigned to revenue authorities. This article examines the historical rationale for vesting land administration in the revenue bureaucracy, analyses the legal architecture governing registration and stamp duties, and critically evaluates the constitutional and administrative implications of police overreach. It argues that indiscriminate criminalisation of civil administration risks undermining statutory governance, institutional balance, and the rule of law.

1. Introduction: Land Administration and the Architecture of the Indian State

Land has never been merely an economic asset in India. It is simultaneously a source of livelihood, social identity, political power, and fiscal authority. Control over land records and revenue has historically underpinned the legitimacy and capacity of the State. From the Mauryan system of bhaga (produce share) to the Mughal zabt settlements and the British colonial revenue regimes, land administration has functioned as the spine of governance, enabling rulers to extract revenue, regulate agrarian relations, and maintain political order.

Post-Independence India inherited not only colonial land laws but also the institutional assumption that revenue administration is the most intimate interface between the State and society. Despite constitutional commitments to social justice and land reform, the basic architecture of land records, revenue courts, and registration offices remains largely intact. What has changed, however, is the growing tendency to view land administration not as a civil regulatory domain, but as a potential site of criminality warranting police intervention.

Recent developments in Haryana exemplify this shift. Police directives invoking criminal liability against Sub-Registrars for alleged violations under planning laws, stamp statutes, and municipal regulations represent a qualitative departure from established administrative practice. This article situates these developments within a longer historical and legal framework, arguing that such expansion of policing authority threatens the foundational logic of civil governance.

2. Historical Evolution of Land and Revenue Administration

2.1 Pre-Colonial Foundations

In pre-colonial India, land rights were rarely absolute or freely alienable. Ownership was embedded in cultivation, lineage, and community recognition. The sovereign’s claim over land was not proprietary but fiscal—the right to a share of produce in return for protection and administration. The Mauryan and Gupta empires institutionalised land measurement, record maintenance, and tax assessment through salaried officials, laying the foundations of a proto-revenue bureaucracy.¹

The Mughal period, particularly under Sher Shah Suri and Emperor Akbar, introduced scientific land measurement and systematic record-keeping. Raja Todar Mal’s revenue reforms formalised the Patwari–Qanungo system, with village-level record keepers responsible for maintaining cultivation and ownership details.² Crucially, even in this centralised system, land administration remained a civil function, oriented toward assessment and regulation rather than coercion.

2.2 Colonial Transformation: Revenue as the Engine of Empire

The British colonial state fundamentally altered India’s land regime. Revenue extraction became the principal motive of governance, and land was transformed into a marketable commodity. The Permanent Settlement of 1793 (Zamindari system) converted intermediaries into absolute proprietors, while Ryotwari and Mahalwari systems created direct fiscal relationships between cultivators and the State.³

The introduction of codified land revenue laws and deed registration was not aimed at justice or equity but at certainty of revenue. The Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887—still applicable in Haryana—emerged from this context. It established a hierarchy of revenue officers and formalised the Record of Rights (Jamabandi), providing a presumptive but rebuttable basis of land ownership.⁴

Registration of deeds was introduced to secure transactions and prevent fraud, not to adjudicate title. The registrar’s role was intentionally limited, reflecting the colonial state’s concern with efficiency rather than dispute resolution.

3. Post-Independence Reorientation: From Extraction to Equity

After 1947, land administration was reoriented toward constitutional goals of equity and redistribution. Zamindari abolition, land ceiling laws, tenancy reforms, and consolidation of holdings sought to dismantle feudal structures and democratise access to land.⁵

Despite these reforms, the administrative machinery remained revenue-centric. This continuity was neither accidental nor regressive. Land records, revenue courts, and registration offices were recognised as essential instruments for implementing reform and maintaining fiscal stability. In states like Haryana, carved out of Punjab in 1966, the inherited revenue structure became central to governance, particularly given the state’s agrarian economy and rapid urbanisation.

4. Dual Architecture of Land Governance: Records and Registration

India follows a hybrid land administration system comprising two distinct but interconnected subsystems:

4.1 Record of Rights (RoR)

Maintained under state land revenue laws, the RoR documents ownership, cultivation, tenancy, and encumbrances, linked to cadastral maps. Entries carry a presumption of correctness until rebutted.⁶ Mutation proceedings update these records following transactions or inheritance. While RoR entries are not conclusive proof of title, they serve as the primary operational evidence of land rights.

