Friday, November 21, 2025

A Republic at Crossroads: How India’s Electoral Mandate Risks Being Robed in Bias and Collusion

 

-Ramphal Kataria

“SIR, Suspicion and the Shape of a Mandate”

A Critical, Factual Analysis of the Bihar SIR and the 2025 Election

                        Executive Summary

The Election Commission of India (ECI) conducted a Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of the Bihar electoral rolls with reference to 1 July 2025, removing nearly 65 lakh electors from the draft rolls. The scale, timing, and opacity of the deletions triggered a political firestorm led by Rahul Gandhi and the INDIA alliance, which branded the exercise “Vote Chori.” The Supreme Court intervened, directing the ECI to disclose the omitted names and permitting Aadhaar as valid proof for re-enrolment.

The controversy collided with an election outcome that defied intuitive electoral logic: the RJD secured the highest vote share (≈23.45%) and largest raw vote tally, yet won only 25 seats, while NDA parties converted lower vote shares into a commanding 202/243-seat majority.

This blog examines the procedural, political, and statistical dimensions of the SIR; questions the institutional neutrality of the ECI; evaluates claims of bias, inducements, and alleged ferrying of outside voters; and argues for a rigorous, transparent, court-supervised audit as the only path to legitimacy.

A Brief History of India’s Election Process and the Election Commission

India’s electoral machinery was born with the Constitution, but its architecture evolved through decades:

1950–1951: Passage of the Representation of the People Acts created legal scaffolding for electoral rolls, constituencies, and candidate rules.

Election Commission of India (ECI) established as a single-member body in 1950; expanded to a multi-member commission in 1993.

Universal adult franchise introduced from the very first general election (1951–52)—an unprecedented experiment in a newly independent, largely illiterate nation.

1970s–1990s: Reforms followed major political upheavals, including debates on ECI independence after the Emergency.

2000s: Technological transition to EPIC cards, digital rolls, and later EVM-VVPAT systems.

2010s–2020s: Concerns over ECI’s neutrality increased, especially regarding MCC enforcement, electoral bonds, and roll revisions.

The ECI historically enjoyed public confidence as a non-partisan institution. The Bihar SIR crisis tests that legacy in ways not seen since the post-Emergency years.

1. What Was Done: The SIR Timeline and the Mechanics

The ECI launched a Special Intensive Revision of the Bihar rolls with reference to 1 July 2025 under the amended Section 14 of the Representation of the People Act (allowing four qualifying dates annually).

Key Timelines

Stage

Date / Action

Reference Date

01.07.2025

Draft Roll Publication

1 August 2025

Claims/Objections Window

1–31 August 2025

Final Roll Publication

30 September 2025

Electors Removed (as per ECI)

~65 lakh

The ECI’s stated purpose: remove duplicates, shifted electors, deceased persons, and ghost entries.

Yet the scale and timing—just months before the Assembly election—raised immediate alarm.

2. The Controversy: Allegations, Evidence, and Official Responses

A. Opposition’s Allegations

Rahul Gandhi, the Congress, and the INDIA bloc alleged:

Mass, selective deletions disproportionately affecting

minorities

migrant workers

students

economically weaker groups

Instances where electors with valid EPICs found themselves struck off

Bureaucratic hurdles in filling Form-6 or proving identity

BLOs allegedly “marking absent” without physical verification

“Vote Chori” as the campaign message, amplified through

Voter Adhikar Yatra

press conferences

signature drives

data compilations of deleted voters

The opposition framed SIR as an engineered narrowing of the voter universe to shape the mandate.

B. ECI’s Position

The ECI defended the SIR as:

Legally mandated

A technical cleansing exercise

Conducted with public drafts available to all parties

Accompanied by grievance mechanisms

Yet the Commission offered no granular demographic breakdown of the 65 lakh deletions, fueling suspicion.

C. Supreme Court Intervention

The Supreme Court entered the fray:

Ordered the ECI to publish details of the 65 lakh omitted voters

Allowed Aadhaar as acceptable ID for re-enrolment

Emphasized transparency and accessibility in remedial processes

The Court did not probe motive, but implicitly acknowledged procedural opacity and administrative friction.

