Union Home Minister Amit Shah’s recent remarks targeting Justice B. Sudershan Reddy, co-author of the 2011 Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh [(2011) 7 SCC 547] — popularly known as the Salwa Judum judgment — represent not merely political rhetoric but a direct and troubling assault on the independence of the judiciary. By accusing Justice Reddy of “supporting Naxalism” and undermining tribal self-defence, the Home Minister has deliberately distorted a landmark constitutional verdict that reaffirmed the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
This is not an academic disagreement. It is a calculated political maneuver designed to intimidate the judiciary, delegitimize a political rival, and normalize the vilification of judges whose rulings do not align with the government’s agenda.
1. The Salwa Judum Judgment: Rule of Law Over Vigilantism
In Nandini Sundar (2011), the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the State of Chhattisgarh’s policy of arming tribal youth as Special Police Officers (SPOs) to fight Maoists. The Court reasoned that the policy violated Article 14 (right to equality) and Article 21 (right to life) because the state cannot outsource its sovereign function of maintaining law and order to untrained, ill-equipped private militias.
Justice Reddy’s bench observed:
“The State, in a democratic republic governed by the rule of law, cannot arm a section of the population and allow them to unleash violence against another section of its own population.”
This was not a partisan statement but a constitutional reaffirmation. To recast this as “support for Naxalism” is a deliberate misrepresentation of judicial reasoning.
2. The Timing and Political Calculus
The BJP has governed nationally since 2014. Choosing to vilify the author of a 2011 judgment only once he is the Opposition’s Vice-Presidential candidate signals instrumentalization of old cases to delegitimize a rival and warn sitting judges that rulings disfavored by the executive invite later public pillorying. That is textbook intimidation in a separation-of-powers system.
It is not about the correctness of a legal ruling; it is about delegitimizing a political rival and sending a broader warning: any judge who rules against the executive may face vilification if they later enter public life.
3. Selective Celebration and Condemnation of Judgments
The government’s record shows a troubling pattern: judgments that favor the political narrative are celebrated, while those that challenge the state are attacked.
Right to Privacy (2017) — K.S. Puttaswamy (9-J): foundational protection for citizens in the digital state.
Aadhaar (2018) — Puttaswamy (Aadhaar) (4-1): upheld the framework but struck key parts (like mandatory linkage for phones/bank accounts), balancing deference and limits.
UAPA bail threshold (2019) — NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali: The Court’s interpretation of the “prima facie true” test made bail exceptionally difficult, affecting civil liberties in national-security cases; later benches have tried to cabin its sweep, but Watali remains the touchstone often invoked to keep accused incarcerated.
Ayodhya Verdict (2019) – M. Siddiq (D) Thr. Lrs v. Mahant Suresh Das [(2020) 1 SCC 1]:
The unanimous judgment granted the disputed land to a trust for temple construction, despite acknowledging the illegal demolition of the Babri Masjid. Many legal scholars noted the judgment prioritized “faith and public order” over strict constitutional principles. The government embraced it wholeheartedly as a civilizational victory.
Internet shutdowns (2020) — Anuradha Bhasin: affirmed proportionality and periodic review for shutdown orders.
Central Vista (2021) — Rajeev Suri v. DDA: The Court green-lit the flagship redevelopment around Parliament and executive offices, deferring to project decisions.
PMLA/ED powers (2022) — Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India: The Court broadly upheld arrest, search, attachment, twin-conditions for bail, and ED procedures—vastly strengthening executive investigation. (A partial review is now pending/ongoing in related matters, which itself underscores controversy.)
Demonetisation (2023) — Vivek Narayan Sharma v. Union of India: A 4:1 majority upheld the 2016 note ban under §26(2) RBI Act, deferring heavily to executive judgment on a measure that dramatically re-ordered the economy. The lone dissent faulted process and legality. The ruling was celebrated by the government as validation.
Abrogation of Article 370 (2023) – In Re: Article 370 Abrogation [(2023) 15 SCC 1]:
The Court upheld the abrogation despite strong arguments that the consent of the J&K Constituent Assembly (no longer in existence) was constitutionally required. By treating Article 370 as “temporary,” the Court effectively endorsed executive unilateralism. Critics, including constitutional scholars, argued the judgment sidestepped key federal questions. The government hailed it as vindication.
Same-sex marriage (2023) — Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty v. Union of India: The Court declined marriage equality and left recognition to Parliament, an outcome congruent with the Union’s stance.