4.2 Registration of Deeds

Governed by the Registration Act, 1908, registration provides public notice of transactions involving immovable property. Sections 17 and 18 distinguish between compulsory and optional registration. Importantly, registration does not guarantee title, nor does it require the registrar to investigate ownership.⁷

The Supreme Court has repeatedly clarified this distinction, holding that registration is evidence of a transaction, not of valid title.⁸

5. Why Revenue Officers Administer Land

The vesting of land administration and registration in revenue officers reflects deep institutional logic:

1. Integrated Knowledge Base: Revenue officers control land records, maps, mutations, consolidation, ceiling proceedings, and acquisition.

2. Quasi-Judicial Tradition: From Assistant Collector to Collector, revenue officers adjudicate disputes under statutory frameworks.

3. Fiscal Responsibility: Stamp duty and registration fees constitute major non-tax revenue streams.

4. Administrative Neutrality: Revenue officers operate within civil service hierarchies, subject to departmental discipline and judicial review.

5. Village-Level Intelligence: Historically, revenue officers have served as the State’s primary interface with rural society.

In Haryana, a Tehsildar exercises powers as Assistant Collector Grade II and, in partition matters, Grade I, while also functioning as Sub-Registrar and Executive Magistrate. This concentration of functions ensures administrative coherence rather than arbitrariness.

6. Registration Law: Statutory Limits and Judicial Interpretation

The Registration Act, 1908 deliberately circumscribes the registrar’s role. Sections 34 and 35 require verification of identity and execution, not title. Section 71 allows refusal of registration only on statutory grounds, subject to appellate review.⁹

Judicial precedent reinforces this limited mandate. In Narandas Karsondas v S A Kamtam (1977), the Supreme Court held that a registered sale deed does not by itself convey title unless the transferor has valid ownership.¹⁰ In Suraj Lamp & Industries v State of Haryana (2012), the Court reiterated that registration is not a substitute for title adjudication.¹¹

These rulings underscore a fundamental principle: registration is facilitative, not adjudicatory.

7. Stamp Duty, Section 47A, and Civil Enforcement

The Indian Stamp Act, 1899, as amended in Haryana, provides a comprehensive mechanism to address undervaluation through Section 47A. The provision empowers the Collector—not the police—to determine market value and recover deficient duty.¹²

This design reflects legislative intent to treat valuation disputes as fiscal matters, resolved through adjudication and recovery rather than criminal prosecution. The Sub-Registrar’s duty is limited to forwarding suspect documents for valuation. Criminalising this process collapses the distinction between civil enforcement and penal sanction.

8. Urban Regulation and Section 7A of the 1975 Act

Section 7A of the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 restricts registration of small urban plots without a No Objection Certificate from the planning authority. The provision targets unauthorised colonisation by regulating transferors. It does not criminalise registration per se, nor does it impose investigative duties on registrars beyond statutory compliance.¹³

Nevertheless, police action has increasingly treated alleged violations as criminal conspiracies, disregarding the regulatory nature of the statute.

9. The Rise of Police Intrusion into Land Administration

Recent police directives in Haryana invoking criminal liability under stamp, municipal, and planning laws represent a significant institutional departure. By framing administrative lapses as criminal misconduct, policing authority is extended into domains governed by revenue statutes and civil procedures.

This expansion raises critical concerns:

9.1 Jurisdictional Overreach

Police authority is investigative, not supervisory over civil administration. Sub-Registrars are governed by revenue hierarchies, with appellate mechanisms under the Registration Act. Police directives seeking to discipline or prosecute registration officials bypass statutory governance.

9.2 Presumption of Corruption

Treating revenue officers as presumptively corrupt undermines the principles of administrative law, which presume bona fide action unless proven otherwise.¹⁴

9.3 Institutional Destabilisation

Fear-driven administration encourages risk avoidance, delays, and informal practices, paradoxically increasing opportunities for rent-seeking.

10. Digital Registration and Reduced Discretion

Haryana’s adoption of integrated digital platforms (HARIS and HALRIS) has significantly reduced individual discretion. Land records, valuation benchmarks, and planning restrictions are now algorithmically linked. In such a system, the Sub-Registrar functions largely as a process validator. To attribute personalised criminal intent in a system-driven environment reflects institutional myopia.

11. Revenue Contribution and Institutional Credibility

Between 2014–15 and 2024–25, Haryana collected approximately ₹75,000 crore in stamp duty and registration fees. This consistent growth undermines narratives of systemic corruption within the revenue administration. A department generating such revenue cannot plausibly be characterised as structurally corrupt without compelling evidence.

12. Civil State vs Police State

India’s constitutional design rests on functional separation and statutory governance. The police play a crucial role in criminal justice, but they are not arbiters of all administrative morality. When policing extends into revenue adjudication and fiscal assessment, the balance between civil governance and coercive power is disturbed.