3. The Central Question: Did the SIR Tilt the Mandate?

Opposition Narrative

From this perspective:

Mass deletions right before polls were not a neutral bureaucratic coincidence.

The timing ensured many deleted electors could not finish Form-6 before polling.

Aadhaar acceptance was delayed until the Supreme Court intervened.

Deletions clustered in migrant-heavy, minority-heavy localities.

Administrative barriers = practical disenfranchisement.

The effect: skewed voter composition before a close contest.

Administrative Explanation

According to ECI and bureaucracy:

The SIR was legal under the four qualifying dates framework.

Removals targeted objective issues: duplication, death, relocation.

Courts ensured that remedial windows remained accessible.

No public authority has yet proven bias or intent.

The Analytical Middle Ground

The SIR may not have been illegal.
But was it wise, well-timed, or credibility-enhancing?
The answer appears to be no.

And when an exercise of such magnitude is carried out without disaggregated disclosure, it invites the inference of manipulation.

4. The Vote–Seat Paradox: Data and Distribution

Party-wise Performance (Official Figures)

Party

Votes

Vote Share (%)

Seats Won

Seats Contested

RJD

5,523,482

23.45

25

~143

BJP

3,685,510

15.65

89

~101

JD(U)

4,819,163

20.46

85

~101

LJP(RV)

2,614,106

11.10

19

29

INC

1,435,448

6.09

6

(multiple)

Interpretation

RJD received the highest party-wise vote total

Yet NDA parties, with lower vote shares, secured 202 seats

The NDA’s alliance architecture allowed optimal seat distribution

RJD votes were concentrated, not distributed efficiently

This is consistent with FPTP dynamics.
But in a post-SIR environment, it fuels suspicion, because even a 1–2 percent shift in the voter universe per constituency can radically affect outcomes.

5. Beyond Rolls: Doles, Transfers, and Voter Ferrying

Several reports from journalists, opposition leaders, and civil society groups alleged:

A. Welfare Announcements and Last-minute Doles

The ruling coalition was accused of:

Announcing pre-poll transfers

Accelerating welfare scheme payouts

Redirecting funds through expedited approvals

These are hard to classify legally, but fall into the grey zone of state-funded inducements, particularly when timed with the MCC window.

B. Alleged Ferrying of Voters from Other States

Multiple Bihar constituencies witnessed reports of:

Special trains

Bus movements

People ferried from bordering states shortly before polling

Mismatches between local voter expectations and turnout surges

These reports remain unverified formally, but they align with a broader pattern:
political engineering of who gets to vote.

6. Legal Framework: How Critics Ground Their Claims

Key statutory bases:

Representation of the People Act, 1950 (Section 14)

Amended in 2021 to allow four qualifying dates

Basis for the Bihar SIR

Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Section 123)

Defines corrupt practices, including:

Bribery

Undue influence

Use of official machinery

Inducements to voters

Model Code of Conduct (MCC)

Forbids:

Ad-hoc financial doles

Use of government machinery for electoral advantage

Movement of outsiders into poll-bound constituencies

Enforcement is always the question.

7. What Is Needed to Settle the Matter Definitively

To move from political suspicion to factual proof, the following are essential:

A. Public Release of Deleted Names

The Supreme Court ordered this.
ECI must disclose:

Name

Part number

Serial number

Grounds for deletion

B. Demographic Cross-Tabulation

Analyze deleted electors by:

Religion

Caste

Age

Gender

Migrant status

Urban/rural cluster

Polling booth

C. Audit of SIR Software Logic

Including:

Duplicate detection algorithm

Form-7 processes

BLO verification logs

D. Court-Supervised Roll Audit

Similar to post-census validation exercises.