Electoral Bonds (2024) – Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (2024 SCC OnLine SC 163):
A five-judge bench struck down the Electoral Bond Scheme as unconstitutional, holding that it violated citizens’ right to information under Article 19(1)(a). The data revealed the BJP as the largest beneficiary of opaque corporate funding. Yet, the government had earlier defended this scheme aggressively and delayed hearings for years, showing its discomfort with transparency.
Creamy Layer for SC/STs (2024) – State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh (2024 SCC OnLine SC 1):
A seven-judge bench (6:1 majority) permitted sub-classification within SC/ST reservations, overruling E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of A.P. (2004). Although the Union Cabinet has assured that “creamy layer” will not apply to SC/STs, Justice Gavai’s opinion gave fresh legitimacy to the idea. Critics warn this could dilute affirmative action. The government welcomed the judgment as a tool for “social justice.”
This is the pattern: judgments that consolidate executive discretion (PMLA, Watali, Central Vista, Demonetisation) are hailed as institutional wisdom; judgments that scrutinize or constrain it (Salwa Judum, Electoral Bonds) are mischaracterized or attacked.
4. Threat to Separation of Powers
By personally targeting Justice Reddy, the Home Minister undermines the doctrine of separation of powers — a bedrock of India’s constitutional democracy. The judiciary’s authority rests on its independence from political intimidation. If judges fear vilification for rulings that displease the executive, their ability to hold the government accountable is fatally compromised.
Former judges and senior lawyers who condemned Shah’s remarks rightly warned of a “chilling effect.” Judicial courage — the willingness to check executive overreach — is indispensable in times of majoritarian politics.
5. A Dangerous Precedent: The broader democratic risk
This is not the first time the ruling dispensation has pressured the judiciary:
Delays in judicial appointments through the Collegium vs. NJAC controversy.
Attacks on judges perceived as “activist,” such as Justice Chelameswar or Justice Gogoi before his controversial post-retirement nomination to Rajya Sabha.
Public campaigns painting dissenting judgments as “anti-national.”
The attack on Justice Reddy takes this trend further: not only questioning a past judgment but weaponizing it for present political battles.
6. What responsible criticism looks like
Robust critique of judgments is healthy: argue doctrine, evidence, and consequences; publish reasoned dissents; seek reviews or references; legislate within constitutional bounds. What crosses the line is imputing disloyalty or sympathy with insurgency to a judge who applied the Constitution to curb unlawful State vigilantism. That is not “debate”; it is delegitimization.
7. Conclusion: Defending the Republic
The Home Minister’s remarks are not simply “unfortunate”; they are an assault on India’s constitutional order. Judicial independence cannot survive in an atmosphere where executive leaders disparage judges for doing their constitutional duty.
A healthy democracy demands respect for the separation of powers. If the judiciary is reduced to a handmaiden of political power, the very idea of constitutionalism collapses. Justice Reddy’s 2011 opinion did not “aid Naxalism.” It defended the Constitution against State-armed vigilantism. The Home Minister’s attack is therefore not just “unfortunate”; it’s an assault on judicial independence that chills constitutional adjudication. Political leaders, the Bar, and civil society should defend the line between criticizing a judgment and vilifying a judge. The former sustains constitutionalism; the latter corrodes it.
It is imperative for civil society, the Bar, the Bench, and political actors across the spectrum to resist this corrosive trend. Criticism of judgments is legitimate in a democracy, but vilification of judges for partisan gain is not.
If left unchecked, this path leads not to a vibrant democracy but to a majoritarian state where the Constitution is subordinated to political expediency. That is a future India cannot afford.
References
1. Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 7 SCC 547.
2. M. Siddiq (D) Thr. Lrs v. Mahant Suresh Das, (2020) 1 SCC 1 (Ayodhya Verdict).
3. In Re: Article 370 Abrogation, (2023) 15 SCC 1.
4. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 163 (Electoral Bonds).
5. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1 (Creamy Layer for SC/STs).
6. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1 (Decriminalization of Section 377).
7. Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1 (Sabarimala Case).
8. Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, (2020) 5 SCC 481 (RTI & Judiciary).
9. Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2023) 4 SCC 1 (Free Speech & State Liability).
10. Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637 (Internet Shutdowns in J&K).
11. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (Right to Privacy).
12. Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1 (Triple Talaq).
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