Haryana, like the rest of India, is governed through civil administration—not police fiat.

13. Conclusion

The fight against corruption is both necessary and legitimate. However, when anti-corruption rhetoric becomes a vehicle for institutional overreach, it risks undermining the rule of law. Land administration in India has evolved over centuries as a specialised, statute-bound civil function. Indiscriminate criminalisation of this domain weakens governance rather than strengthening it.

The challenge lies not in policing land administration, but in governing it better—through transparency, accountability, and respect for statutory boundaries.

Footnotes

1. Thapar, R (2002): Early India, Penguin.

2. Habib, I (1999): The Agrarian System of Mughal India, OUP.

3. Stokes, E (1959): The English Utilitarians and India, OUP.

4. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887.

5. Government of India (1951): Report of the Agrarian Reforms Committee.

6. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, Sections 31–44.

7. Registration Act, 1908, Sections 17–18.

8. Narandas Karsondas v S A Kamtam (1977) 3 SCC 247.

9. Registration Act, 1908, Sections 71–77.

10. Suraj Lamp & Industries v State of Haryana (2012) 1 SCC 656.

11. Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (Haryana Amendment), Section 47A.

12. Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975, Section 7A.

13. State of Punjab v Baldev Singh (1999) 6 SCC 172.

 

 

Groundwater Stress Worsens in Haryana: A Looming Water Catastrophe

-Ramphal Kataria

From Breadbasket to Water Bankruptcy: Haryana’s Groundwater Reckoning

“When water hides beneath our feet, we forget its value—until the wells run dry and the fields crack.”
This proverb has tragically become true in Haryana, where groundwater—a lifeline for agriculture, drinking water, and rural livelihoods—is being extracted far faster than nature can replenish it. Recent data shows the state is extracting water at about 136–137% of its annual extractable resources, leading to an alarming situation where 88 out of 143 blocks are over-exploited* and several others are categorised as critical by scientific assessment.

Haryana, once a flourishing agrarian state and a pillar of India’s Green Revolution, now faces an existential water crisis. Recent assessments show that about 64%–62% of Haryana’s blocks have crossed the threshold of groundwater sustainability, classified as over-exploited — meaning that extraction exceeds natural recharge annually.⁽1⁾ Similarly, extraction is currently running at approximately 136% of the state’s annual extractable groundwater resources — a clear indicator that water is being consumed faster than it can be replenished.

The Present Crisis: Facts and Figures

Haryana’s groundwater situation reflects an unsustainable extraction model:

Of 143 assessment units (blocks/urban), ~62% are over-exploited, ~8% critical, and only ~25% safe.

Total annual recharge is around 10.32 billion cubic meters (BCM), yet extraction reaches ~12.7 BCM—far outstripping what nature can replenish.

Agriculture is the primary consumer: over 1.12 million hectares of cultivated land are irrigated by tubewells, supported by approximately 850,000 irrigation tubewells.

Independent research indicates that Haryana, along with neighbouring Punjab, has lost tens of billions of cubic meters of groundwater over the past two decades, affecting aquifers deeply.

This unsustainable pattern has crippled the groundwater regime, especially in south-western districts like Hisar, Bhiwani, Jind, Dadri and Mahendragarh, where water tables have been dropping consistently because of high extraction and poor recharge.

Why This Crisis Happened: Root Causes

1. Water-Intensive Agriculture

Haryana’s agricultural success story is also a paradoxical water tragedy:

The Green Revolution’s emphasis on wheat and especially rice—one of the most water-thirsty crops—significantly increased irrigation demand.

Paddy cultivation has expanded many times over since the 1960s, while traditional millets and pulses have shrunk, despite these crops being far more water-efficient.

Even regions with sandy soils and naturally low water retention (e.g., western Haryana) have witnessed paddy cultivation, leading to greater water waste and faster aquifer depletion.

This has created a rigid cropping pattern that is difficult to shift without strong economic incentives or policy nudges.

2. Inefficient Field Irrigation Practices

Farmers predominantly use flood irrigation, where fields are intentionally inundated and water is lost to evaporation or lateral flow rather than being used efficiently by crops. Uneven bunding, lack of micro-irrigation techniques (like drip or sprinkler), and poor soil moisture practices exacerbate water loss.

3. Failed Policy & Institution Response

Despite widespread recognition of the problem, policy and implementation gaps persist:

Attempts to diversify cropping patterns have not succeeded at scale due to lack of incentives, weak extension education, and insufficient farmer engagement.

Water harvesting proposals remain largely unimplemented; stormwater and monsoon runoff—which could significantly recharge aquifers—are not being captured systematically.