E. Transparent MCC Enforcement Log

Including complaints about:

Cash/dole transfers

Voter ferrying

Illicit inducements

8. Conclusion: What the SIR Episode Reveals About India’s Electoral Architecture

The Bihar SIR saga illustrates a deeper malaise:

Electoral roll revisions are no longer seen as neutral administrative routines

Large-scale deletions, when conducted close to polling, corrode public trust

The ECI’s credibility rests not merely on legality, but on perceived impartiality

The Supreme Court’s push for disclosure acknowledges the crisis of confidence

The vote–seat paradox becomes politically combustible when paired with roll controversies

Allegations of inducements and voter ferrying amplify the sense of a managed mandate

Bihar 2025 is not merely an election.
It is a referendum on the integrity of India’s democratic infrastructure.

The opacity of the SIR has already done damage.
Only a rigorous, public, disaggregated audit can restore legitimacy.
Until then, suspicion will remain the shadow cast across the mandate.

India stands today at an inflection point. The world’s largest democracy cannot afford to become the world’s most elaborate illusion of democracy. Electoral integrity is not a luxury—it is the foundation of legitimacy. If elections become mere rituals sanctifying predetermined outcomes, public faith will crumble.

What is at stake is not just the next government—but the future of the Republic itself.

Democracy dies not only in darkness, but also in the soft glow of administrative complicity.

As citizens, we must illuminate every corner.

References

1. Press Information Bureau (ECI Press Notes and Roll Revision Bulletins)

2. Election Commission of India — Final Roll Publications, Bihar CEO Data

3. PRS Legislative Research — Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 2021

4. The Times of India — Coverage of SC hearings and SIR controversy

5. The Indian Express — Election analysis and seat/vote share data

6. Hindustan Times — Bihar election reporting

7. The New Indian Express — Reports on “Vote Chori” campaign

8. Amar Ujala — Field reports on SIR deletions and opposition claims

9. TaxTMI — Supreme Court interim orders on Aadhaar and SIR

10. India Today — Party-wise vote totals and analysis

 

 

Friday, November 14, 2025

Child Nutrition in Haryana at a Crossroads: Empirical Insights and Strategies for Accelerated Improvement

 

-Ramphal Kataria

Abstract

Haryana has adopted a multi-pronged strategy aligned with Poshan Abhiyaan to reduce undernutrition, especially among girl children. This paper uses NFHS-4 (2015–16) and  (2019–21) survey data, Agriculture Census evidence, and recent State Budget and programme information to:

1. describe the current nutritional situation in Haryana;

2. diagnose structural and behavioural causes (including declining livestock ownership, shrinking landholdings and dietary transition);

3. assess the capacity of the Women & Child Development (WCD) Department to respond through Anganwadi networks, supplementary nutrition and fortification; and

4. propose an integrated, budgeted, cross-departmental action plan with clear monitoring and evaluation metrics.

1. Introduction

Malnutrition in early childhood reduces human capital, impairs cognition, and increases morbidity and mortality. While Haryana has recorded measurable improvements between NFHS-4 and NFHS-5, pockets of vulnerability persist—particularly among Scheduled Castes, landless families, and economically weaker groups.

Despite Haryana’s agricultural wealth and historically milk-rich diets, structural changes in agriculture, livestock patterns, and market behaviour have reduced nutrient-dense food access among vulnerable households. This paper provides an evidence-based assessment and proposes a multidimensional strategy tailored to Haryana’s emerging needs.

2. Data Sources and Methods

2.1 Data Sources

NFHS-4 (2015–16) and NFHS-5 (2019–21) state fact sheets

Agriculture Census 2015–16 and state agricultural datasets

WCD Departmental Data related to SNP, AWC functioning, and Poshan Tracker

Haryana Budget (2024–25) — Demand for Grants of WCD Department

Relevant research literature on diet change, livestock economics and fodder availability

2.2 Methods

Descriptive trend analysis comparing NFHS-4 and NFHS-5

Causal inference based on literature and socioeconomic patterns

Gap analysis of programme design and resource allocation

Indicative cost modelling for supplementation and fortification interventions

3. Nutritional Status: Trends from NFHS-4 to NFHS-5

Below are core NFHS indicators inserted in table format.

