-Ramphal Kataria
Federalism Failed, the Centre Captured: Ambedkar’s Nightmare in Contemporary India
Abstract
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s Federation versus Freedom represents one of the most sophisticated critiques of federalism in a socially stratified society. Contrary to romanticized notions of decentralization, Ambedkar warned that in a deeply hierarchical and caste-ridden social order like India, federal autonomy could empower local elites, reinforce feudal and caste domination, and undermine the freedom of marginalized communities. Consequently, he argued for a strong Union capable of enforcing constitutional morality, social justice, and individual rights. Simultaneously, Ambedkar remained acutely aware of the dangers of excessive centralization, cautioning that a powerful Centre, if captured by majoritarian or authoritarian forces, could itself become a threat to liberty. This paper critically analyzes Ambedkar’s federal philosophy in light of India’s constitutional experience after Independence, with particular focus on the last decade. It argues that the contemporary Indian state reflects the tragic realization of Ambedkar’s dual fear: the erosion of federal balance on one hand, and the consolidation of a majoritarian, centralized, and coercive Union on the other. The paper demonstrates how institutions once envisaged as safeguards—Parliament, central agencies, media, and even the higher judiciary—have increasingly functioned to normalize majoritarian dominance, curtail dissent, and weaken constitutional protections for minorities, Dalits, and political opposition.
I. Ambedkar’s Philosophy of Federation: Freedom Before Federalism
Ambedkar’s intervention in the debate on federalism was fundamentally shaped by India’s social reality, not by abstract constitutional theory. Unlike the American or Swiss federations—formed by relatively homogeneous units coming together voluntarily—India was, in Ambedkar’s words, a society “graded in inequality,” fractured by caste, religion, language, and region.
For Ambedkar, federalism was not inherently democratic. In a hierarchical society, decentralization risked transferring power from colonial rulers to upper-caste, landed, and dominant local elites, thereby reproducing oppression at the provincial and village levels. His apprehension was clear:
“Political power in the hands of the village is likely to become a weapon of tyranny.”
Thus, Ambedkar prioritized individual freedom and social justice over provincial autonomy. The Constitution’s design—strong Union, residuary powers with the Centre, emergency provisions, All-India Services, and a powerful judiciary—reflected this belief. The Indian Union was deliberately made indestructible, with no right to secession, because Ambedkar feared that weak central authority would spell disaster for minorities and Dalits.
II. The Core Contradiction: Central Power as Protector and Predator
Ambedkar’s thought contains a profound dialectical tension. While he trusted the Centre more than the provinces to protect the oppressed, he also warned that central authority itself could become tyrannical if monopolized by a dominant majority.
This contradiction is not accidental but rooted in Ambedkar’s realism. He recognized that constitutional safeguards are only as strong as the political morality of those who wield power. Hence, his insistence on:
constitutional morality over popular morality, and
checks on executive dominance.
Ambedkar did not advocate blind centralization; he advocated a constitutional Union constrained by law.
III. From Constitutional Union to Majoritarian Centre: The Last Decade
The last decade in India demonstrates how Ambedkar’s fears regarding the Centre itself becoming an instrument of domination are being realized.
1. Majoritarianism and the Targeting of Minorities
India’s constitutional promise of fraternity has been increasingly replaced by a civilizational-nationalist narrative, identifying the nation with a singular religious identity.
Muslims have been subjected to lynchings in the name of cow protection, discriminatory citizenship regimes (CAA-NRC discourse), bulldozer demolitions following communal violence, and selective policing.
Christians face intensified attacks on places of worship, criminalization through anti-conversion laws, and social intimidation.
North-Eastern communities continue to experience racialized violence and cultural marginalization.
Dalits face rising atrocities, dilution of labor protections, and criminalization of protest movements.
These developments confirm Ambedkar’s warning that political democracy without social democracy degenerates into tyranny of the majority.
IV. Criminalization of Dissent and Collapse of Free Speech
Ambedkar viewed free speech as the lifeblood of democracy. Today, dissent is increasingly equated with sedition or conspiracy.
Academics, students, journalists, and activists have been charged under UAPA and sedition laws, often without timely trials.
Cases such as Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam illustrate the erosion of the presumption of innocence. The denial of bail despite prolonged incarceration reflects a punitive, not judicial, logic.
Journalists and media platforms critical of the government face raids, arrests, and economic strangulation.
This mirrors Ambedkar’s fear that constitutional rights could be rendered hollow through procedural coercion.
V. Central Agencies as Instruments of Political Control
Institutions designed as autonomous—CBI, ED, Income Tax Department—have increasingly functioned as tools of political intimidation.
Opposition leaders face disproportionate investigations.
Defections are frequently preceded by agency pressure.
The Election Commission, once a pillar of credibility, is now widely perceived as partisan, particularly in its handling of electoral violations and scheduling.
Ambedkar’s insistence on institutional independence was precisely to prevent this fusion of executive power with coercive machinery.
VI. Judiciary: From Constitutional Sentinel to Strategic Silence
Ambedkar placed extraordinary faith in the judiciary as the final arbiter of constitutional morality. However, the last decade reveals a troubling pattern:
Landmark cases of immense political consequence—Ram Janmabhoomi–Babri Masjid, abrogation of Article 370, Electoral Bonds—have largely validated executive actions.
Delays in hearing habeas corpus petitions and civil liberties cases contrast sharply with urgency shown in matters aligned with state priorities.
Judicial appointments and post-retirement sinecures have raised serious questions about institutional independence.
The judiciary’s reluctance to confront executive excess has weakened Ambedkar’s envisioned balance of power.
VII. Economic Concentration and Democratic Hollowing
Ambedkar understood that political equality without economic equality is a sham. The contemporary Indian economy exhibits:
Extreme concentration of wealth among a few corporate groups,
State-facilitated privatization of public assets,
Electoral Bonds enabling opaque corporate funding, overwhelmingly favoring the ruling party.
With over ₹10,000 crore flowing disproportionately to the ruling party, the notion of a level democratic playing field stands fundamentally compromised.
VIII. Federalism Undermined: States as Administrative Subordinates
Ironically, while Ambedkar feared excessive state autonomy, contemporary India has witnessed the hollowing out of states themselves:
Centralization of fiscal powers through GST,
Use of Governors as political instruments,
Imposition of centrally driven laws overriding state consent.
This is not cooperative federalism but executive federalism, where states are reduced to implementing arms of the Centre.
IX. Conclusion: Ambedkar’s Tragic Vindication
Ambedkar’s Federation versus Freedom was not merely a constitutional argument; it was a moral warning. The Indian experiment today reflects the worst realization of his dual anxieties:
Federalism has not empowered the oppressed;
The Centre, instead of acting as their protector, has increasingly functioned as an instrument of majoritarian domination.
Ambedkar’s choice of a Union of States, distinct from classical federations, was an attempt to navigate India’s social realities. Yet, without constitutional morality, even this carefully calibrated structure cannot prevent democratic decay.
The last decade demonstrates that the greatest threat to Indian democracy today is not federalism or centralism per se, but the capture of the state by a homogenizing, majoritarian ideology—precisely the outcome Ambedkar feared.
References
1. Ambedkar, B.R. Federation versus Freedom.
2. Ambedkar, B.R. Pakistan or the Partition of India.
3. Constituent Assembly Debates (1946–49).
4. Austin, Granville. The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation.
5. Baxi, Upendra. The Crisis of the Indian Legal System.
6. Reports by PUCL, Amnesty International India, and Human Rights Watch.
7. Supreme Court judgments on Article 370, Ram Janmabhoomi, Electoral Bonds.
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