No effective regulation exists on tubewell drilling or extraction limits, meaning farmers and industries can extract without restriction.

There is no statewide institutional plan that coordinates the Agriculture Department, Irrigation Department, water boards, and universities to mobilise scientific best practices and enforce sustainable water use.

4. Rainwater Mismanagement & Floods

In the rainy season, surface water flows unchanneled across the state, often inundating low-lying zones of Jind, Hisar, Bhiwani and Rohtak. Severe rain events, particularly in Ghaggar and Yamuna sub-basins, regularly cause flooding, stagnation, and crop damage.

Instead of harvesting and diverting this rainwater to water-deficit zones in south-west Haryana, much of it is lost as floods or stagnation. Blocked drains, silted channels, and poor canal management often worsen flooding—which is the flip side of the groundwater imbalance.

Historical Policy Failures

Despite multiple groundwater assessments by CGWB and state bodies over decades, strategic action has lagged:

No mandatory groundwater licensing or quotas for tubewells exist in most rural areas.

Farmers receive electricity subsidies for tube well operation, inadvertently encouraging extraction with little cost.

Crop MSP and procurement policies continue to favour water-intensive crops.

Haryana has repeatedly introduced schemes like Mera Pani, Meri Virasat with limited reach and uptake.

Universities and research institutions (e.g., agricultural universities) have not been properly mobilised to train farmers in water-saving techniques at scale or to develop alternatives adapted to local agro-ecologies.

What Must Be Done: A Scientific Roadmap

Addressing this crisis requires urgent, coordinated, and science-based policies:

1. Restrict & Regulate Extraction

Implement groundwater licensing and limits tied to aquifer health.

Enforce penalties for illegal drilling and over-extraction.

2. Shift Cropping Patterns

Offer remunerative incentives to grow millets, oilseeds, pulses, cotton and other low-water crops.

Reform MSP and procurement to reduce rice dominance.

3. Water-Efficient Farming

Subsidise micro-irrigation systems (drip/sprinkler) especially in water-stressed blocks.

Strengthen extension services to teach crop rotations and soil moisture conservation.

4. Rainwater & Runoff Harvesting

Develop statewide rainwater harvesting plans to capture monsoon runoff and flood flows into recharge basins.

Enhance drainage network maintenance to prevent stagnation and channel water to recharge structures.

5. Institutional Coordination

Create an empowered Haryana Water Commission integrating Irrigation, Agriculture, Rural Development, and Science Institutions.

Mandate annual data-driven groundwater health reporting and adaptive management.

Areas Most Affected: Stark Contrasts

Region / Block Type	Water Status
~61–62% Blocks (88+)	Over-exploited – extraction > recharge
~8% Blocks (~11)	Critical – severe stress
~25% Blocks (~36)	Safe or semi-critical
Gurgaon, Faridabad, Panipat	Very high extraction rates (200%+)
South-West (Hisar, Bhiwani, Jind)	Deepening water table, limited surface inflow
Eastern & North zones	Occasional floods, poor runoff management

(Exact block names and data available in CGWB’s full Haryana assessment reports.)

The Bottom Line: A Water Reckoning for Haryana

Haryana’s groundwater crisis did not arise overnight—it is the outcome of decades of policy inertia, agricultural preferences, and institutional fragmentation. The state stands at a crossroads: continue with the same model and witness deeper water insecurity, or pivot decisively toward sustainability.

This is not just an environmental issue—it threatens food security, rural livelihoods, economic resilience, and social stability. With aquifers declining and surface droughts juxtaposed with floods, the time for comprehensive action is now.

If we fail to build a scientific, community-anchored water management system, the next generation could inherit a landscape where water is no longer a guaranteed right but a dwindling resource.

Footnotes

1. Central Ground Water Board (CGWB) Dynamic Ground Water Resources Assessment 2024: groundwater extraction ~135.96% of extractable resources; 88 of 143 blocks classified as over-exploited.

2. Tribune India, groundwater category and conservation program Mera Pani Meri Virasat details.

3. The Week – Haryana groundwater and irrigated area statistics.

4. India Environment Portal – Groundwater use in agriculture context.

 

 

The Politics of Silence: Naravane’s Memoir, Parliamentary Procedure, and Civil–Military Accountability

-Ramphal Kataria

Civilian Control or Convenient Silence? The Naravane Memoir Controversy

Abstract

The controversy surrounding former Army Chief General (Retd.) M.M. Naravane’s memoir Four Stars of Destiny has exposed deeper fissures in India’s parliamentary functioning and civil–military relations. The refusal of the government and the Speaker of the Lok Sabha to permit discussion of excerpts—already available in the public domain through a detailed review in The Caravan—raises serious questions about selective application of parliamentary rules, erosion of the Speaker’s neutrality, and the avoidance of political accountability in matters of national security. This article argues that the issue at stake is not the legality of a memoir but the constitutional responsibility of political leadership in moments of military crisis, and Parliament’s diminishing capacity to interrogate executive power.