Table 1: Prevalence of Underweight (0–5 years)

Indicator

NFHS-4 (2015–16)

NFHS-5 (2019–21)

Change

Underweight children

29.4%

21.5%

–7.9 percentage points

 

Table 2: Prevalence of Stunting (0–5 years)

Indicator

NFHS-4 (2015–16)

NFHS-5 (2019–21)

Change

Stunted children

34.0%

30.0%

–4.0 percentage points

 

Table 3: Prevalence of Wasting (0–5 years)

Indicator

NFHS-4 (2015–16)

NFHS-5 (2019–21)

Change

Wasted children

21.2%

17.3%

–3.9 percentage points

 

Table 4: Prevalence of Severe Wasting (0–5 years)

Indicator

NFHS-4 (2015–16)

NFHS-5 (2019–21)

Change

Severe wasting

7.0%

6.4%

–0.6 percentage point

 

Table 5: Anaemia Prevalence in Children (6–59 months)

Indicator

NFHS-4 (2015–16)

NFHS-5 (2019–21)

Change

Anaemia (6–59 months)

71.7%

73.2%

+1.5 percentage points

 

3.1 Key Observations

Haryana shows significant improvement in underweight, stunting, wasting and severe wasting.

Anaemia has worsened, indicating micronutrient deficiency remains unaddressed.

The improvement is uneven across districts, with SC, landless and low-income households showing higher vulnerability.

Poshan Tracker quarterly snapshots (2022–2025) show incremental improvement in growth monitoring quality and SNP coverage but highlight district-level data inconsistencies.

4. Structural Causes and Pathways

4.1 Dietary Transition & Declining Household Milk Availability

Traditionally, Haryana’s nutrition relied heavily on home-produced milk. However:

Shrinking landholdings

High fodder prices

Decline in common grazing lands

Reduced household livestock ownership

have collectively reduced daily milk availability among poorer households, especially girls.

4.2 Shrinking Operational Landholdings

Agriculture Census shows:

Average holding size has decreased, reducing crop residues and by-product fodder.

Marginal farmers face difficulty maintaining even 1–2 milch animals.

4.3 Market & Agronomic Transformation

Shift toward herbicide-driven, high-intensity cropping reduces fodder grasses.

Commercial crops (cotton, vegetables) produce less fodder than traditional cereals.

4.4 Poverty, Inequity & Social Norms

Lower-income households prioritise low-cost, filling foods over nutrient-dense ones.

Intra-household gender disparities negatively affect girl children’s diet.

4.5 Programme Gaps

Inconsistent SNP quality across AWCs

Occasional stock-outs and storage issues

Limited micronutrient testing (Vitamin D, Hb)

Incomplete supervision at circle/block level

5. Role of WCD & Anganwadi Network — Opportunities and Limits

Strengths

26,000+ Anganwadi Centres providing universal access

Existing SNP structure (hot-cooked meals + THR)

Poshan Tracker for near-real-time monitoring

Established platform for growth monitoring, BCC and maternal counselling

Limitations

Variability in capacity of Anganwadi Workers

Budget constraints for protein-rich supplementation

Limited infrastructure for cold storage

Inconsistent quality assurance mechanisms for fortified ingredients

6. Budget and Resource Assessment

The Haryana WCD Department's 2024–25 allocation broadly covers:

Supplementary nutrition

AWCs

Crèche support

Maternity and girl-child schemes

Capacity building

6.1 Preliminary Gap Assessment

Intervention

Cost Implication

Feasibility

Hb Test Kits (monthly screening)

Moderate recurring

High feasibility

Protein Milk Bars / 200 ml Milk

High recurring

Feasible in pilot districts

Fortified Flour Procurement

Low incremental

Statewide scalable

Fodder Banks

Capital-heavy

Convergence model needed

AWW Incentive System

Moderate recurring

Highly impactful

Existing budgets may support pilot interventions, but statewide scale-up requires convergence with Health, Agriculture, Rural Development and Finance Departments.