Introduction: When a Book Shuts Down Parliament

In February 2026, repeated disruptions and adjournments of Parliament followed Leader of the Opposition Rahul Gandhi’s attempt to cite excerpts from Four Stars of Destiny, the unpublished (and briefly available) memoir of former Army Chief General M.M. Naravane. The excerpts, drawn from an extensive review by journalist Sushant Singh in The Caravan magazine, pertained to the Indian Army’s handling of the Rechin La/Kailash Range standoff in Eastern Ladakh on 31 August 2020.

What followed was extraordinary. The Defence Minister, the Home Minister, the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs, and ultimately the Speaker of the Lok Sabha intervened to block discussion, arguing that the book was “unpublished” and therefore inadmissible under parliamentary rules. More strikingly, the Speaker ruled that even if the book were published, its contents could not be read in the House.

This episode invites a deeper examination of parliamentary procedure, civil–military doctrine, and the political management of truth in contemporary India.

Naravane’s Account and the Question of Political Direction

At the centre of the controversy is Naravane’s account of a critical moment during the 2020–21 India–China military standoff. According to the memoir—as summarised and quoted in The Caravan—Chinese tanks advanced towards Indian positions on the strategically significant Kailash Range. The Northern Army Commander sought guidance from Army Headquarters, which in turn sought political direction from the highest levels of government.

Naravane recounts that despite repeated calls to the Defence Minister, the National Security Adviser, and others, no clear directive was issued for over two hours. Eventually, the Defence Minister reportedly conveyed the Prime Minister’s message: “Jo uchit samjho, woh karo” (Do what you deem appropriate).

The significance of this account lies not in its dramatics but in its doctrinal implications. The Indian military operates under firm civilian control. Decisions involving escalation against another state—particularly a nuclear-armed adversary—are not discretionary military choices but political decisions. Delegating such responsibility, implicitly or explicitly, raises serious constitutional questions.

Civilian Control and the Limits of “Operational Freedom”

Successive governments have emphasised civilian supremacy over the armed forces as a cornerstone of Indian democracy. This principle has been repeatedly reaffirmed in practice, including during recent operations where political clearance was explicitly sought for military action.

Indeed, official narratives during later crises—such as Operation Sindoor—claimed that the armed forces were given “complete operational freedom.” Yet senior military officers subsequently indicated that delays in political decision-making had operational consequences, including loss of aircraft. The Prime Minister himself has acknowledged that critical military decisions are taken within the Cabinet Committee on Security.

Against this backdrop, Naravane’s account—whether fully accurate or contested—cannot be dismissed as a mere personal recollection. It directly engages with the question of political responsibility in moments of crisis.

Parliamentary Rules and Selective Enforcement

The government’s procedural objection relied primarily on Rule 349, which restricts references to materials not in the public domain. This argument is difficult to sustain.

First, The Caravan article is unequivocally in the public domain. Parliamentary practice has long allowed members to cite books, journals, and newspapers, subject to later authentication. Second, Rahul Gandhi physically produced the book in the House. The absence of a formal ban or notification under the Official Secrets Act further weakens the claim that the material was inadmissible.

The selective nature of this enforcement became evident when, shortly thereafter, BJP MP Nishikant Dubey read excerpts from a book critical of Jawaharlal Nehru—reportedly M.J. Akbar’s Nehru: A Political Biography—without objection. The contrast underscores how parliamentary rules are increasingly deployed not as neutral safeguards but as political instruments.

The Speaker and the Question of Institutional Neutrality

The Speaker’s intervention marked a departure from established parliamentary conventions. By ruling that even a published book could not be read in the House, the Chair effectively foreclosed debate rather than regulating it.

Equally significant was the refusal to allow The Caravan article to be placed on record for authentication. Parliamentary privilege exists precisely to enable representatives to scrutinise executive actions. Denying this opportunity transforms procedure into pre-emptive censorship.

Such conduct erodes the perception of the Speaker as an impartial guardian of the House and reinforces concerns about the shrinking space for opposition voices.

Delayed Review and Avoidable Crisis

The memoir was reportedly scheduled for release in April 2024. Nearly two years later, the Ministry of Defence has neither cleared nor formally rejected it. Indefinite review has become a mechanism of avoidance.

Had the government either approved the book with redactions or imposed a reasoned prohibition, the present controversy might have been avoided. Instead, delay has fuelled speculation and politicisation.

The precedent of Major General (Retd.) V.K. Singh’s prolonged legal battle under the Official Secrets Act has already cast a long shadow over military memoirs. Naravane’s case reinforces a chilling message: that truth, when politically inconvenient, is best left unpublished.

Media Silence and Democratic Consequences

While excerpts from the memoir circulate widely on social media, much of the mainstream print and electronic media has largely avoided sustained engagement with the issue. The result is a paradox where Parliament refuses debate, and the media declines amplification.

This convergence of institutional reticence weakens democratic accountability. When Parliament cannot debate matters of national security and political responsibility, and the media hesitates to interrogate power, public discourse is impoverished.

Conclusion: Beyond the Book

The controversy over Four Stars of Destiny is not fundamentally about a memoir. It is about Parliament’s capacity to question the executive, the political leadership’s responsibility in moments of military crisis, and the integrity of constitutional norms governing civil–military relations.

Even if Naravane’s account is disputed, the appropriate response in a democracy is debate, clarification, and accountability—not procedural silencing. The Defence Minister could have resolved the issue with a clear statement explaining what decision was taken on the night of 31 August 2020.

That opportunity was lost. What remains is a deeper concern: that Parliament is increasingly being managed not as a forum for truth-seeking but as a space for damage control.

References

1. Singh, Sushant (2026): “What Naravane’s Memoir Reveals about India’s China Crisis,” The Caravan, February.

2. Naravane, M.M. (forthcoming): Four Stars of Destiny. Penguin Random House (under review).

3. Lok Sabha Secretariat: Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, Rule 349.

4. Akbar, M.J. (1988): Nehru: A Political Biography. Penguin.

5. Official Secrets Act, 1923.

6. Army Rules, 1954.

 

 

 

From Asymmetry to Arm-Twisting:The India–US Trade “Deal” and the Unravelling of Strategic Autonomy

-Ramphal Kataria

Trade under Duress: India–US Tariffs and the Erosion of Strategic Autonomy

Abstract

The trade “deal” announced by US President Donald Trump in February 2026, purportedly resetting tariffs on Indian exports and rebalancing bilateral trade, marks a significant rupture in India’s trade and foreign policy posture. Announced unilaterally by the US President on social media, without a published text or parliamentary scrutiny in India, the agreement follows a year of punitive tariff escalation by the United States linked explicitly to India’s energy purchases from Russia. This article examines the evolution of the India–US trade relationship from its earlier asymmetrical but rules-based structure to a coercive tariff regime and finally to the present opaque “deal”. It argues that the agreement, far from representing a strategic or economic gain for India, reflects negotiated retreat under duress, raises serious concerns about transparency, parliamentary sovereignty and policy autonomy, and risks long-term damage to India’s agriculture, trade diversification and independent foreign policy.

1. Introduction: A Deal Announced Elsewhere

On 2 February 2026, US President Donald Trump announced on his Truth Social platform that he had concluded a “trade deal” with India following a telephone conversation with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The announcement claimed that US tariffs on Indian goods would be reduced from 50% to 18%, that India would eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers on US goods, purchase over $500 billion worth of American products, and cease buying Russian oil. Within hours, US officials echoed these claims, framing the agreement as a major victory for American farmers and energy producers.

What was striking was not merely the content of the announcement, but the venue and process: no joint statement, no released text, no prior parliamentary briefing in India, and a conspicuous divergence between the US narrative and India’s own official statements. While Prime Minister Modi welcomed the reduction in tariffs on Indian goods, he made no reference to Russian oil, zero tariffs on US imports, agriculture or the purported $500 billion import commitment.

This episode invites deeper scrutiny. How did a trade relationship that once operated within multilateral rules descend into tariff warfare? What exactly has changed under the new “deal”? And what does this tell us about India’s evolving trade and foreign policy orientation?

2. The Pre-Crisis Trade Regime: Asymmetry without Coercion

Before the tariff crisis of 2025, India–US trade was characterised by asymmetrical but predictable tariff structures under WTO rules.

According to WTO data, the average applied US tariff on Indian goods was approximately 2–3%, reflecting the low industrial tariffs of advanced economies.¹ By contrast, India’s average applied tariff on US goods was significantly higher, around 12–15%, with much steeper protection in agriculture, dairy, livestock products and processed foods.²

This asymmetry was neither accidental nor clandestine. India’s tariff structure reflected its developmental priorities, the vulnerability of its agrarian economy, and long-standing political economy constraints. Crucially, these tariffs were WTO-consistent and applied on a Most Favoured Nation (MFN) basis.