7. Cross-Departmental Cooperation Needed

Department

Key Roles

Health

Micronutrient testing, SAM/MAM management, deworming, facility referrals

Agriculture & Animal Husbandry

Fodder banks, dairy cooperatives, forage seed distribution

Education

PM Poshan coordination for continuity

Rural Development / PRIs

Land for community nutrition gardens, SHG mobilisation

Finance

Budget restructuring, outcome-based budgeting

 

8. Programmatic Recommendations (Operational + M&E)

1. Universal micronutrient screening (Hb + Vitamin D) for children and women.

2. SNP recipe optimisation:

Weekly millet menu

Twice-weekly protein milk bars / 200 ml milk

3. Mandatory fortification of flour supplied to AWCs; district testing labs.

4. Dairy revival pilot in high-burden blocks:

Fodder banks

Women’s dairy SHGs

5. District Convergence Cells for monthly joint review using Poshan Tracker dashboards.

6. Capacity building for AWWs, including performance-linked incentives.

7. Strong Monitoring & Evaluation with:

Stepped-wedge trials for protein supplementation

Independent evaluations

Monthly public dashboards

9. Indicative Budgeting

Example: Per Child Costing

Item

Unit Cost

Monthly Cost per Child

Hb Test Strip

₹12

₹12

Protein Milk Bar (2/week)

₹8 x 8

₹64

Fortified Flour Increment

₹0.5/kg

₹8

AWW performance incentive

₹20

Staged Rollout Model

Pilot phase: 3 high-burden districts, 6 months

Evaluation: Effect on wasting, anaemia

Scale-up: Statewide in 2–3 phases based on evidence and budget

10. Conclusion

Haryana has achieved measurable gains in child nutrition, but these remain fragile. A multidimensional strategy — combining short-term supplementation (protein bars, fortified ingredients, micronutrient screening) with medium-term structural changes (fodder support, dairy cooperatives, kitchen gardens, agrarian convergence) — is essential.

A phased, evidence-driven rollout with rigorous M&E and convergence between WCD, Health, Agriculture and Finance Departments will yield the highest return on investment in child and maternal nutrition.

References

1. Government of India. (2017). National Family Health Survey (NFHS-4), 2015–16: Haryana Fact Sheet.

2. Government of India. (2021). National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5), 2019–21: Haryana Fact Sheet.

3. Government of India. (2019). Agriculture Census 2015–16: Operational Holdings Report.

4. Government of Haryana. (2024). Demand for Grants 2024–25: Women & Child Development Department.

5. Ministry of Women & Child Development. (2022). Poshan Abhiyaan Guidelines.

6. International Institute for Population Sciences. (2022). NFHS-5 National Report.

7. Deolalikar, A. (2005). Poverty and child malnutrition in India. Asian Development Review.

8. Gulati, A., et al. (2024). Revitalising India’s Dairy Sector. ICRIER.

9. Kumar, P., & Singh, R. (2018). Fodder scarcity and livestock productivity. Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics.

10. UNICEF India. (2023). Improving Child Nutrition through Community-Based Approaches.

 

 

 

Annex 1: Detailed NFHS-4 & NFHS-5 Comparative Tables

A. Anthropometric Indicators (0–5 years)

Indicator

NFHS-4

NFHS-5

Change

Stunted

34.0%

30.0%

–4.0%

Severely Stunted

14.1%

11.2%

–2.9%

Wasted

21.2%

17.3%

–3.9%

Severely Wasted

7.0%

6.4%

–0.6%

Underweight

29.4%

21.5%

–7.9%

B. Anaemia (6–59 months)

Indicator

NFHS-4

NFHS-5

Change

Anaemic children

71.7%

73.2%

+1.5%

 

Annex 2: Indicative Budget Template

Budget Head

Unit Cost

Total Estimated Cost (Pilot 3 Districts)

Hb Testing

₹12/test

₹1.5 crore

Protein Milk Bars

₹64/child/month

₹8 crore

Fortified Flour

Minimal

₹0.5 crore

Training & Incentives

₹1 crore

M&E

₹0.8 crore

 

Annex 3: Monitoring Indicators

% children screened for Hb

% AWCs providing fortified flour

% children receiving protein supplementation

% AWCs achieving >90% growth monitoring quality

Reduction in wasting and anaemia in pilot districts