Despite frequent US complaints about market access—particularly regarding dairy, medical devices and digital trade—disputes were pursued through negotiations and, occasionally, WTO mechanisms. The relationship, while unequal, remained rules-based rather than coercive.

3. The Turning Point: Energy, Geopolitics and Tariff Weaponisation

The equilibrium collapsed in 2025. Following the escalation of the Ukraine war and tightening Western sanctions on Russia, India sharply increased imports of discounted Russian crude oil to secure energy affordability and inflation control. By mid-2024, Russia had become one of India’s largest oil suppliers.

The Trump administration explicitly linked trade retaliation to this energy relationship. In early 2025, the US imposed a 25% “reciprocal tariff” on a wide range of Indian exports. Later that year, it added an additional 25% punitive tariff, explicitly framed as a penalty for India’s continued purchase of Russian oil.³

This escalation pushed total tariffs on Indian goods to nearly 50%, rendering large segments of Indian exports—textiles, garments, leather, gems and jewellery—commercially unviable in the US market. The move was unilateral, extraterritorial in intent, and difficult to reconcile with WTO principles.

Reuters reported that the measures affected Indian exports worth tens of billions of dollars and triggered strong protests from New Delhi, which argued that energy security decisions were sovereign and market-based.⁴

4. India–US Trade Deal 2026: From Asymmetry to Arm-Twisting

Table 1: India–US Trade Regimes Compared

Parameter	Pre-Trade War (till 2024)	US Unilateral Tariff Regime (2025)	Trump-Announced “Deal” (Feb 2026)
Average US tariff on Indian goods	~2–3% (WTO MFN rates)	25% + additional 25% penalty = ~50%	18%
Legal basis	WTO-consistent	Unilateral, punitive, non-WTO	Executive announcement; text not public
Trigger	Normal trade	India buying Russian oil	“Friendship with Modi” (Trump’s words)
Indian tariff on US goods	~12–15% average; higher on agri/dairy	Unchanged	Trump claims ZERO tariffs; India denies
Agriculture & dairy imports from US	Effectively excluded / highly protected	Excluded	US claims entry; India claims exclusion
Energy commitments	Market-based diversification	Penalised for Russian oil	Trump: stop Russian oil, buy US & Venezuela
Transparency	Parliamentary oversight	Publicly notified	Announced on Truth Social, not Parliament

 

5. India’s Parallel Trade Strategy: Russia and the European Union

While trade tensions with the US intensified, India pursued diversification elsewhere.

5.1 India–Russia Trade

India’s trade engagement with Russia expanded significantly after 2022, anchored primarily in energy. The arrangement involved:

Long-term crude oil supply contracts at discounted rates

Settlement mechanisms outside the US dollar

Increased imports of fertilisers and coal

Prospective cooperation in pharmaceuticals, defence spares and shipping insurance

This trade was not ideological alignment but pragmatic energy economics. The US tariff penalty effectively criminalised this pragmatism.

5.2 India–EU Free Trade Agreement

In January 2026, India and the European Union concluded negotiations on a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA), described as the most ambitious trade opening India has ever offered.⁵ The agreement promises:

Progressive elimination or reduction of tariffs on over 90% of traded goods

Significant access for EU automobiles, machinery, chemicals and pharmaceuticals

Expanded access for Indian textiles, leather, marine products and services

EU Deal vs US Deal: The Stark Contrast

EU–India FTA	US–India “Deal”
Negotiated over years	Announced via social media
Text released	Text absent
Parliamentary ratification required	Parliament bypassed
Gradual tariff reduction	Immediate coercive reset
Reciprocity	One-sided leverage

 

Crucially, the EU–India FTA requires ratification by the European Parliament and national parliaments of EU member states, as well as India’s Parliament. Until then, it has no legal force.

This contrast in process is instructive.

6. The February 2026 Announcement: What Was Claimed

On 2 February 2026, President Trump wrote on Truth Social:

“Prime Minister Modi agreed to stop buying Russian Oil, and to buy much more from the United States and, potentially, Venezuela… We agreed to a Trade Deal… lowering tariffs from 25% to 18%. India will reduce their Tariffs and Non Tariff Barriers against the United States, to ZERO… and buy over $500 BILLION DOLLARS of U.S. Energy, Technology, Agricultural, Coal, and many other products.”⁶

The White House subsequently described the deal as a “major win” for US farmers and exporters, while the US Secretary of Agriculture publicly thanked Trump for opening India’s market to American agricultural products.⁷

7. India’s Official Response: Precision through Silence

Prime Minister Modi’s public statement was markedly restrained. He confirmed that tariffs on Indian exports to the US would be reduced to 18% and praised President Trump’s leadership, but omitted any reference to:

Russian oil

Zero tariffs on US goods

Agriculture and dairy access

A $500 billion import commitment

Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal later told Parliament that India’s sensitive sectors, including agriculture and dairy, were protected and that energy security decisions would remain market-based.⁸

The divergence between the two narratives has not been resolved by the release of a signed text or tariff schedule.

8. Import Arithmetic: The Implausibility of $500 Billion

India’s macro-trade data renders the US claim of $500 billion imports deeply questionable.

According to the Union Budget 2026–27 and official trade statistics:

India’s total annual imports are approximately $720–750 billion (about ₹49 lakh crore).⁹

Imports from the United States in recent years have averaged $45–50 billion annually.

A commitment to import $500 billion worth of US goods would imply:

Nearly two-thirds of India’s total imports sourced from one country

A dramatic displacement of imports from the EU, China, ASEAN, the Gulf and Africa

No timeline or disaggregation has been provided. Without such clarity, the figure appears rhetorical rather than contractual.

9. Tariff Outcomes: Relief Disguised as Concession

The reduction of US tariffs on Indian goods from 50% to 18% has been widely portrayed as a diplomatic success. In reality, it represents:

A partial rollback of punitive measures

Not a restoration of pre-crisis tariff levels

Certainly not a structural gain

At 18%, US tariffs on Indian exports remain six to nine times higher than their pre-2025 levels.

Meanwhile, the claim that India will reduce tariffs on US goods to zero—if realised—would represent a far more radical departure from India’s historical trade policy, particularly if extended to agriculture and dairy.

10. Agriculture: The Silent Fault Line

Agriculture remains the most politically sensitive sector in India. The US has long sought access for:

Dairy products

Poultry

Processed foods

Genetically modified crops

US officials have explicitly framed the deal as a victory for American farmers.⁷ Indian officials deny any such opening.

Without a published annex or tariff schedule, this contradiction cannot be independently verified. What is clear is that opacity itself becomes a policy risk, especially for a sector already burdened by debt, price volatility and agrarian distress.

11. Trade, Energy and Strategic Autonomy

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the announcement is its implication for India’s foreign policy.

Trump’s assertion that India agreed to stop buying Russian oil—and instead buy oil from the US and Venezuela—raises fundamental questions:

When did Venezuela, previously sanctioned, become acceptable?

Why is India’s energy policy being announced by a foreign leader?

Can India still claim strategic autonomy if trade sanctions dictate its energy choices?

The use of tariffs to compel foreign policy alignment represents a shift from partnership to discipline.

12. Parliament and the Democratic Deficit

Trade agreements reshape domestic economies and livelihoods. In constitutional democracies, they are subject to scrutiny and debate.

The EU–India FTA awaits ratification. The India–US “deal” was announced while Parliament was in session, without a statement, debate or document. Opposition demands for clarification were met with general assurances, not evidence.

This bypassing of Parliament marks a worrying erosion of democratic oversight in trade and foreign policy.

13. The Butter-and-Bread Analogy (Child Demanding butter, snatched the bread by mom)

India once had:

low US tariffs

policy autonomy

After the trade war:

tariffs were snatched away

autonomy was put on the table

Now, India is being told to celebrate getting back part of what it already had — at the cost of future concessions.

This is not a deal.
It is damage control under duress.

14. Conclusion: Retreat, Not Realignment

The February 2026 India–US trade “deal” does not represent a strategic breakthrough. It represents a negotiated retreat from an artificially created crisis.

India regained partial market access it should never have lost, at the cost of:

Policy ambiguity

Strategic silence

Potential future concessions

For a country aspiring to be a pole in a multipolar world, this episode signals vulnerability rather than confidence. Trade conducted under threat ceases to be trade; it becomes compliance.

Footnotes

1. WTO, World Tariff Profiles, latest edition. ↩

2. WTO, Tariff Analysis Online, India profile. ↩

3. Reuters, “U.S. raises tariffs on Indian goods over Russian oil purchases,” 2025. ↩

4. Reuters, “India protests U.S. tariff penalties linked to Russia trade,” 2025. ↩

5. Financial Times, “EU and India conclude landmark free trade agreement,” January 2026. ↩

6. Reuters, “Trump says U.S. agreed trade deal with India,” 2 February 2026. ↩

7. Reuters, statements by US Secretary of Agriculture, February 2026. ↩ ↩²

8. Reuters, “India says farm sector protected in U.S. trade deal,” February 2026.

9. Union Budget of India 2026–27, Budget Documents, Ministry of Finance. ↩